NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES

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No. 10 12 JULY 1974

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Governmental Affairs

PRESS RELEASE OF 12 June 1974

In connection with the publication of a book entitled The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency makes the following statement:

The Central Intelligence Agency received a manuscript entitled The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence from its co-authors, Victor Marchetti and John Marks, pursuant to the provisions of a permanent injunction ordered by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, enforcing the Secrecy Agreement made by Mr. Victor Marchetti in connection with his employment by CIA and consequent access to sensitive intelligence matters.

In accordance with that injunction, the Central Intelligence Agency identified for deletion those portions of the manuscript which were classified, were learned during Mr. Marchetti's employment with the Central Intelligence Agency, and had not been placed in the public domain by the U.S. Government. The CIA made a subsequent decision not to contest the publication of certain of these portions, in order to place full emphasis on the sensitive items remaining. The CIA also indicated its willingness not to contest certain portions if they could be rephrased to omit certain names or other specific references to classified material, but this offer was not accepted.

The Central Intelligence Agency did not correct or contest the publication of factual errors in the manuscript. The Agency's decision not to contest the major portions of the manuscript does not constitute an endorsement of the book or agreement with its conclusions.

A publisher's note at the beginning of the book states, "Bold face type is used to indicate passages first deleted and later reinstated." Certain passages in bold face type were not identified for deletion by the Central Intelligence Agency to the authors.

The Central Intelligence Agency has reviewed manuscripts of books of a number of former employees who had signed secrecy agreements as a condition of employment at the Agency. In all cases, the Agency's role has been solely to identify classified information learned by the ex-employee during his employment. In no case has the Agency attempted to suggest editorial changes of the author's opinions or conclusions. The Agency has not attempted to suggest changes in material that was not true.

Legislative Note

During the first week of June the Senate debated several amendments to the Defense Procurement Authorization bill (S.3000) that are of concern to the Intelligence Community.

An amendment offered by Senator Proxmire would have required the Director of Central Intelligence to submit an unclassified report each year to the Congress disclosing the total national intelligence program budget. The amendment was defeated by a vote of 55 to 33.

--Opposing this amendment were a number of senators, including the Chairmen of the Community's Oversight Committees in the Senate. Their opposition was based on the belief that such a disclosure would only stimulate requests for additional detail on the foreign intelligence effort. They also argued that disclosing the total budget figure over the years would reveal trends in intelligence spending that would prove helpful to our adversaries.

--The Senators emphasized that the four Congressional Committees responsible for oversight of the Intelligence Community are fully conversant with the details and programs of the foreign intelligence budget and that they inquire deeply into these matters. They assured the Senate that they would provide information on the total figures, on a classified basis, to any Senator who wished to know.

Other amendments to the bill, affecting the CIA section of the National Security Act of 1947, and supported by the Director of Central Intelligence, were passed by the Senate. The changes are as follows:

--Emphasize that CIA is concerned only with foreign intelligence by inserting the word "foreign" as a modifier throughout the section of the law setting forth the Agency's responsibilities.

--Require that functions and duties related to foreign intelligence performed by CIA at the direction of the National Security Council shall be reported to the Congress. This provision establishes in statute a procedure followed for a number of years with the Agency's four oversight committees.

--Clarify the current statutory prohibition concerning law enforcement, police, or internal security matters by providing that CIA shall not carry out on its own or assist other agencies of Government in carrying out law enforcement or police-type operations. The amendment specifically authorizes the Agency to protect its installations, conduct investigations of those granted access to sensitive Agency information, and provide information resulting from foreign intelligence activities to other appropriate departments and agencies.

The Senate passed the Defense Procurement Authorization bill on June 11 by a vote of 84 to 6. The bill will now go to conference with the House and will require final passage by both houses before being sent to the President for signature.

EDITOR & PUBLISHER
29 June 1974

CIA seeks power to stop 'leaks'

The *Washington Post* reported this week that legislation that would significantly broaden the government's power to bring criminal sanctions against employees for disclosure of intelligence secrets is being circulated with the Nixon administration.

The Post said the measure, proposed by Central Intelligence Agency director William E. Colby, could also empower him to seek injunctions against news media to prevent them from publishing material he considers harmful to the protection of intelligence sources and methods.

Under Colby's proposed amendment to the National Security Act of 1947, the CIA, director would be empowered to determine the ground rules for classification under a general grant of responsibility for protecting "intelligence sources and methods."

The Colby proposal would exempt news media from the criminal provisions of the law. But the draft language could, according to informed officials, enable the CIA director to trigger injunctive action by the Attorney General against "any person"—presumably including journalists—before or after an act of disclosure.

Leaks of confidential information and supposedly secret documents from "informed sources" have become the stock in trade of investigative reporters delving into the complexities of Watergate. Widespread use of leaks in news stories and by the electronic media has begun to irritate some legislative and administrative officials and especially the White House.

Target of the most outspoken criticism is the House Judiciary Committee which is considering charges of impeachment of President Nixon.

Gerald L. Warren, deputy White House press secretary, said Thursday at his news conference that Chairman Peter L. Rodino and other members of the House committee, should take some action to stop leaks of "prejudicial and one-sided information" emanating from unidentified sources reportedly familiar with all phases of the impeachment inquiry. "Selective leaking of prejudicial information from the committee," Warren said, "is a violation of due process and creates a deplorable situation."

The situation could be corrected, Warren thought, by throwing open committee meetings to the public.

Warren's criticism followed earlier assertions by Ken W. Clawson, White House Communications Director, and Patrick J. Buchanan, a presidential assistant, that leaks from the Judiciary Committee and other congressional sources constituted a "systematic campaign to tear down the reputation of the President and his associates."

The sharpest attack on disclosure of confidential information by the media was made by Senator Barry Goldwater, Arizona Republican. In a Senate speech he suggested that the Attorney General might find grounds "to institute criminal prosecutions against the *Washington Post*."

The Arizona Senator placed in the Record a 38-page legal memo he said was prepared by J. Terry Emerson, his staff legal counsel. The memo listed these special provisions of the U.S. code as the basis for prosecution:

"Communicating documents relating to the national defense; retaining national defense documents (presumably the Pentagon papers and others): conversion of property of the United States; conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States; conspiracy to impair, obstruct or defeat the lawful functions of the United States and the Secretary of State."

"The possible criminality of the Post's activities lies not only in its disclosure and retention of top-secret documents," Senator Goldwater said, "but also in the use to which these documents were put, which was to challenge the credibility of the Secretary of State at a time when the country is engaged in negotiations of a monumental nature."

Last week, Senator Goldwater charged the Post with "treason" in printing secret FBI documents. He withdrew the charge after his legal advisors told him that the "act I am complaining about would not come under this (treason) term."

Some syndicated columnists, among them Richard Wilson of the *Des Moines Register Tribune*, have commented that Watergate, and by inference the prosecutors and investigators, have gone too far and it is time now to close the books and either drop the impeachment proceedings or get them over with. Senator Mansfield said he was "disturbed and in a sense depressed by the delay" in the impeachment proceedings, and by the leaks.

NEWSWEEK
1 JULY 1974

Dangerous Deletions

THE CIA AND THE CULT OF INTELLIGENCE. *By Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks. 398 pages. Knopf. $8.95.*

The legal hassle began before the book was ever written. On the basis of an outline submitted to New York publishers in the spring of 1972, the Central Intelligence Agency obtained a blanket injunction prohibiting Victor Marchetti from "disclosing in any manner ... any intelligence information" on the ground that his proposed book would "result in grave and irreparable injury to the interests of the United States."

When Marchetti, a CIA officer for fourteen years before his resignation in 1969, and co-author John D. Marks, a former State Department intelligence analyst, presented their completed manuscript, the CIA required 339 national-security cuts, of which 171 were restored before the case came to court. A Federal judge ruled in March that no more than 27 cuts were necessary. But that decision is still being appealed. The book now appears with 168 blanks, varying in length from a few words to whole paragraphs; the 171 restored passages are printed in boldface for ready identification. Two weeks before publication, the CIA went to the trouble of issuing a press release—one of the few in its 27-year history—in a last-ditch effort to discredit the book.

"The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence" was worth the CIA's moves to suppress it. The "irreparable damage" it inflicts is to the agency's image of omnipotence and indispensability. Founded in 1947 as a cold-war extension of the wartime OSS, exempted from the normal Congressional reviewing process, the CIA is here portrayed as having grown "old, fat, and bureaucratic"—a flop at its appointed task of penetrating the secrets of the U.S.S.R. and Communist China. Classical espionage has been rendered obsolete by satellite surveillance, and U.S. intelligence has been unable for fifteen years to break the high-grade cipher systems and codes of its most powerful adversaries; boxcars and warehouses of incomprehensible Soviet and Chinese tapes await a hoped-for breakthrough.

Fresh: Balked in its intelligence function, the CIA began during the 1950s to deploy its Clandestine Services branch in paramilitary adventures in the Third World, where easier results could be achieved and the agency's existence justified. Marchetti and Marks provide fresh details on such interventions as the sponsoring of the uprising against Indonesia's Sukarno, the floating of balloons full of propaganda leaflets over China during the cultural revolution, the building of a miniature Fort Bragg in the Peruvian jungle in the mid-'60s. The CIA permitted publication (in boldface, meaning it was censored earlier) of a plan to create a one-man airplane that could theoretically have been carried into China in two large suitcases, assembled when the agent's mission was completed and flown to the nearest friendly border. This wondrous project died on the drawing boards, Marchetti and Marks report; their description of it is followed by two blank half-pages stamped DELETED, depriving us of who-knows-what scheme too hot (or too foolish) to be revealed.

Marchetti and Marks suggest that secrecy for secrecy's sake has become the besetting sin of an agency that has so bewitched legislators that the House has never even had a recorded vote on 150 bills introduced since 1947 to increase Congressional surveillance. "I'll just tell them a few war stories," said Allen Dulles, setting off for an annual budget presentation in the 1950s. Covert action in countries that pose no threat to U.S. security, the book argues, is a liability for this country on practical as well as moral grounds, and the $6 billion yearly cost of American intelligence is largely wasted.

Since Watergate, "national security" has become an odorous slogan. Marchetti and Marks, delayed nearly two years in publishing their book, may have succeeded where earlier CIA exposés have failed—in voicing an idea whose time has come. Even in this mutilated form, their presentation is crisp, finely detailed and devastating.

—WALTER CLEMONS

RAMPARTS
July 1974

Inside the CIA:

The Clandestine Mentality

by Victor Marchetti and John Marks

Ten years ago, the CIA was an organization whose operations seemed awesome in their secrecy and their scope, its agents all the more formidable for their anonymity. When someone like the legendary Col. Edward G. Landsdale did become known, the fact that he slipped romantically between the intrigue-ridden back alleys of Saigon and the palace of the Diems, setting up programs for the South Vietnamese peasants and channeling millions of dollars of CIA money into clandestine operations against the NLF, only made his employer seem more potent and glamorous.

By the late 1960s the Agency's aura had begun to fade. Beginning with RAMPARTS' *1967 revelations that the National Student Association and other supposedly independent domestic institutions were in fact fronts for the CIA, the Agency was dragged more and more into the public view. Its stature diminished with each new* cause célèbre *until, far from being a collection of James Bonds, it seemed more a haven for Keystone Kops, unable to pull off their assignments without stumbling over one another.*

This is not to underestimate the CIA's capacity for terror and destruction. Yet it is evident that much of the Agency's impact has depended on the illusion of prowess it has been able to create. This illusion, plus an obsession with secrecy, have been the pillars on which its reputation was built. And this is why it has gone all out to censor Victor Marchetti, to stop the publication of The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence.

* * *

Marchetti joined the Agency in 1955 after graduating with a degree in Russian history and culture from Penn State. Like others of his generation, he believed the myths of the Cold War, and for 15 years was a willing soldier in its battles. He eventually became one of the leading CIA analysts on Soviet military capacity and aid to the Third World, and worked from 1966 until 1969 in the Office of the Director, Central Intelligence.

Increasingly disillusioned with the CIA's practices and attitudes, Marchetti resigned in 1969. For the next couple of years he moved around Washington, finding others who had dropped out of the intelligence community, listening to their experiences and comparing them to his own. He decided then to write a book that would penetrate the mythology on which the operation of the CIA was based.

Yet before he had written the first sentence of the first chapter, the Agency knew of it. One of its agents in New York had managed to obtain a copy of the book outline Marchetti had submitted to several New York publishers. In April 1972 the CIA filed for an injunction to prohibit him from publishing anything about the Agency; then-Director Richard Helms swore in an affidavit that such a book would "cause grave and irreparable harm to the national defense interest of the United States and will seriously disrupt the conduct of the country's foreign relations." The heart of the Agency's position, however, was filed in an affidavit by the head of Clandestine Services, a document which was itself classified as "secret" and forbidden even to Marchetti's ACLU attorneys until four days before the trial.

Marchetti's legal team, including ACLU head Melvin Wulf, realized that this case had serious implications and assembled a series of expert witnesses including Princeton Professor Richard Falk and former Kissinger aide Morton Halperin. They were prepared to contest government allegations that the book Marchetti had not yet written was a threat to security. Yet when they came to court on May 15, 1972 they found that the issue was to be fought on the narrow ground of contract enforcement—the fact that Marchetti, like all who join the Agency, had signed a piece of paper agreeing never to talk about his work. The court ruled against Marchetti. Six months later the Supreme Court—which had recently decided against censorship in the Pentagon Papers case—refused by a 6-3 vote to consider Marchetti's appeal.

Yet Marchetti went ahead and wrote the book anyway, in collaboration with John Marks, a young foreign service officer who had worked in the State Department from 1966 until he wrote a pessimistic memo at the time of the 1970 Cambodia invasion. It took them nine months to complete the job, the difficulty of their labor compounded by the fact that they were enjoined from seeking editorial help from their publisher, Alfred A. Knopf.

* * *

In August 1973, Marchetti sent a draft of the manuscript to the CIA, which marked it TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE, read it, and agreed that it could be published—after some 339 cuts had been made, or roughly 20 percent of the entire book. In the negotiations which followed between Marchetti and his attorneys and the CIA, the Agency was forced to admit that many of the censored items were either in the public domain or so minor as to be ludicrous.

By February 1974 the CIA had reduced its demand to 168 cuts. Meanwhile, the matter had returned to court as Knopf, Marchetti and Marks vs. Colby and Kissinger, *and the CIA was finally hoisted on its own petard when it refused to bring in evidence to support the TOP SECRET classification it had attached to the 168 deletions. So obsessed with secrecy was the Agency that it refused to give the evidence that would back up its claims; and in the end the judge ruled that only 28 of the 168 cuts might be considered classified.*

The trial is not over. Marchetti, et al have appealed the decision that the CIA has any right whatsoever to censor the manuscript. But while that lengthy process is taking place, the decision was made to go ahead and publish the work with its 28 deletions, which are every bit as telling, and in the same spirit, as the 18½-minute-gap in a White House tape.

Even before its publication, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence *has accomplished much of what it started to do, showing that the malevolence and imperiousness of the CIA is well tempered by bureaucratic ineptitude. Like all bullies its success is dependent on an inflated reputation.*

The Agency that has toppled governments cannot stop the publication of a book. Doubtless some will see this as another sign of the vitality of the American system, a sign of the long-range medicinal powers of the Constitution. Actually the lesson is simpler and more fundamental: Organizations like the CIA flourish in the dark and lose their powers when they are forced to operate in the daylight, when their true nature—and their banality—become overpoweringly clear. We owe thanks to Victor Marchetti, not least of all because he is the latest voice to protest that the emperor has no clothes. —The Editors

A few years ago *Newsweek* magazine described the CIA as the most secretive and tightly knit organization (with the possible exception of the Mafia) in American society. The characterization is something of an overstatement, but it contains more than a kernel of truth. In its golden era, during the height of the Cold War, the agency did possess a rare *élan*; it had a staff of imaginative and daring officers at all levels and in all directorates. But over the years the CIA has grown old, fat, and bureaucratic. The *esprit de corps* and devotion to duty its staff once had, setting the agency apart from other government departments, has faded, and to a great degree it has been replaced by an outmoded, doctrinaire approach to its missions and functions. The true purpose of secrecy—to keep the opposition in the dark about agency policies and operations—has been lost sight of. Today the CIA often practices secrecy for secrecy's sake—and to prevent the American public from learning of its activities. And the true purpose of intelligence collection—to monitor efficiently the moves of international adversaries—has been distorted by the need to nourish a collective clandestine ego.

After the U.S. invasion of Cambodia in 1970, a few hundred CIA employees (mostly younger officers from the Intelligence and Science and Technology directorates, *not* the Clandestine Services) signed a petition objecting to American policies in Indochina. Director Richard Helms was so concerned about the prospect of widespread unrest in the agency's ranks, and the chance that word of it might leak out to the public, that he summoned all the protestors to the main auditorium and lectured them on the need to separate their personal views from their professional duties. At the same time, similar demonstrations on the Cambodian issue were mounted at the State Department and other government agencies. Nearly every newspaper in the country carried articles about the incipient rebellion brewing in the ranks of the federal bureaucracy. The happenings at the CIA, which were potentially the most newsworthy of all, were, however, never discovered by the press. In keeping with the agency's clandestine traditions, CIA employees had conducted a secret protest.

To agency personnel who had had the need for secrecy drilled into them from their moment of recruitment, there was nothing strange about keeping their demonstration hidden from public view. Secrecy is an absolute way of life at the agency, and while outsiders might consider some of the resulting practices comical in the extreme, the subject is treated with great seriousness in the CIA. Training officers lecture new personnel for hours on end about "security consciousness," and these sessions are augmented during an employee's entire career by refresher courses, warning posters, and even the semi-annual requirement for each employee to review the agency's security rules and to sign a copy, as an indication it has been read. As a matter of course, outsiders should be told absolutely nothing about the CIA and fellow employees should be given only that information for which they have an actual "need to know." (The penchant for secrecy sometimes takes on an air of ludicrousness. Secret medals are awarded for outstanding performance, but they cannot be worn or shown outside the agency. Even athletic trophies—for intramural bowling, softball, and so on—cannot be displayed except within the guarded sanctuary of the headquarters building.)

CIA personnel become so accustomed to the rigorous security precautions (some of which are indeed justified) that they easily accept them all, and seldom are caught in violations. Nothing could be more natural than to work with a telephone book marked SECRET, an intentionally incomplete telephone book which lists no one working in the Clandestine Services and which in each semi-annually revised edition leaves out the names of many of the people employed by the overt directorates, so if the book ever falls into unauthorized hands, no enterprising foreign agent or reporter will be able to figure out how many people work at CIA headquarters, or even how many work in non-clandestine jobs. Those temporarily omitted can look forward to having their names appear in the next edition of the directory, at which time others are selected for telephonic limbo. Added to this confusion is the fact that most agency phone numbers are regularly changed for security reasons. Most employees manage to keep track of commonly called numbers by listing them in their own personal desk directories, although they have to be careful to lock these in their safes at night—or else risk being charged with a security violation. For a first violation the employee is given a reprimand and usually assigned to several weeks of security inspection in his or her office. Successive violations lead to forced vacation without pay for periods up to several weeks, or to outright dismissal.

Along with the phone books, all other classified material (including typewriter ribbons and scrap paper) is placed in office safes whenever the office is unoccupied. Security guards patrol every part of the agency at roughly half-hour intervals in the evening and on weekends to see that no secret documents have been left out, that no safes have been left unlocked, and that no spies are lurking in the halls. If a guard finds any classified material unsecured, both the person who failed to put it away and the person within the office who was assigned to double-check the premises have security violations entered in their personnel files.

These security precautions all take place inside a headquarters building that is surrounded by a twelve-foot fence topped with barbed wire, patrolled by armed guards and police dogs, and sealed off by a security check system that guarantees that no one can enter either the outer perimeter or the building itself without the proper identification. Each CIA employee is issued a laminated plastic badge with his picture on it, and these must not only be presented to the guards on entry, but be kept constantly in view within the building. Around the edges of the badge are twenty or so little boxes which may or may not be filled with red letters. Each letter signifies a special security clearance held by the owner. Certain offices at the CIA are designated as restricted, and only persons holding the proper clearance, as marked on their badges, can gain entry. These areas are usually guarded by an agency policeman sitting inside a glass cage, from which he controls a turnstile that forbids passage to unauthorized personnel. Particularly sensitive offices are protected, in addition to the guarded turnstile, by a combination or cipher lock which must be opened by the individual after the badge is inspected.

Even a charwoman at the CIA must gain security clearance in order to qualify for the badge that she, too, must wear at all times; then she must be accompanied by an armed guard while she cleans offices (where all classified material has presumably been locked up). Some rooms at the agency are considered so secret that the charwoman and her guard must also be watched by someone who works in the office.

The pervasive secrecy extends everywhere. Cards placed on agency bulletin boards offering items for sale conclude: "Call Bill, extension 6464." Neither clandestine nor overt CIA employees are permitted to have their last names exposed to the scrutiny of their colleagues, and it was only in 1973 that employees were allowed to answer their phones with any words other than those signifying the four-digit extension number.

Also until recent years all CIA personnel were required to identify themselves to non-agency people as employees of the State or Defense Department or some other outside organization. Now the analysts and technicians are permitted to say they work for the agency, although they cannot reveal their particular office. Clandestine Service employees are easily spotted around Washington because they almost always claim to be employed by Defense or State, but usually are extremely vague on the details and unable to furnish an office address. They do sometimes give out a phone number which corresponds to the correct exchange, but these extensions,

[illegible] wiring, ring at CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia.

[THE AGENCY'S EMPIRE]

The headquarters building, located on a partially wooded 125-acre tract eight miles from downtown Washington, is a modernistic fortress-like structure. Until the spring of 1973 one of the two roads leading into the secluded compound was totally unmarked, and the other featured a sign identifying the installation as the Bureau of Public Roads, which maintains the Fairbanks Highway Research Station adjacent to the agency.

Until 1961 the CIA had been located in a score of buildings scattered all over Washington. One of the principal justifications for the $46 million headquarters in the suburbs was that considerable expense would be saved by moving all employees under one roof. But in keeping with the best-laid bureaucratic plans, the headquarters building, from the day it was completed, proved too small for all the CIA's Washington activities. The agency never vacated some of its old headquarters buildings hidden behind a naval medical facility on 23rd Street Northwest in Washington, and its National Photo Interpretation Center shares part of the Navy's facilities in Southeast Washington. Other large CIA offices located downtown include the Domestic Operations Division, on Pennsylvania Avenue near the White House.

In Washington's Virginia suburbs there are even more CIA buildings outside the headquarters complex. An agency training facility is located in the Broyhill Building in Arlington, and the CIA occupies considerable other office space in that county's Rosslyn section. Also at least half a dozen CIA components are located in the Tyson's Corner area of northern Virginia, which has become something of a mini-intelligence community for technical work due to the presence there of numerous electronics and research companies that do work for the agency and the Pentagon.

(Of course the list of CIA facilities would be much longer if it included covert sites across the U.S.—a paramilitary base in North Carolina, secret air bases in Nevada and Arizona, scores of "dummy" commercial organizations and airlines, operational offices in more than twenty major cities, a huge arms warehouse in the Midwest, and "safe houses" for rendezvous in Washington and other cities.)

The rapid expansion of CIA office space in the last ten years did not happen as a result of any appreciable increase in personnel. Rather, the technological explosion, coupled with inevitable bureaucratic lust for new frontiers, has been the cause. As Director, Richard Helms paid little attention to the diffusion of his agency until one day in 1968 when a CIA official mentioned to him that yet one more technical component was moving to Tyson's Corner. For some reason this aroused Helms' ire, and he ordered a study prepared to find out just how much of the agency was located outside CIA headquarters. The completed report told him what most Washington-area real-estate agents already knew, that a substantial percentage of CIA employees had vacated the buildings originally justified to Congress as necessary to put all personnel under one roof. Helms decreed that all future moves would require his personal approval, but his action only slowed the exodus only temporarily.

When the CIA headquarters building was being constructed during the late 1950s, the subcontractor responsible for putting in the heating and air-conditioning system asked the agency how many people the structure was intended to accomodate. For security reasons, the agency refused to tell him, and he was forced to make his own estimate based on the building's size. The resulting heating system worked reasonably well, while the air-conditioning was quite uneven. After initial complaints in 1961, the contractor installed an individual thermostat in each office, but many agency employees were continually readjusting their thermostats that the system got worse. The M&S Directorate then decreed that the thermostats could no longer be used, and each one was sealed up. However, the M&S experts had not considered that the CIA was a clandestine agency, and that many of its personnel had taken a "locks and picks" course while in training. Most of the thermostats were soon unlocked and back in operation.

At this point the CIA took the subcontractor to court to force him to make improvements. His defense was that he had installed the best system he could without a clear indication of how many people would occupy the building. The CIA could not counter this reasoning and lost the decision.

Another unusual feature of the CIA headquarters is the cafeteria. It is partitioned into a secret and an open section, the larger part being only for agency employees, who must show their badges to the armed guards before entering, and the smaller being for visitors as well as people who work at the CIA. Although the only outsiders ever to enter the small, dismal section are employees of other U.S. government agencies, representatives of a few friendly governments, and CIA families, the partition ensures that no visitor will see the face of any clandestine operator eating lunch.

The CIA's "supergrades" (civilian equivalents of generals) have their own private dining room in the executive suite, however. There they are provided higher-quality food at lower prices than in the cafeteria, served on fine china with fresh linens by black waiters in immaculate white coats. These waiters and the executive cooks are regular CIA employees, in contrast to the cafeteria personnel, who work for a contractor. On several occasions the Office of Management and Budget has questioned the high cost of this private dining room, but the agency has always been able to fend off the attacks, as it fends off virtually all attacks on its activities, by citing "national security" reasons as the major justification.

["THE LAST BASTION"]

Questions of social class and snobbery have always been very important in the CIA. With its roots in the wartime Office of Strategic Services (the letters OSS were said, only half-jokingly, to stand for "Oh So Social"), the agency has long been known for its concentration of Eastern Establishment, Ivy League types. Allen Dulles, a former American diplomat and Wall Street lawyer with impeccable connections and credentials, set the tone for an agency full of Roosevelts, Bundys, Cleveland Amory's brother Robert, and other scions of America's leading families. There have been exceptions, to be sure, but most of the CIA's top leaders have been white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, and graduates of the right Eastern schools. While changing times and ideas have diffused the influence of the Eastern élite throughout the government as a whole, the CIA remains perhaps the last bastion in official Washington of WASP power, or at least the slowest to adopt the principle of equal opportunity.

It was no accident that former Clandestine Services chief Richard Bissell (Groton, Yale, A.B., Ph.D., London School of Economics, A.B.) was talking to a Council on Foreign Relations discussion group in 1968 when he made his "confidential" speech on covert action. For the influential but private Council, composed of several hundred of the country's top political, military, business, and academic leaders, has long been the CIA's principal "constituency" in the American public. When the agency has needed prominent citizens to front for its proprietary companies or for other special assistance, it has often turned to Council members. Bissell knew that night in 1968 that he could talk freely and openly about extremely sensitive subjects because he was among "friends." His words leaked out not because of the indiscretion of any of the participants, but because of student upheavals at Harvard in 1971.

It may well have been the sons of CFR members or CIA

officials who ransacked the office housing the minutes of Bissell's speech, and therein lies the changing nature of the CIA (and the Eastern Establishment, for that matter). Over the last decade the attitudes of the young people, who in earlier times would have followed their fathers or their fathers' college roommates into the CIA, have changed drastically. With the Vietnam War as a catalyst, the agency has become, to a large extent, discredited in the traditional Eastern schools and colleges. And consequently the CIA has been forced to alter its recruiting base. No longer do Harvard, Yale, Princeton, and a few other Eastern schools provide the bulk of the agency's professional recruits, or even a substantial number.

For the most part, Ivy Leaguers do not want to join the agency, and the CIA now does its most fruitful recruiting at the universities of middle America and in the armed forces. While the shift unquestionably reflects increasing democratization in American government, the CIA made the change not so much voluntarily as because it had no other choice if it wished to fill its ranks. If the "old boy" network cannot be replenished, some officials believe, it will be much more difficult to enlist the aid of American corporations and generally to make use of influential "friends" in the private and public sectors.

Despite the comparatively recent broadening of the CIA's recruiting base, the agency is not now and has never been an equal-opportunity employer. The agency has one of the smallest percentages—if not *the* smallest—of blacks of any federal department. The CIA's top management had this forcefully called to their attention in 1967 when a local civil-rights activist wrote to the agency to complain about minority hiring practices. A study was ordered at that time, and the CIA's highest-ranking black was found to be a GS-13 (the rough equivalent of an Army major). Altogether, there were less than twenty blacks among the CIA's approximately 12,000* non-clerical employees, and even the proportion of black secretaries, clerks, and other non-professionals was considerably below that of most Washington-area government agencies. One might attribute this latter fact to the agency's suburban location, but blacks were notably well represented in the guard and char forces.

Top officials seemed surprised by the results of the 1967 study because they did not consider themselves prejudiced men. They ordered increased efforts to hire more blacks, but these were not particularly successful. Young black college graduates in recent years have shied away from joining the agency, some on political grounds and others because of the more promising opportunities available in the private sector. Furthermore, the CIA recruiting system could not easily be changed to bring in minorities. Most of the "spotting" of potential employees is done by individual college professors who are either friends or consultants of the agency, and they are located on predominantly white campuses where each year they hand-pick a few carefully selected students for the CIA.

The paucity of minority groups in the CIA goes well beyond blacks, however. In 1964 the agency's Inspector General did a routine study of the Office of National Estimates (ONE). The Inspector found no black, Jewish, or women professionals, and only a few Catholics. ONE immediately took steps to bring in minorities. One woman professional was hired on a probationary basis, and one black secretary was brought in. When the professional had finished her probation, she was encouraged to find work elsewhere, and the black secretary was given duties away from the main ONE offices—out of sight in the reproduction center. ONE did bend somewhat by hiring a few Jews and some additional Catholics.

There are extremely few women in high-ranking positions in the CIA, but, of course, the agency does employ women as secretaries and for other non-professional duties. As is true with all large organizations, there is a high turnover in these jobs, and the agency each year hires a thousand or more new applicants. In a search for suitable candidates, CIA recruiters concentrate on recent high-school graduates from the mostly white small towns and cities of Virginia and the neighboring states, Maryland, West Virginia, and Pennsylvania. Washington, with its overwhelming black majority, supplies comparatively few of the CIA's secretaries. Over the years the recruiters have established good contacts with high-school guidance counselors and principals in the nearby states, and when they make their annual tour in search of candidates, interested girls are steered their way, with several from the same class often being hired at the same time. When the new secretaries come to CIA headquarters outside of Washington, they are encouraged to live in agency-selected apartments in the Virginia suburbs, buildings in which virtually all the tenants are CIA employees.

Security considerations play a large part in the agency's lack of attention to urban areas in its secretarial recruiting. All agency employees must receive full security clearances before they start work. This is a very expensive process, and women from small towns are easier and cheaper to investigate. Moreover, the CIA seems actually to prefer secretaries with the All-American image who are less likely to have been "corrupted" or "politicized" than their urbanized sisters.

[NEW RECRUITS]

Agency secretaries, as well as all other personnel, must pass lie-detector tests as a condition of employment. Then they periodically—usually at five-year intervals or when they return from overseas assignments—must submit themselves again to the "black box." The CIA, unlike most employers, finds out nearly everything imaginable about the private lives of its personnel through these polygraph tests. Questions about sex, drugs, and personal honesty are routinely asked along with security-related matters such as possible contacts with foreign agents. The younger secretaries invariably register a negative reading on the machine when asked the standard: "Have you ever stolen government property?" The polygraph experts usually have to add the qualifying [illegible], or

* The figure is in boldface to indicate one of 339 items the CIA attempted to censor before publication of *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* (see page 27).

minor clerical items."

Once CIA recruits have passed their security investigations and lie-detector tests, they are given training by the agency. Most of the secretaries receive instruction in the Washington area, such instruction focusing on the need for secrecy in all aspects of the work. Women going overseas to type and file for their CIA bosses are given short courses in espionage tradecraft. A former secretary reported that the most notable part of her field training in the late 1960s was to trail an instructor in and out of Washington department stores. (This woman's training proved useful, however, when in her first post abroad, ostensibly as an embassy secretary, she was given the mission of surveilling an apartment building in disguise as an Arab woman.)

The agency's professionals, most of them (until the 1967 National Student Association disclosures) recruited through "friendly" college professors, receive much more extensive instruction when they enter the CIA as career trainees (CTs). For two years they are on a probationary status, the first year in formal training programs and the second with on-the-job instruction. The CTs take introductory courses at a CIA facility ("The Farm") in Arlington, Virginia, in subjects such as security, the organization of the agency and the rest of the intelligence community, and the nature of international communism. Allen Dulles, in his days as Director, liked to talk to these classes and tell them how, as an American diplomat in Switzerland during World War I, he received a telephone call from a Russian late on a Saturday morning. The Russian wanted to talk to a U.S. government representative immediately, but Dulles had a date with a young lady, so he declined the offer. The Russian turned out to be Nikolai Lenin, and Dulles used the incident to urge the young CTs always to be alert to the possible importance of people they meet in their work.

The Farm, disguised as a Pentagon research-and-testing facility, indeed resembles a large military reservation. Barracks, offices, classrooms, and an officers' club are grouped around a central point. Scattered over its 480 mostly wooded acres are weapons ranges, jump towers, and a simulated closed border of a mythical communist country. Away from these facilities are heavily guarded and off-limits sites, locations used for super-secret projects such as debriefing a recent defector, planning a special operation, or training an important foreign agent who will be returning to his native country to spy for the CIA.

All the CTs receive some light-weapons training, and those destined for paramilitary duties receive a full course which includes instruction in explosives and demolition, parachute jumps, air and sea operations, and artillery training. This paramilitary training is also taken by the contract soldiers (who greatly resent being called "mercenaries") who have been separately recruited for special operations. They join the CTs for some of the other courses, but generally tend to avoid the younger and less experienced recent college graduates who make up the bulk of the CT ranks. Many of these mercenaries and a few of the CTs continue on for an advanced course in explosives and heavy weapons given at a CIA training facility in North Carolina. Postgraduate training in paramilitary operations is conducted at Fort Bragg in North Carolina and at Fort Gulick in the Panama Canal Zone.

[FRINGE BENEFITS]

Although agency personnel hold the same ratings and receive the same salaries as other government employees, they do not fall under Civil Service jurisdiction. The Director has the authority to hire or fire an employee without any regard to normal governmental regulations, and there is no legal appeal to his decisions. In general, however, it is the CIA's practice to take extremely good care of the people who remain loyal to the organization. There is a strong feeling among agency management officials that they must concern themselves with the welfare of all personnel, and this feeling goes well beyond the normal employer-employee relationship in the government or in private industry. To a certain extent, security considerations dictate this attitude on the part of management, since an unhappy or financially insecure employee can become a potential target for a foreign espionage agent. But there is more to it than that. Nearly everyone seems to believe: *We're all in this together and anyone who's on the team should be taken care of decently.* The employees probably feel a higher loyalty to the CIA than members of almost any other agency feel for their organization. Again, this is good for security, but that makes the sentiments no less real.

If a CIA employee dies, an agency security officer immediately goes to his or her house to see that everything is in order for the survivors (and, not incidentally, to make sure no CIA documents have been taken home from the office). If the individual has been living under a cover identity, the security officer insures that the cover does not fall apart with the death. Often the security man will even help with the funeral and burial arrangements.

For banking activities, CIA employees are encouraged to use the agency's own credit union, which is located in the headquarters building. The union is expert in giving loans to clandestine operators under cover, whose personal-background statements are by definition false. In the rare instance when an employee forfeits on a loan, the credit union seldom prosecutes to get back the money that could be breach of security. There is also a special fund, supported by annual contributions from agency officers, to help fellow employees who accidentally get into financial trouble.

The credit union also makes various kinds of insurance available to CIA employees. Since the agency does not wish to give outsiders any biographical information on its personnel, the CIA provides the insuror with none of that data that insurance companies normally demand, except age and size of policy. The agency certifies that all facts are true—even that a particular employee has died—without offering any proof. Blue Cross, which originally had the agency's health-insurance policy, demanded too much information for the agency's liking, and in the late 1950s the CIA switched its account to the more tolerant Mutual of Omaha. Agency employees are even instructed not to use the airplane-crash insurance machines available at airports, but to purchase such insurance from the credit union.

Attempts are made even to regulate the extracurricular activities of agency employees—to reinforce their attachment to the organization and, of course, for security reasons. An employee-activity association (incorporated for legal purposes) sponsors programs in everything from sports and art to slimnastics and karate. The association also runs a recreational travel service, a sports and theater ticket service, and a discount sales store. The CIA runs its own training programs for reserve military officers, too. And it has arranged with local universities to have its own officers teach college-level and graduate courses for credit to its employees in the security of its headquarters building.

The CIA can be engagingly paternal in other ways, too. On the whole, it is quite tolerant of sexual dalliance among its employees, as long as the relationships are heterosexual and not with enemy spies. In fact, the CIA's medical office in Saigon was known during the late 1960s for its no-questions-asked cures of venereal disease, while State Department officers in that city avoided the embassy clinic for the same malady because they feared the consequences to their careers of having VD listed on their per-

sonnel records.

In many other ways the CIA keeps close watch over its employees' health. If a CIA officer gets sick, he can go to an agency doctor or a "cleared" outside physician. If he undergoes surgery, he frequently is accompanied into the operating room by a CIA security man who makes sure that no secrets are revealed under sodium-pentothol anesthesia. If he has a mental breakdown, he is required to be treated by an agency psychiatrist (or a cleared contact on the outside) or, in an extreme case, to be admitted to a CIA-sanctioned sanitarium. Although no statistics are available, mental breakdowns seem more common in the agency's tension-laden atmosphere than in the population as a whole, and the CIA tends to have a more tolerant attitude than the general public toward mental-health problems and psychiatric therapy. In the Clandestine Services, breakdowns are considered virtually normal work hazards, and employees are encouraged to return to work after they have completed treatment. Usually no stigma is attached to illness of this type; in fact, Richard Helms suffered a breakdown when he was still with the Clandestine Services during the 1950s and it clearly did not hurt his career. Ex-Clandestine Services chief Frank Wisner had a similar illess, and he later returned to work as the CIA station chief in London.

Many agency officials are known for their heavy drinking—which also seems to be looked upon as an occupational hazard. Again, the CIA is more sympathetic to drinking problems than outside organizations. Drug use, however, remains absolutely taboo.

While the personnel policies and benefits extended by the CIA to its employees can be justified on the grounds of national security and the need to develop organizational loyalty, these tend to have something of a personal debilitating effect on the career officers. The agency is unconsciously viewed as an omniscient, omnipotent institution—one that can even be considered infallible. Devotion to duty grows to fanaticism; questioning the decisions of the authorities is tantamount to religious blasphemy. Such circumstances encourage bureaucratic insulation and introversion (especially under strong pressures from the outside), and they even promote a perverse, defensive attitude which restricts the individual from keeping pace with significant social events occurring in one's own nation—to say nothing of those evolving abroad. Instead of continuing to develop vision and sensitivity with regard to their professional activities, the career officers become unthinking bureaucrats concerned only with their own comfort and security, which they achieve by catering to the demands of the existing political and institutional leaderships—those groups which are able to provide the means for such personal ends. □

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
30 June 1974

"The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence"

How the CIA Operates Inside the U.S.

Although the CIA is generally thought of in terms of tight-lipped cloak-and-dagger operatives conspiring in exotic, far-away lands, the secrecy-shrouded agency is active in this country as well as overseas. In "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence," authors Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks disclose some of the domestic operations that brought the CIA unwanted publicity—and criticism.

By VICTOR MARCHETTI and JOHN D. MARKS

Second of two parts

THE DOMESTIC Operations Division (DOD) of the CIA, with a staff of a few hundred persons and an annual budget of up to $10 million, is a well-established part of the Clandestine Services.

The DOD is surrounded by extreme secrecy, even by CIA standards, and its actual functions are shrouded in mystery. The extent of the agency's unwillingness to discuss the Domestic Division could be seen when the CIA officer preparing the agency's annual budget request to Congress in 1968 was pointedly told by the Executive Director not to include anything about the DOD in the secret briefing to be given to the Senate and House appropriations committees.

Training for Cops

In December 1972, The New York Times revealed that the CIA had secretly provided training to 14 New York City policemen. After persistent queries by Representative Edward Koch, the CIA's legislative counsel, John Maury, admitted that "less than [illegible] officers, all told, from a total of about a dozen city and county police forces, have received some sort of agency briefing within the past two years."

But the CIA police training, which consisted of much more than a "briefing," had been going on for considerably more than the two years cited by the CIA — at least since 1967 when Chicago police received instruction at the agency's headquarters and at "The Farm," a training installation in southeastern Virginia.

CIA training of local police departments may seem like a relatively harmless activity, but it does raise several questions. Why did the agency at first try to cover up and then mislead Congress and the press and the public about its activity? Why could the same training not have been given by the FBI? And why have subsequent CIA directors James Schlesinger and William Colby not specifically ruled out any future police training, even after the press and the Congress have raised the questions of illegality and impropriety?

A few months after Watergate, the press would discover that CIA Director [illegible] and Helms [illegible] press would discover that CIA Director [illegible] and Helms [illegible] ative and helpful" (in the words of White House aide Tom Huston) in helping to organize top-secret White House plans for domestic surveillance and intelligence collection; that the CIA had provided "technical" assistance to the White House plumbers in their 1971 burglary of the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist; that the agency maintained "safe houses" in the heart of Washington where E. Howard Hunt was clandestinely provided with CIA-manufactured false documents, a disguise, a speech-altering device, and a camera fitted into a tobacco pouch; that five of the seven Watergate burglars were ex-CIA employees, and one was still on the payroll and regularly reporting to an agency case officer; and, perhaps most significantly, that top CIA officials remained silent, even in secret testimony before Congressional committees, about the illegal activities they knew had taken place.

To the mistrustful minds of the Clandestine Services, the problems caused by dissidents, civil-rights activists, and anti-war protesters conjured up the specter of foreign influences. And as Director Colby mentioned at his confirmation hearings: the agency can rightfully spy on Americans "involved with foreign institutions."

Pentagon Blunders

In the late 1960s and early 1970, the Johnson White House gave the major responsibility for penetrating the anti-war movement to the Pentagon. But Army intelligence blundered and its domestic surveillance programs were exposed in January, 1970, by ex-agent Christopher Pyle. During the following year, the military services were forced [illegible] massive attack against domestic dissidents; the field was once

again left to the FBI and CIA.

This situation resulted in an open break between the agency and the bureau. Sam Papich, the FBI's officer in charge of liaison with the CIA, and a member of J. Edgar Hoover's immediate staff, was dismissed by the bureau chief. And only weeks later, the head of the FBI's Division of Internal Security, the FBI's representative on the U. S. Intelligence Board, was locked out of his office and fired by Hoover.

In the aftermath of the troubles at the FBI, the press carried a series of reports of Hoover's and the bureau's incompetence. Some comments, attributed to "authoritative sources" clearly originated with, or were inspired by, the CIA.

What the public was aware of at the time, was that since 1970 — long before the open CIA-FBI split — the White House had been planning to expand domestic intelligence operations. And while the CIA had encouraged the secret policy, the FBI had resisted it. It was, in fact, Hoover's personal refusal to support the new policy that resulted in the collapse of the White House plan.

Student Subsidization

Another domestic area in which the CIA has been involved came to light in 1967 after Ramparts magazine revealed the CIA subsidization of the National Student Association.

The Clandestine Services at times has used universities to provide cover and even assist in a covert operation overseas. From 1955 to 1959, for instance, the CIA paid $25 million to Michigan State University to run a covert police-training program in South Vietnam.

The linkage between the CIA and research institutions on campus and in the private sector became standard practice, just as it did for the Pentagon. But whereas the Pentagon's procedures could to some extent be monitored by the Congress and the public, the CIA set up and subsidized its own "think tanks" under a complete veil of secrecy.

The compilers of a 1967 study on CIA ties to the academic community found that the Clandestine Services had their own research links with universities for the purposes of developing better espionage tools. But the universities also represented fertile territory for enrolling foreign students, especially those from emerging countries, many of whom were (and are) destined to hold high positions in their homelands.

Enlist Professors

To evaluate these students, the Clandestine Services maintained a contractual relationship with key professors on numerous campuses. When a professor had picked out a likely candidate, he notified his contact at the CIA and, on occasion, participated in the actual recruitment attempt.

When a CIA study on the agency's ties with American universities was presented to the then director, Richard Helms, only one copy was made, because of its sensitivity. Helms reviewed it and agreed with its conclusion: that all CIA campus activities were valuable to the agency and should be continued. In the end, there was a selective pruning of these programs but essentially the CIA's activities with and at the universities continued as they had before the NSA scandal broke.

They do so today.

"Proprietary corporations," or, more simply, "proprietaries," are ostensibly private institutions and businesses which are in fact financed and controlled by the CIA.

From behind their commercial and sometimes non-profit covers, the agency is able to carry out a multitude of clandestine activities—usually covert.

The CIA's best-known proprietaries were Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. The corporate structures of these two stations served as prototypes for other agency proprietaries. Each functioned under the cover provided by a board of directors made up of prominent Americans. But CIA officers in key management positions made all the important decisions.

Direct CIA ownership of Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty and Interarmco (a private arms-sales company) is largely history. Nevertheless, the agency is still very much involved in the proprietary business, especially to support its paramilitary operations.

Incredible as it may seem, the CIA is the owner of one of the biggest fleets of "commercial" airplanes in the world. Agency proprietaries include Air America, Air Asia, Civil Air Transport, Intermountain Aviation, Southern Air Transport and several other air charter companies around the world.

Air America was set up in the late 1950s to accommodate the agency's rapidly-growing number of operations in Southeast Asia. By 1971, the Agency for International Development (AID) alone had paid Air America more than $83 million for charter services. In fact, Air America was able to generate so much business in Southeast Asia that eventually other American airlines took note of the profits to be made.

One private company, Continental Airlines, made a successful move in the mid-1960s to take some of the market away from Air America. Pierre Salinger, who became an officer of Continental after his years as President Kennedy's press secretary, led Continental's fight to gain its share of the lucrative Southeast Asian business.

Rather than face the possibility of unwanted publicity, the CIA permitted Continental to move into Laos, where, since the late 1960s, it has flown charter flights worth millions of dollars annually. And Continental's best customer is the CIA itself.

Although the boards of directors of the air proprietaries are studded with the names of eminently respectable business leaders and financiers, several of the companies' operations were actually long in the hands of one rather singular man, George Doole Jr. Doole's official titles, until his retirement in 1971, were president of the Pacific Corporation and chief executive officer of Air America and Air Asia.

Man of Talent

Doole was known to his colleagues in the agency as a superb businessman. He had a talent for expanding his airlines and for making them into profit-making concerns. In fact, his proprietaries proved something of an embarrassment to the agency, because of their profitability.

In 1968, the CIA's Executive Committee for Air met to deal with a request from Doole for several million dollars to "modernize" Southern Air Transport. Doole's justification for the money was that every major airline in the world was using jets, and that Southern needed to follow suit if it were to continue to "live its cover."

At the meeting, Doole was asked if he thought expanding Southern's capabilities for future interventions in Latin America conformed with existing estimates.

Doole remained silent but a Clandestine Services officer working in paramilitary affairs replied that the estimate might well have been a correct appraisal of the Latin American situation, but that non-intervention would not necessarily become official American policy.

The Clandestine Services man pointed out that over the years there had been other developments in Latin America—in countries such as Guatemala and the Dominican Republic—where the agency had been called on by the White House to take action against existing political trends.

Came Up With $$

It proved to be persuasive strategy, as the director personally approved Doole's request, and Southern received its several million dollars for jets.

So if the U.S. decides to intervene covertly in the internal affairs of a Latin American country, Doole's planes will be available to support the operation.

These CIA airlines stand ready to drop their legitimate charter business quietly and assume the role they were established for: the transport of arms and mercenaries for the agency's special operations.

The guns will come from the CIA's own stockpiles and from the warehouses of Interarmco and other arms dealers. The mercenaries will be furnished by the agency's Special Operations Division, and, like the air proprietaries, their connection with the agency will be "plausibly deniable" to the American public and the world.

A few years ago, the CIA was described as the most secretive and tightly-knit organization (with the possible exception of the Mafia) in American society. In its golden era, during the height of the Cold War, the agency did possess a rare elan; it had a staff of imaginative and daring officers at all levels and all directorates.

But over the years the CIA has grown old and fat and bureaucratic. The true purpose of secrecy—to keep the opposition in the dark about agency policies and operations—has been lost sight of. Today the CIA often practices secrecy for secrecy's sake—and to prevent the American public from learning of its activities.

Purpose 'Distorted'

The true purpose of intelligence collection—to monitor efficiently the threatening moves of international adversaries—has been distorted by the need to nourish a collective clandestine ego.

Secrecy is an absolute way of life at the agency, and while outsiders might consider some of the resulting practices comical in the extreme, the subject is treated with great seriousness in the CIA.

Training officers lecture new personnel for hours on end about "security consciousness," augmenting these sessions with refresher courses, warning posters and semi-annual reviews of security rules.

As a matter of course, outsiders should be told absolutely nothing about the CIA and fellow employes should be given only that information for which they have an actual "need to know."

CIA personnel become so accustomed to the rigorous security precautions (some of which are indeed justified) that they easily accept them all. Nothing could be more natural than to work with a telephone book marked SECRET, an intentionally incomplete book which lists no one in the Clandestine Services and which, in each semi-annually revised edition, leaves out the names of many of the people employed by the overt directorates.

Thus, if the book ever falls into unauthorized hands, no one will be able to figure out how many people work at CIA headquarters. Those temporarily omitted can look forward to having their names appear in the next edition, at which time others are selected for telephonic limbo.

Along with the phone books, all other classified material (including typewriter ribbons and scrap paper) is placed in safes whenever an office is unoccupied. Security guards patrol every part of

the agency at roughly half-hour intervals in the evenings and on weekends.

Even a charwoman at CIA must gain security clearance to qualify for the badge she must wear at all times; then she must be accompanied by an armed guard while she cleans offices (where all classified material has already been locked up). Some rooms at the agency are considered so secret that the charwoman and her guard must also be watched by someone who works in the office.

The penchant for secrecy sometimes takes on an air of ludicrousness. Secret medals are awarded for outstanding performance, but they cannot be worn or shown outside the agency. Even athletic trophies—for intramural sports—cannot be displayed except within the guarded sanctuary of the headquarters building.

Questions of social class and snobbery have always been very important in the CIA.

The agency has long been known for its concentration of Eastern Establishment, Ivy League types. There have been exceptions, to be sure, but most of the CIA's top leaders have been white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant and graduates of the "right" Eastern schools. While changing times and ideas have diffused the influence of the Eastern elite throughout the government as a whole, the CIA remains perhaps the last bastion in official Washington of WASP power, or at least the slowest to adopt the principle of equal opportunity.

The Name Is Changed

The man who masterminded and oversaw the CIA's clandestine operations in Indochina during much of the 1960s was William Colby, the current CIA director. He is a trim, well-groomed Princeton and Columbia Law School graduate. Starting during World War II with the Office of Strategic Services, he showed a remarkable talent for clandestine work, and in 1962 he was named head of the Far East Division of the Clandestine Services.

In 1965, Colby oversaw the founding in Vietnam of the agency's Counter Terror (CT) program. In 1966, the agency became wary of adverse publicity surrounding the use of the word "terror" and changed the name of the CT teams to the Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU).

Wayne Cooper, a former foreign service officer who spent almost 18 months as an advisor to South Vietnamese internal security operations, described the operation as "a unilateral American program, never recognized by the South Vietnamese government. CIA representatives recruited, organized, supplied and directly paid CT teams, whose function was to use Viet Cong techniques of terror — assassination, abuses, kidnapings and intimidation — against the Viet Cong leadership."

Admits Some Abuses

In 1967, Colby's office devised a program, called Phoenix, to coordinate an attack against the Viet Cong infrastructure. CIA money was the catalyst. According to Colby's own testimony, 20,587 suspected Viet Cong were killed under Phoenix in its first two-and-a-half years.

Even Colby admitted that serious abuses were committed under Phoenix. Former intelligence officers before Congressional committees have described repeated examples of torture and other repugnant practices used by Phoenix operatives.

Deeply embedded within the clandestine mentality is the belief that human ethics and social laws have no bearing on covert operations. The intelligence profession, because of its lofty "national security" goals, is free from all moral restrictions. There is no need to wrestle with technical legalisms or judgments as to whether something is right or wrong. The determining factors in secret operations are purely pragmatic: Does the job need to be done? Can it be done? And can secrecy (or plausible denial) be maintained?

Thus a William Colby can devise and direct terror tactics, secret wars and the like, all in the name of democracy.

This is the clandestine mentality; a separation of personal morality and conduct from actions, no matter how debased, which are taken in the name of the government and, more specifically, the Central Intelligence Agency.

Although Harry Truman wrote in 1963 that "I never had any thought when I set up the CIA that it would be injected into peacetime cloak-and-dagger operations," he — and each President after him — willingly employed the agency to carry out clandestine espionage and covert intervention in the internal affairs of other countries.

From its beginning, the CIA's actual functions were couched in deception and secrecy.

Charter Revised

Former Clandestine Services Chief Richard Bissell told the Council on Foreign Relations in 1968 that the "CIA's full 'charter' has been frequently revised, but it has been, and must remain, secret. The absence of a public charter leads people to search for the charter and to question the agency's authority to undertake various activities. The problem of a secret 'charter' remains as a curse, but the need for secrecy would appear to preclude a solution."

One executive organization set up to control the CIA is the 40 Committee. The committee is supposed to meet once a week, but its members have so many responsibilities in their own departments that its meetings are frequently canceled.

Nor is the 40 Committee an effective watchdog when it does meet. According to one veteran intelligence official, quoted in the Washington Post, the 40 Committee "was like a bunch of schoolboys. They would listen and their eyes would bug out."

He continued: "I always used to say that I could get $5 million out of the 40 Committee for a covert operation faster than I could get money for a typewriter out of the ordinary bureaucracy."

Even as the 40 Committee fails to keep a close watch on secret reconnaissance activities, is ineffective in monitoring the CIA's covert operations and is totally in the dark on espionage operations, President Nixon and especially Henry Kissinger are unquestionably aware of its shortcomings and have done little to change things.

It is the President and Kissinger who ultimately determine how the CIA operates, and if they do not want to impose closer control, then the form of any control mechanism is meaningless.

Adapted from the book, "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence," by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks. © 1974 by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks. Published by Alfred A. Knopf, New York.

THE GUARDIAN, MANCHESTER
1 July 1974

The odd case of the CIA's folding aeroplanes

From SIMON WINCHESTER, Washington, June 30

A remarkable book published here this week is being billed as "The first book the US Government ever went to court to censor before publication."

Called "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence," it is the work of Victor Marchetti and John Marks, respectively former CIA official and State Department intelligence expert, who joined forces three years ago to expose what they believed to be the shortcomings of the CIA and the growing "theology of intelligence."

The CIA took them to court, saying that no material gained while the pair were civil servants could be published. So Marchetti and Marks wrote the manuscript under a court order to hand it over to CIA censors when it was finished. This they did, and the CIA cut no fewer than 339 "offensive" passages.

So the authors went back to court in Virginia and tried to persuade the CIA to allow at least some of the deletions to find their way into print. Eventually the agency agreed: they reduced the number of deletions from 339 to 168.

The publishers, Alfred Knopf, of New York, went ahead on this basis, and for $8.95 (about £3.75) one can now buy the resulting book.

The 168 continuing CIA deletions appear as blanks, some of them two pages long. The 171 which the Government allowed after the fight appear in bold type; and a future edition will contain, probably, all but about 30 of the deleted passages in full, because the judge in Virginia has recently declared (though he has permitted the CIA to appeal) that the public at large should be allowed to read them.

The reader's attention is naturally drawn to all the passages in the book that appear in bold print, some of which, drawn at random from the book, give a detailed portrait of the American intelligence community.

The CIA staff, we learn for example, is 16,500 strong. It has an annual budget of about $750 millions. The total intelligence costs in the US every year are a staggering $6,300 millions (with the National Security Agency, which listens to all embassy radio traffic and tapes all transatlantic telephone and telex conversations, taking $1,200 millions). The cost of the CIA's direct espionage and counter-espionage programme is $440 millions a year.

The way this money is spent might occasionally appear a little ridiculous. There was once a plan, a bold face passage in the book says, to give all agents operating in hostile territories an aeroplane that could quite literally be folded up into a suitcase.

The idea was that if ever the agent was discovered he would walk to the nearest border, unpack his plane, and fly off to freedom. Little other than initial funds were spent on this device, to the taxpayers' relief.

The CIA also spends a lot of money looking after the security of all US embassy communications rooms, taking elaborate precautions to prevent the Russians from eavesdropping.

"The rooms themselves are encased in lead and rest on huge springs to reduce internal noises. Resembling large camping trailers, the code rooms are normally located deep in the concrete basements of embassy buildings."

There are occasional revelations that do not so much embarrass the CIA as they do other wings of the American Government. In 1970 for example, a State Department official told an Arab diplomat in Washington about current peace negotiations in the

Middle East. The diplomat cabled a report on the conversation to his own Government. The CIA-NSA network intercepted his cable and found to their surprise that the State Department man had not told the Arabs the proper facts, or else the Arab had grossly misunderstood them. The dollars spent on uncovering slip-ups of diplomacy like that may well be worthwhile in the long-run.

For the first time since its creation in 1947, the agency that has sent shivers down the necks of Governments as far away as Chile and Ireland has now lifted its skirts a tiny amount to reveal a tantalising amount of clandestine ankle. It is up to the courts in Washington to decide whether we shall ever see the whole body.

NEW YORK TIMES
4 July 1974

C.I.A. Agent Said to Give Secrets to Russian in 1972

Report Drunken American Disclosed to Soviet Aide What He Knew Emerges as Result of Watergate Inquiry

By JOHN M. CREWDSON
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 3—A tale of a drunken and despondent C.I.A. agent who apparently sat down with a Soviet K.G.B. operative somewhere in Latin America and told him what he knew has emerged as a result of a Senate Watergate committee inquiry into the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The K.G.B., the Soviet Committee of State Security, combines internal security and foreign intelligence functions.

A report issued by the Watergate committee yesterday contains a cryptic mention of a "W H flap" that highly reliable sources said today resulted from the conversation and its ensuing effect on many of the agency's clandestine operations. The initials "W H" are C.I.A. parlance for the Western Hemisphere.

The agent clearly provided information of value to the Russians, because the C.I.A.'s deputy director for plans later told the Watergate committee, according to its report, that the affair "threatened to compromise Western Hemisphere operations."

The C.I.A. man, believed to have been stationed somewhere in Latin America, was described by sources as "despondent," "disgruntled" with the agency and "in his cups" at the time of his brief, and perhaps unprecedented, contact with the Rusians a little more than two years ago.

It could not be learned what specific information the American imparted, but the sources said today that the matter was still considered extremely sensitive.

One of the lesser agency secrets compromised in the conversation, however, was the fact that a Washington public relations concern, Robert R. Mullen & Co., had for years been providing "cover" for C.I.A. agents stationed abroad.

According to the Senate report, prepared by the Watergate committee's minority staff and released yesterday, the Mullen concern "has maintained a relationship with the Central Intelligence Agency since its incorporation in 1959."

At the time of the Watergate break-in, on June 17, 1972, one C.I.A. agent in Singapore and another in Amsterdam were said to be representing themselves as "overseas employes" of the Mullen company.

A number of other American multinational companies with interest in Western Europe or the Far East have traditionally furnished such "cover" for C.I.A. operations, according to intelligence sources.

At the time of the Watergate break-in, the Mullen Company employed E. Howard Hunt Jr., a retired C.I.A. operative who later pleaded guilty to having conspired to tap telephones at the Democratic party's national headquarters here.

Although the company's president, Robert F. Bennett, has said that the Mullen company was not serving as a cover organization for Mr. Hunt, the committee report says that "Hunt's covert security clearance was extended by the C.I.A." when he left the agency to join the company in 1970.

Mr. Bennett, the son of Senator Wallace F. Bennett, Republican of Utah, has headed the Mullen organization since 1971. The company handled publicity for President Nixon's 1968 campaign and reportedly helped to set up and administer Republican campaign finance committees that received $232,500 from dairy industry representatives in 1971 and $100,000 from Howard R. Hughes in 1972.

A July 10, 1972, memo from Martin Lukasky, Mr. Bennett's "case officer" at the C.I.A., refers to the "W H flap," according to the committee rport, and "States that if the Mullen [company] cover is terminated, the Watergate could not be used as an excuse."

The agency's reluctance to tell Mr. Bennett outright that the company's cover had been brached, according to one source, stemmed from its desire to conceal from the Russians its knowledge of the clandestine contact between the Russian agent and the C.I.A. man, who has since retired from the agency.

This source said that he had been told that the C.I.A. had learned of the matter from another individual within the "Soviet apparatus," who apparently been privy to the K.G.B. man's account of the affair and whom the C.I.A. wished to protect.

Another source, however, said that that was "absolutely not" the manner in which the information about the talkative American agent had reached C.I.A. headquarters in Langley, Va.

A spokesman for the C.I.A. said that the "W H flap" was still a highly sensitive matter. He declined to comment further, except to say that additional information had been provided to the Watergate panel and other Congressional committees.

The Watergate committee's minority staff received a number of classified documents from the C.I.A. in connection with its inquiry, including the July 10 memo from Mr. Lukasky and a follow-up report from him two weeks later.

Although the first memo suggested, according to the committee report, that "the agency might have to level with [Mr. Bennett] about the 'W H Flap,'" the C.I.A. apparently decided on a course of deception instead.

The second Lukasky memo, the report said, "shows that the C.I.A. convinced Robert Mullen of the need to withdraw its Far East [Singapore] cover through an 'agreed upon scenario' which included a falsified Watergate publicity crisis."

The report also said that, while the C.I.A. had explained the "W H flap" in general terms to Senate investigators, it had not given "sufficient reason to withhold such information from Mullen nor explained the significance of some to Watergate developments."

The connection to Watergate, according to a well-placed source, was more imagined than real. Mr. Bennett was reportedly told that an individual in Singapore, an island city at the tip of the Malaysian peninsula, had previously accused the Mullen representative there of being associated with the C.I.A. The agent denied his affiliation, the source said.

Some time between June 17 an July 24, 1972, Mr. Bennett was allegedly told, this same individual had approached the C.I.A. man bearing a copy of The International Herald Tribune, which is published in Paris, that contained an article on Mr. Hunt's erstwhile employment at the Mullen headquarters in Washington.

The accuser cited the article as proof that the Singapore agent's connection with Mullen indicated his affiliation with the C.I.A., Mr. Bennett was allegedly told, and the cover would therefore have to be discarded, which it was.

But, the source said, it was subsequently established that the entire incident in Singapore never took place.

WASHINGTON POST
7 July 1974

Ex-Agent Identified In 'Flap'

By Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writer

A veteran Central Intelligence Agency covert agent, who resigned in 1969 in protest to U.S. policies in Latin America, figured centrally in the closing of a Mexico City CIA "cover" operation run by the Washington-based public relations firm, Robert R. Mullen & Co.

The ex-agent, Philip B. F. Agee, was the unidentified subject of a cryptic reference to a "WH flap" in the recently released Watergate report of Sen. Howard Baker (R-Tenn.).

Agee served in the Western Hemisphere (WH) Division of the CIA's clandestine services in Ecuador, Uruguay and Mexico from 1960 to 1969, when he resigned from the agency, according to informed nongovernmental sources.

Since leaving the CIA, it was further learned, Agee, who now is living abroad, made several trips to Cuba where, according to one acquaintance, he was engaged in "research." An earlier published report that a former CIA official—now known to have been an allusion to Agee—had passed information on to Soviet intelligence officials was termed "nonsense" yesterday by informed sources.

The CIA terminated the previously undisclosed Mullen company cover operation in Mexico City after becoming fearful that Agee might publicly disclose its secret intelligence role. The Washington Post previously reported that Mullen operated cover offices for CIA operatives in Singapore and Amsterdam which have since been closed. A fourth Mullen company cover

operation was conducted in Stockholm, according to informed sources, but was transferred to Amsterdam.

Baker for months has been pursuing the possibility of a CIA involvement in the Watergate scandal. President Nixon, too, justified the intervention of top White House aides in the July, 1972, FBI investigation of Nixon re-election funds being "laundered" through Mexico City banks on grounds that an FBI probe might expose covert CIA activities.

CIA Director William E. Colby, in a written response to Baker's report last week, said that "the 'Western Hemisphere flap' . . . had no relationship to Watergate."

This was presumably a response to the observation in the Baker report that the CIA had failed to explain the "significance" of the flap "to Watergate developments."

The CIA acknowledged to Baker's investigators that the "Western Hemisphere Flap" threatened to "compromise Western Hemisphere (CIA) operations." And without specifically alluding to the Agee-Mullen episode, the CIA further told Baker that its efforts to "terminate projects and move assets [cover operations] subject to compromise . . . were closely held even within the agency in order to protect these efforts."

The first reference to a "WH flap" was made in a July 10, 1972, memorandum by CIA official Martin J. Lukasky, summarizing the agency's relationship with the Mullen public relations firm. It was cited in the Baker report as one of the aspects of the case that required further investigation. Lukasky was the the CIA "case officer" for Robert F. Bennett, president of Mullen, and son of Sen. Wallace Bennett (R-Utah).

CIA officials refused to comment yesterday on any aspect of the Agee resignation or the circumstances of the closing of the Mullen office in Mexico City.

Nor would any government spokesman comment on whether the episode was the basis for President Nixon's publicly stated concern early in the Watergate case over exposure of covert CIA operations in Mexico.

Within six days of the Watergate break-in on June 17, 1972, the President directed his two chief aides then, H. R. (Bob) Haldeman and John D. Ehrlichman, to "ensure that the investigation of the (Watergate) break-in not expose either an unrelated covert operation of the CIA or the activities of the White House investigations unit . . .," as Mr. Nixon recalled it on May 22, 1973.

Then CIA Director Richard M. Helms and his deputy, Gen. Vernon Walters, repeatedly asserted to White House officials and to then acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray III that the FBI investigation of Watergate money laundered through Mexico would not expose covert CIA activities.

Colby's comments last week reaffirmed the Helms position of last year. But Baker persisted last week in keeping the question open and said that the agency's explanation of the Mullen-CIA incident "is clouded by conflicting evidence."

Agee, the disaffected ex-CIA agent who has not previously been identified publicly in the complex Mexican connection scenario, is understood to be a continuing source of concern to government officials because of his extensive knowledge of CIA activities in Latin America.

It was understood that when Agee resigned in 1969 his CIA superiors had no idea of the extent of his disaffection with his own mission or the general pattern of covert U.S. activities in the countries where he worked.

An acquaintance in the United States with whom Agee has been corresponding said the former CIA officer acknowledged that he had functioned as an undercover agent in the American Institute for Free Labor Development, an affiliate of the AFL-CIO. The institute, which was headed by veteran AFL-CIO organizer Jay Lovestone, has conducted extensive programs with Latin-American labor organizations.

Agee wrote his American correspondent recently that he now regards the CIA as a "police force" which in his view assists in imposing U.S. "economic exploitation" on Latin American countries.

"He's obviously become quite radicalized," said Agee's correspondent, who has also been associated with intelligence activities. "But this guy was an operative for 14 years and he knows names and places. There are people in Washington who are scared s--- of this guy."

Agee is understood to have entered into negotiations with a foreign publisher for a manuscript, which totals some 250,000 words.

He was described by his American acquaintance as a graduate of Notre Dame — "a good Catholic boy who was finally fed up to the teeth with hypocrisy and deception. Like some Catholic priests who have gone down there he became freaked out with poverty and repression and what our government was doing."

[illegible] children are in the United States. The couple is separated.

CIA witnesses named Agee in secret testimony to four congressional subcommittees looking into the agency's relationship with the Watergate case. These include the Senate and House intelligence oversight subcommittees as well as the Senate Watergate committee.

It was understood that Baker was the only investigating senator who concluded that Agee's resignation from the agency and the feared exposure of the Mullen cover in Mexico City was of possible significance in linking the agency to the Watergate scandal.

Bennett and the Mullen company have figured in a series of relationships not only with the CIA but also the Nixon re-election campaign.

During 1971 Bennett drew up the names of dummy committees set up to funnel secretly more than $300,000 in contributions from the milk producers into the Nixon re-election campaign. The Mullen company was also identified as the source of blank checks transmitted from Howard Hughes' interests to the Committee for the Re-election of the President during the 1972 campaign.

Bennett, according to the Baker report, also served as a "point of contact" between convicted Watergate conspirator and ex-CIA operative E. Howard Hunt Jr. and G. Gordon Liddy, Hunt's co-conspirator, during the two weeks after the Watergate break-in.

Hunt, too, went to work for the Mullen firm after retiring from the CIA in 1970 and continued to work for the public relations firm for a period of time while working as a consultant to the White House in the special investigative unit that became known as "the plumbers."

A CIA official, Frank O'Malley, recommended Hunt for employment with Mullen, according to officials of the firm. It was understood that one of O'Malley's responsibilities at the agency was finding retirement employment for CIA employees.

The CIA has regular "coverage" arrangements with private companies for operatives abroad, according to knowledgeable oficials. It was recently acknowledged that some 200 operatives abroad function under such private corporate covers. Mullen & Co. was one such corporate host.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
1 July 1974

2 Officials See No CIA Part in Scandal

WASHINGTON (UPI) — Two members of Congress who participated in hearings into possible CIA involvement in the Watergate burglary or coverup said Sunday they had found no evidence that the agency's top officials were involved.

"I have seen nothing that I think is wrong from the standpoint of what they have been doing," Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) said of the Central Intelligence Agency directors at the time of the burglary and since.

Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi (D-Mich.), chairman of a House armed services subcommittee on intelligence, said: "I don't believe that you're going to see anything substantive with respect to CIA involvement in the Watergate affair."

Both men were questioned in broadcast interviews.

NEW YORK TIMES
6 July 1974

Employe of C.I.A. 'Cover' Quit 2 Years Ag

By SYDNEY H. SCHANBERG
Special to The New York Times

SINGAPORE, July 5—A man who gave his name as Arthur H. Hochberg left Singapore hurriedly about two years ago, and has not been heard from since. He left in such a rush that he did not even tell his office landlord that he was pulling out and closing down his small office.

His two local employes were puzzled, as was the landlord, but they were not angry, for he had been a congenial employer who had paid his rent several months in advance. The landlord did have one small complaint, however—Mr. Hochberg had put a special lock on his private inner office and the landlord had to bring in locksmiths to open it after Mr. Hochberg vanished.

All of this would not be very unusual in Singapore, which is, after all, an international commercial center where foreign businessmen come and go in large numbers, except that a couple of days ago, a report by the minority staff of the Senate Watergate committee revealed that the company Mr. Hochberg worked for has for many years been providing "cover" for Central Intelligence Agency operatives stationed abroad.

The company is Robert R. Mullen & Co., a Washington public relations concern. The Senate committee came up with the information about Mullen as a by-product of its inquiry into the role played by the C.I.A. in the Watergate scandal.

An article in The New York Times about the Senate report was reprinted in this morning's Straits Times, Singapore's main English-language daily.

The apparent reason for Mr. Hochberg's sudden departure from Singapore, according to the report, was that a short time earlier, a C.I.A. agent in Latin America, while drunk and despondent, had given away several agency secrets to a Russian intelligence agent, including the C.I.A. function of the Mullen Company.

Murky Connection

The Senate report said that the president of the Mullen Company, Robert F. Bennett, son of Senator Wallace F. Bennett, Republican of Utah, had not been told that the secret was out and that this was the real reason for having to close down the Singapore operation, but was instead given a cooked-up "scenario which included a falsified Watergate publicity crisis."

The connection between the Singapore episode and Watergate is extremely murky. The only possibly connective facts that are publicly known are that E. Howard Hunt Jr., a former C.I.A. agent who pleaded guilty and was convicted for his role in the Watergate break-in, was employed by the Mullen Company at the time of the break-in on June 17, 1972, while at the same time retaining his C.I.A. "covert security clearance."

Also, the Senate report said that at the time of the break-in, a C.I.A. agent in Singapore and another in Amsterdam were said to be representing themselves as 'overseas employes" of the Mullen Company.

Mr. Hochberg was the only known Mullen representative in Singapore at the time.

A very limited picture of his activities here emerged today from conversations with his office landlord and one of his former employes.

'A Very Fair Employer'

The employe, a secretary, described Mr. Hochberg as an American in his mid-30's who wore horn-rimmed glasses and had tight, curly hair. She said he was "a very fair employer" and a "cheerful" man. She presumed him to be a bachelor because he had no family with him in Singapore. She also had the impression that he did not lead an active social life here and kept fairly much to himself.

She said Mr. Hochberg resigned from the company when he left and was not me being transferred to ano Mullen job.

She had not read the s about the C.I.A. and the Mu company in this morni newspaper, but when about it and asked if she ever noticed anything out the ordinary during the year she worked for Mr. Hochb she answered in the negat She described her work as tine business corresponde about public relations matt She recalled letters to s banking houses and to a ca container company.

A Modern Office

She said Mr. Hochberg "his own small typewriter" his private office. The of was in Suite 306 of the Cat Building, which also house movie theater. It is a mod office, with wall-to-wall carp ing and Scandinavian-style fice furniture. A Swedish sh ping company now has space once occupied by Mull

The former employe said t Mr. Hochberg opened the of and hired her in the summer 1971 and left Singapore a y later in August, 1972. Bef taking the office, she s Mr. Hochberg had apparer worked alone out of his ho the address of which she co not remember.

She expressed puzzleme not only over the haste of Hochberg's departure but a over the circumstances of event—she said the Mul Company wanted the office remain open, but that Mr. Ho berg's resignation forced shut-down.

Closing Was Forced

"His decision to res caused the company to clos she said. "It was not the co pany asking him to lea Which we found odd, becau the company did not want close but it had to because resigned."

A spokesman for the Uni States Embassy here, asked comment, said: "We never ha any comment on alleged C.I activities."

The landlord of the Cath Building, who earlier in the d had talked freely about M Hochberg's advance rent pa ments and about the subs quent trouble with his offi locks, and who had invited newsman to phone him lat for more information—becar silent when the newsma called back.

It could not be determin if Singapore or American a thorities had spoken to him.

NEW YORK TIMES
11 July 1974

Ex-C.I.A. Agent Denies He Gave Information to the Russians

Special to The New York Times

LONDON, July 10—Philip B. F. Agee, a former employe of the Central Intelligence Agency who has written a book about the agency's operation in Latin America, denied today that he had ever disclosed information about the agency to the K.G.B., the Soviet intelligence agency.

Last week, reliable sources in Washington were reported in an article in The New York Times as having said that the C.I.A. had been obliged to reorganize its Western Hemisphere operations because one of its agents, when drunk, had revealed aspects of the organization to a K.G.B. agent.

These sources did not name Mr. Agee, who resigned from the agency in 1969, subsequently spent time in Mexico, France and Cuba, and now is living in Britain. It was later reported, however, that the intelligence agency's reorganization was a result of its concern that Mr. Agee would reveal information about the agency's work in Latin America.

Mr. Agee said today that his book, which is to be published next year by Penguin Book Publishers of London, would give a detailed picture of the C.I.A.'s work in Ecuador, Uruguay and Mexico during the years he was stationed in those countries.

"It is only a small window on the C.I.A. as a whole," he said. "But I think that it can be taken as giving a clear idea of how the agency operates."

"I did not at any time give information about the C.I.A. to members of the K.B.G.," he said. "That is a complete fabrication and I can only think it is part of an effort to discredit the book in advance. What I have to say about the C.I.A., I am saying in my book."

Mr. Agee also denied a report in a New York Times dispatch that the book contained allegations that C.I.A. agents had upon occasion assassinated temporary employes of the agency in Latin America. He said that although in training courses he had taken after joining the agency such action was not excluded, he knew of no instances in which assassination had been resorted to.

No Comment by C.I.A.

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 10—The Central Intelligence Agency had no comment today on the denial by Mr. Agee that he had compromised the agency's Latin-American operations.

Official sources had said earlier that they could not deny that the former agent had met with the Soviet intelligence service.

Subsequently, official sources said that although Mr. Agee had traveled to Cuba on three occasions after resigning from the C.I.A., there was no indication that he had spoken with Soviet agents there or anywhere else.

The New York Times dispatch last week said that a tale of a "drunken and despondent" C.I.A. agent who had sat down with a Soviet intelligence operative "somewhere in Latin America" had emerged as a result of a Senate Watergate C mittee inquiry into the activities of the intelligence agency.

"Information of value to the Russians" clearly was provided, the dispatch said, because the Watergate Committee's report quoted a high C.I.A. official as having said that the affair "threatened to compromise Western Hemisphere operations."

An informed source, speaking of Mr. Agee today, said that the matter of "what contacts he had, with whom he had them, what he may have passed and what damage has been don is still a very serious counterintelligence problem."

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NEW YORK TIMES
9 July 1974

Ex-Agent Said to Assert C.I.A. Killed Some Aides

By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 8—A former undercover agent for the Central Intelligence Agency in Latin America has written what his associates describe as a major exposé of the agency's Latin-American activities in the 1960's, including an assertion that the agency participated in the murder of some of its employes.

The new book, sources said, was recently completed in London by the former agent, Philip B. F. Agee, who served from 1956 until 1969 with the C.I.A. in, among other places, Ecuador, Mexico and Uruguay.

The as yet unnamed book by Mr. Agee is expected to be published by Penguin Book Publishers of London this fall. Mr. Agee, now seeking an American publisher for the 220,000-word manuscript, has retained Melvin L. Wulf, legal director of the American Civil Liberties Union, in anticipation of protests by the C.I.A.

Mr. Wulf, who represented Victor Marchetti, a former C.I.A. official, in his recent dispute with the agency, confirmed in a telephone interview that the A.C.L.U., "if needed, will certainly come to Mr. Agee's defense."

Mr. Agee's decision to publish his book, said to be in diary form, and the fact that he made three trips to Cuba since 1971 have been of intense concern to the C.I.A. That concern, in turn, sources said, was the cryptic "WH flap" mentioned in the Watergate-C.I.A. report released last week by Senaor Howard H. Baker Jr., Republican of Tennessee.

Mr. Baker, vice chairman of the Senate Watergate committee, has been known to be deeply suspicious of the agency's possible advance knowledge of both the 1971 "plumbers" burglary of the office of Dr. Daniel Ellsberg's former psychiatrist and the 1972 Watergate break-in at the offices of the Democratic National Committee.

Both operations involved E. Howard Hunt Jr., a former C.I.A. official who joined a Washington-based public relations firm, Robert R. Mullen & Company, after his retirement in 1971.

Mr. Baker's report officially disclosed that overseas offices of the Mullen Company had been serving as "cover" offices for C.I.A. employes. The report also noted that a Mullen office in the Far East had been shut down by the C.I.A. in fear that Mr. Agee might have compromised that and other "cover" operations during his Cuba visits.

Agency officials have denied that there was any connection between the closing of the Mullen offices in the Far East and elsewhere, including an office in Mexico City, and the Watergate investigations.

President Nixon has publicly said he asked his top White House aides, John D. Ehrlichman and H. R. Haldeman, to intervene in a Federal Bureau of Investigation inquiry into "money-laundering" operations in Mexico City after the Watergate break-in because of his concern that the F.B.I. might inadvetently expose covert C.I.A. operations in Mexico.

One well-informed legislator, who said he had received full briefings on the Agee affair, emphatically declared today that there was no evidence linking Mr. Nixon's concern about the F.B.I. inquiry in Mexico to Mr. Agee.

The legislator also said that he believed the C.I.A. was overreacting to the dangers posed by Mr. Agee's revelations.

"The whole operation is so compartmentalized that I personally don't think any single person can compromise it that badly," he said, adding: "He went sour and so they've shuffled things about."

An informed source acknowledged today that the C.I.A. had been unable to learn how much if anything—Mr. Agee told the Cuban Government during his visits, although there was an official "presumption" that he "was very forthcoming in Havana and Havana was very forthcoming with Moscow."

Because of Mr. Agee's acknowledged threat to "cover" offices and methods of operation throughout Latin America, the official added, some operations were terminated and others modified. Throughout part of his clandestine Latin-American career, Mr. Agee's official cover was as an employe of the American Institute for Free Labor Development, an arm of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations.

A spokesman for the institute, a nonprofit organization set up in 1962 to work with Latin-American labor organizations, said records there showed no indication that Mr. Agee had ever been carried on its payroll.

High agency officials said they would have no comment on Mr. Agee's decision to publish in his book, although they did confirm that he had served in Latin America for the agency.

The State Department's Foreign Service List for 1968 lists Mr. Agee as a staff aide in the executive section of the United States Embassy in Mexico City.

The official biographical register for the State Department shows that he was born in 1935 in Maryland, was a 1956 graduate of Notre Dame University, and enlisted in the Air Force and State Department official for the next 12 years, one of his cover assignments, as listed in the register, was as a "laundry manager" for the Air Force in 1956-57.

In an interview today with The Associate Press, Mr. Agee, on vacation in Cornwall, England, said his book would tell "what we did in Latin America, why we did it, why I quit and why I decided to write about it."

He added, according to The Associated Press, that "what we did in Latin America and what we do in so many other countries of the third world is similar to what the United States did in Vietnam." The result, he was quoted as saying, is the strengthening of minority governments "which perpetuate great wealth for a few and widespread poverty."

Mr. Agee, whose wife and children are now living in Florida, has told associates that he has firsthand knowledge of many previously unrevealed C.I.A. operations—some of them against Cuba—and that he also was involved in the assassination of locally employed C.I.A. agents, known in the agency as contract employes.

Highly reliable sources said that in discussions with friends, he has declared that the assassinations were not official policy of the C.I.A., but instead were local options taken in the field.

At least one such killing, Mr. Agee is known to have related, involved the use of a truck to run over a recently utilized local C.I.A. operative whose mission had been completed.

Such allegations about the C.I.A.'s operations in Latin America and elsewhere have been widely rumored for years, but—pending Mr. Agee's to-be-published account, there has been no firsthand description of such incidents.

WASHINGTON STAR
28 June 1974

CIA Is Accused Of Gagging Firm

Associated Press

The Central Intelligence Agency requested last year that a public relations firm which had employed one of the original Watergate conspirators not disclose that it provided cover for CIA agents abroad, according to an informed official source.

On Feb. 28, 1973, then-CIA director James R. Schlesinger met with a representative of Robert R. Mullen & Co., an international public relations firm, the source said last night.

"Schlesinger told them to keep their mouths shut about their relation with the CIA, because several people overseas as Mullen representatives were CIA people," the source said.

THE MULLEN firm employed E. Howard Hunt Jr., the convicted Watergate break-in conspirator, after he left the CIA and at least parttime while he was a member of the White House special investigations — or plumbers — unit.

Earlier this week, private investigator Richard L. Bast said that former White House special counsel Charles W. Colson had told him that the Mullen firm was a CIA front and that the Mullen firm was directed to lie if necessary in denying any CIA association.

Meanwhile, ABC News reported last night that documents in possession of the Senate Watergate committee show that Schlesinger ordered information in agency files turned over to the Mullen firm for use in planting cover stories.

ABC said the Mullen firm planted an erroneous story in the March 5 edition of Newsweek magazine asserting that Colson was in charge of political dirty tricks during the 1972 presidential campaign. It was learned that the CIA was prepared to deny having had any hand in the Newsweek story.

THE CIA's purpose in planting stories, ABC said, was to divert newsmen from discovery of its relationship to the Mullen firm and to a law firm, which ABC also said was under contract to provide cover for CIA agents.

A major concern was that newsmen would trace CIA connection to Paul L. O'Brien, a counsel to the Committee for the Re-election of the President, ABC said.

THE WASHINGTON POST Thursday, July 11, 1974

Ex-Spy to Give Detailed Account of Covert CIA Operations

By Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writer

LONDON, July 10—Philip B. F. Agee is an ex-spy who is coming out of the cold with what is likely to be the most detailed account of covert Central Intelligence Agency operations ever compiled by an American intelligence officer.

The 39-year-old former CIA case officer, who hopes to remain in seclusion in a remote stretch of English countryside until his book is published, has finished a 200,000-word manuscript at which he has labored since he resigned from the CIA in 1969.

Agee's credentials as an officer in the clandestine ("dirty tricks") service of the CIA have been confirmed by authoritative sources in Washington. The CIA itself refuses to comment on any aspect of the case but officials are reported to be deeply concerned about Agee's prospective revelations.

In the course of an afternoon-long interview at his modest seaside hideaway Agee spoke guardedly of his eight years of covert operations against "unfriendly" governments and insurgent political forces. It was a world of manipulation of agents, news media, public officials, and military establishments through the classic espionage techniques of bribery, blackmail and mass propaganda.

In agreeing to talk to a reporter for The Washington Post, Agee withheld specific details that are in his manuscript which he felt might jeopardize his physical security before the book makes its appearance sometime within the next year. He did, however, make these points:

• During a brief assignment at CIA headquarters in Langley in 1966 he set up the Mexico City "cover" operation for the CIA, conducted under the front of the Robert Mullen company, a Washington-based public relations firm that has figured prominently in the Watergate case. It was his involvement in the Mullen cover, established for a CIA operative engaged in anti-Soviet operations, which led last week to the surfacing of Agee's identity. CIA fears that Agee would publicly disclose the Mullen arrangement in 1972 led to its closing by the CIA and the "Western Hemisphere flap" alluded to in the report last week of Sen. Howard Baker (R-Tenn.).

In Mexico, Agee's cover was as the Olympics staff assistant to then-Ambassador Holton Freeman. In his Olympics role, Agee's covert mission during 1967 and 1968 was to "meet all kinds of people" in order to extend the Mexican CIA station's network of agents.

• While serving in the CIA's Ecuador station in 1962 Agee participated in the launching of a pressure campaign against the Arosemena government to end diplomatic ties with Cuba. "President Arosemena didn't want to break relations but we forced him," Agee related. "We promoted the Communist issue and especially Communist penetration of the government." Eventually Arosemena fell and was replaced by a military junta.

• Agee personally served in 1964 as a conduit for funneling $200,000 in Chilean currency from a major New York City bank into covert election support activities for Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei. Frei won. Agee handled the cashing of the check in Montevideo, where he was then assigned to the CIA station, and conversion into Chilean currency which was then sent on by diplomatic pounch into Santiago, he related. There was in 1964 a major covert program on Frei's behalf. Agee said that the United States also poured an estimated $20 million into the 1962 Brazilian election in support of several hundred candidates for gubernatorial, congressional, state and municipal offices.

The CIA operates in close coordination with an international network of trade union confederations and national labor groups which Agee said have proven to be effective instruments of political influence in Latin America. In Ecuador, Agee said, he served as a CIA case officer for a local branch of the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), which was founded in the early 1960s as an affiliate of the AFL-CIO. He cited AIFLD, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, its Latin American subsidiary, ORIT, the Public Service International (comprised of government employee unions) and the various international trade secretariats as having given strong support to CIA-directed covert political programs.

The trade union organizations as well as other mass groups coordinate with the CIA chiefly through the international organizations division, which was in the center of the controversy over CIA funding of student, labor and cultural organizations seven years ago.

Agee last week was mentioned in press reports as having told his secrets to the KGB in a fit of drunken despondency. The Washington source responsible for the story later denied its authenticity.

Agee insists that he has never talked to the KGB, although he acknowledges that he intends to demonstrate in his book that the CIA has served as "the secret police force of American capitalism."

The former agent said he had made three trips to Cuba since 1971 to conduct research for his book and, as he put it, to witness the results of a "successful socialist revolution."

The Cuban trips were arranged by a Paris publisher who first contracted to publish Agee's book. One of the terms on which he went to Cuba, Agee said, was that he did not want to be debriefed by the KGB.

Agee's ideological break with the CIA and U.S. policy in Latin America started during his 1963-1966 assignment to Uruguay where his official mission was to direct operations against the Cubans and build up local security forces.

It was in Uruguay, which was an advanced welfare state by Latin American standards, that Agee said he lost his faith in the possibility of solving the region's problems through piecemeal reform.

Agee, who is under contract at present with British Penguin book publishers, said that his account, written in diary form, names numerous case officers, agents and particular episodes gathered from firsthand experience in the field. Such a narrative has never been published on the American clandestine services and Agee is apprehensive about the possibility of injunction action against him such as was taken against Victor Marchetti on his book, co-authored with John Marks, "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence."

In 1971 when he had embarked on the book project and was living from hand-to-mouth at a secret location in Paris, Agee said he came under surveillance by a pair of Americans who befriended him and advanced him small amounts of money. Agee said he determined to his certainty that they were retained by the CIA to find out the contents of his book.

The CIA, he said, first became aware of his intentions to publish the critical book after he wrote a letter to a Uruguayan political journal suggesting that the 1971 election there would be subject to CIA infiltration. In December of that year he received a visit from a former CIA colleague who tracked him down in Paris through French police connections.

Within several months, Agee said, he was in regular contact with the two Americans who professed an interest in the book and a desire to see the manuscript. It was to his new-found "friends" that Agee confided, after the first burst of Watergate publicity in the newspapers, that the Mullen organization was providing cover for the CIA in Mexico. The Washington public relations company was identified in early stories as an employer of Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt Jr.

Agee's "friends" in turn sent word to the CIA, as he reconstructs the events, that he might disclose the Mullen cover in his book. This was the origin of the "WH flap" alluded to in Baker's report.

Agee found himself in the remarkable position of having created the Mullen cover and having been responsible for "blowing" it five years later by divulging his awareness of it to agents—as he firmly believes today—of the CIA.

The CIA admitted in writing to Baker that as a result of the "WH flap" (the initials stand for Western Hemisphere division of CIA) it had to shift assets and personnel in Mexico as well as other posts in which Agee served to minimize the damage of his possible revelations.

It is Agee's opinion that the Mullen cover arrangement in Mexico is "completely irrelevant" to Watergate.

Nonetheless it was President Nixon's stated concern over exposing covert

CIA operations in Mexico that prompted him to issue instructions resulting in the FBI's delay for nearly three weeks in June and July 1972 of its investigation of the "laundering," of Nixon re-election money through a Mexico City bank account.

The President said, however, on May 22, 1973, that he had learned there was no basis for having worried about exposing covert CIA activities in Mexico. Former CIA Director Richard M. Helms was providing repeated assurances of this.

The tortuous path that has brought Agee to his current position of self-exile started in a conventionally middle-class home in Tampa, Fla. His father was a businessman and the atmosphere was politically "reactionary—no, say conventional."

He attended a Jesuit high school and went to Notre Dame, where Agee was first aproached by CIA recruiters in 1956. He joined the following year and took three years of military training under the agency's auspices.

"It didn't take long to develop enthusiasm and decide to stay in. There was a combination of things, the aura of intrigue, the sense of patriotism and public service. It was intellectually stimulating and challenging work," as Agee saw it in the early period.

Now he sees the clandestine service and the agency generally as an instrument of political repression.

Agee manages to live on a series of meager advances while the book is being prepared for publication. His two young sons recently joined him from Falls Church, Va., where they had been living with their mother. The Agees are divorced.

WASHINGTON STAR
28 June 1974

Smith Hempstone: Brother Chuck and the CIA

On the face of it, former White House aide Charles W. Colson's charge that virtually the entire Watergate scandal was a Central Intelligence Agency plot designed to blackmail President Nixon so that the cloak-and-dagger boys could get what they wanted out of the Oval Office is preposterous.

This is not to say that it cannot be true: We here in Gomorrah East have learned over the past two years that the unthinkable is, indeed, thinkable.

Nor does it mean that Brother Chuck, born anew in Christ prior to drawing one-to-three years in stir and a $5,000 fine after pleading guilty to obstruction of justice last week, does not believe the fantastic tale he told former private investigator Richard L. Bast, a Washington man seldom described as one of nature's noblemen: Colson has a tendency to see life through a glass, darkly.

IT COULD BE true; it may be true. But there emanates from the whole bizarre story an odor oddly reminiscent of that fish called a red herring.

According to the public record to date, the CIA was indeed involved in Watergate in a peripheral fashion. The agency, largely through the good offices of its then-deputy director, Gen. Robert Cushman, a former aide to President Nixon when he was vice president and now commandant of the Marine Corps, did provide former CIA agent E. Howard Hunt Jr., one of the White House plumbers, with that famous ill-fitting red wig (indignant CIA staffers maintain that the wig was auburn and a perfect fit), a voice-modifier and a miniature camera.

But the public testimony to date indicates that former CIA Director Richard M. Helms, now ambassador to Iran, terminated the arrangement with extreme prejudice (as the Green Berets used to say) as soon as he heard about it.

Nor is there anything in the White House transcripts dumped on the House Judiciary Committee to indicate, as Colson implies in the notes recorded by Bast at two long conversations on May 13 and May 31, that Mr. Nixon regarded himself as a pawn of the CIA.

OF COURSE, one would be in a better position to make a judgment of the thinking of Mr. Nixon and Colson (although not necessarily of the veracity of their allegations, if any) if the tape — if there is one — of the "two or three hours" of conversation that Colson said he had with the President on a Sunday in January were available. But Mr. Nixon to date has resolutely refused to release the tapes of any of his conversations with Brother Chuck, theological or otherwise.

It is true that Sen. Howard H. Baker, the Tennessee Republican, ranking minority member on the Ervin Committee and a sensible man, has long been of the view that the CIA has been, shall we say, something less than candid about its role in the Watergate mess. But if, as Colson alleges, Senator Sam is sitting on a 35-page report detailing the spooks' chicanery, then surely this should be made public, despite the CIA's alleged objections to its declassification.

Ultimately, in the absence of specific knowledge about the incident in question, one can only draw on one's own experience. Having spent 13 years working abroad, where the CIA's writ does run, and having known perhaps 100 employes of the agency, some intimately, some casually, this observer finds it hard to credit the Colson implication of a CIA plot against the President.

IN THE first place, most CIA employes are essentially bureaucrats, different only in degree from the striped-pants boys at the State Department or, indeed, the paper-shufflers at Health, Education and Welfare.

There are, to be sure, cowboys among them, deep-cover operatives whose deeds cannot stand close scrutiny. But the mass of them are analysts, statisticians, academics, linguists, computer experts and communications specialists who wouldn't know a cloak—let alone a dagger—from a portmanteau.

They are men and women who serve their government — in the main well — and retire like other government employes to sun and shuffleboard. They may occasionally assist in the overthrow of a troublesome foreign government. But messing about in domestic politics simply has not been their bag, and there is no real reason to think it has become so.

The point has been made that all of those directly involved in the Watergate and Ellsberg break-ins, with the exception of G. Gordon Liddy (who had an FBI background), had been associated, either directly or indirectly, with the CIA. But since they were hired by Hunt, this is perhaps not unnatural, and hardly in itself justifies Colson's description of the CIA as a "frightening" power "with tentacles everywhere."

And ultimately one returns to a simple question: Who hired Hunt? Answer: Colson, who has himself now come in from the cold.

CIA's role in Watergate, in short, deserves further scrutiny. But at least at this writing, the Colson-Bast scenario lacks, as they say, credibility.

WASHINGTON POST
29 June 1974

Break-ins For CIA Alleged

By Richard M. Cohen
Washington Post Staff Writer

The lawyer for Watergate conspirators Bernard Barker and Eugenio Martinez revealed yesterday that the two had previously engaged in a series of illegal activities for the Central Intelligence Agency, including a "penetration" of the Radio City Music Hall by Barker in the mid-1960s.

The Radio City Music Hall entry, the lawyer said, was apparently a "CIA "training session" to see if Barker could accomplish his mission satsfactorily. Other missions, the lawyer said, included the burglary of the Miami home of a boat crew member who was making trips for the CIA to Cuba and a similar break-in of a Miami business office.

The lawyer, Daniel Schultz, revealed some of Barker's and Martinez' past CIA escapades during opening arguments for their trial, along with former top presidential aide John D. Ehrlichman and Watergate conspirator G. Gordon Liddy, on charges stemming from the 1971 break-in of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office.

A CIA spokesman said yesterday the agency would not comment on Schultz's statement because the matter is now before the court. "Our legal guys are very concerned about the propriety of this," the spokesman said.

By the 1947 act of Congress that created it, the CIA is forbidden to engage in domestic intelligence operations. However, the agency is permitted to conduct domestic operations to protect its foreign activities — a loophole that could cover the alleged Miami break-ins by Barker.

Those break-ins and those at the Watergate and at the office of Ellsberg's psychiatrist are just a few to have gained public attention. Some, such as the illegal entry into Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office, involved the use of CIA equipment and facilities. Others, such as the break-ins at Chilean government offices here and New York in 1971 and 1972 remain unexplained and no agency role has ever been proven.

In addition, antiwar groups have frequently complained of break-ins, somtimes alleging government attempts to obtain information. None of these claims has been substantiated."

Schultz refused to expand upon his courtroom remarks other than to say that additional details would be made public as the trial progressed.

Nevertheless, it was the second time in a week that a report of a CIA role in the Watergate affair has come to public attention.

Earlier this week, a Washington-based former private detective, Richard Bast, said former presidential aide Charles Colson suspected that the CIA planned both the Watergate break-in and the entry of Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office, and that President Nixon, to an extent, shared Colson's suspicions of the agency.

Bast said he interviewed Colson on two occasions before Colson was sentenced a week ago to a one-to-three-year jail term and a $5,000 fine for attempting to influence the outcome of the Ellsberg trial by leaking derogatory information about Ellsberg to the press.

Colson, according to Bast, also said that Senate Watergate committee investigators were informed of the times and places of at least 300 other break-ins conducted by Martinez. Senate committee sources have denied they have such information.

Neither Barker nor Martinez has made any secret of their past work for the CIA, which the two have said was limited to operations against the regime of Fidel Castro in Cuba. Barker and Martinez also were among five men arrested in the Watergate offices of the Democratic National Committee and were subsequently convicted of burglary.

Barker, a bespectacled undercover operative, was born in Havana and grew up both in the United States and Cuba. He was a captain in World War II in the Army Air Corps and was shot down over Germany where he was held prisoner for 17 months. In the late 1950s, he joined the Castro guerilla movement but he became disillusioned and fled to Miami in 1959.

Thereafter, Barker worked against Castro and is said to have been one of the organizers of the Bay of Pigs invasion. From that time, until 1966, Barker worked for the

WASHINGTON STAR
28 June 1974

Carl T. Rowan:

'Hook the Spooks' Theory

Once again, in banner headlines, we are slapped with the theory that the Watergate burglary and the Ellsberg break-in were part of a plot conceived and executed by the cloak-and-dagger boys of the Central Intelligence Agency.

This time we get a really wild fourth-hand version, where reporters are told by a former private eye, Richard L. Bast, who allegedly was told by former White House aide Charles Colson, that President Nixon felt the CIA was even scheming to "get something" on the White House.

This "hook the spooks" theorizing may be swallowed whole by some of those Americans who believe that the CIA is a government unto itself, with far-flung agents who murder unfriendly politicians, organize coups, rig foreign elections and topple democratic regimes in favor of dictatorships — all without the President, the secretary of State or other American officials either approving or knowing anything about it.

The CIA has engaged in all the activities mentioned above, but you can wager that the overall CIA actions had the sanction of whomever was President — or of top officials giving approval in the President's behalf.

LOOKING AT ALL the Watergate evidence, I became convinced months ago that the CIA was more deeply involved than the public or the Congress knew. In my column of May 11, 1973, I told of a conversation in which former CIA Director Richard Helms casually mentioned to me that minutes after the burglars were seized inside the Watergate someone at CIA awakened him to tell him of the arrests.

I raised the question of why anyone at CIA would awaken the director in the wee hours just to inform of what at the time seemed to be "a third-rate burglary" — unless the caller knew of potential serious embarrassment to CIA.

As far as I can determine, none of the investigating units has bothered to ask Helms who telephoned him. Or why anyone would feel compelled to awaken the CIA director because of that burglary.

We now know that the men involved in the Watergate and Ellsberg burglaries had previously been involved in numerous CIA ventures. We know that the CIA was still providing disguises and other help to E. Howard Hunt, Jr., a leader of the Watergate burglary and accused of being a principal in the Ellsberg break-in. But we have testimony that CIA cooperation was *requested* by the White House, and this seems to shoot holes in the theory that the CIA was out to subvert the President and make the White House bend to its will.

COLSON HAS denied telling Bast that President Nixon thought of firing current CIA Director William E. Colby because of the President's suspicion that CIA was up to some dirt in the Watergate and Ellsberg matters.

It wouldn't have made sense anyhow. Helms, not Colby, was CIA boss at the time of, and long after, the Watergate burglary.

During four and a half years in government I got to know Richard Helms pretty well. I found him to be a professional whose integrity I never saw cause to question.

I can conceive of Helms agreeing, under pressure from the White House, to cooperate with Hunt and his crew, or with the White House plumbers, out of a belief that they really might be uncovering information vital to national security. I can't believe that Helms would knowingly make CIA part of burglaries designed simply to serve the partisan political interest of the party in power.

I find it beyond either acceptance or speculation that Helms would use the CIA, or let it be used, to undermine the President and his White House staff.

Either Colson got suckered by the President, or Bast got suckered by Colson, or the press got taken in by all of them.

There is reason to ask a lot more questions about the CIA's involvement, for it appears that the CIA was used and abused in a shocking way. But there is no evidence of any substance that the whole dirty business was a CIA plot, with Richard Nixon targeted as a major victim.

CIA. Until his arrest at the Watergate, he ran a real estate agency in Miami.

Like Barker, Martinez originally worked for Castro but later turned against him. He, too, participated in the Bay of Pigs invasion, later worked for the CIA and joined Barker's real estate firm as a salesman.

According to an informed source, Barker and Martinez met during the planning and execution of the Bay of Pigs invasion and later worked for the CIA in operations directed against the Castro regime. Martinez, according to the source, was the captain of a boat used by the CIA to ferry supplies and personnel to Cuba and to take refugees back to Florida. Martinez, according to this source, participated in occasional raids against the Castro regime.

In these capacities, the source said, Martinez engaged in the activities that Schultz mentioned in court yesterday —destrucion of foreign property, possession, and distribution of firearms, and falsification of income tax returns to hide the CIA as a source of income.

As for Barker, his entry into the Radio City Music Hall, the source said, was a CIA test to see if he could accomplish the mission successfully and retain details of what he had seen. The break-in site was the theater's "monitoring office", which contained closed-circuit television cameras. When Barker returned from his mission, he was debriefed to see if he had actually been in the room.

The source close to Barker said that Barker presumed the Radio City Music Hall break-in was a training operation because of the nature of the questioning he underwent upon his return.

The source said the illegal entry into the Miami home of a crew member of a boat used in forays against Cuba was ordered because the man was suspected of talking about the Cuban operations—"not keeping security.' The other Miami break-in Schultz mentioned yesterday was also connected to the CIA's Cuban operations, the source said.

Barker, for one, has acknowledged his participation in anti-Castro activities, maintaining before the Senate Watergate Committee that he believed the Watergate break-in was ordered to determine if the Democrats were receiving money from the Castro regime.

WASHINGTON STAR
29 June 1974

CIA Silence on Break-in Reported

By Dan Thomasson
Scripps-Howard News Service

A secret Senate report states that the Central Intelligence Agency knew inside details of the Watergate break-in less than a month after it occurred but never passed them on to federal investigators.

Sources familiar with the report say it also states that the CIA knew of plans to break into the presidential campaign headquarters of Sen. George S. McGovern, D-S.D.

The report — written by minority staff members of the Senate Watergate committee — is undergoing CIA "declassification" in preparation for its release to the public.

The report was instigated by committee Vice Chairman Howard H. Baker Jr., R-Tenn., who long has contended privately that CIA involvement in the entire Watergate affair was considerably more than the agency has admitted.

BUT ALTHOUGH the report contains documented information supporting this theory, it does not, the sources said, add much support to contentions the CIA had advance knowledge of the Watergate break-in or that it deliberately assisted in the break-in of the office of Dr. Lewis Fielding, a psychiatrist who had been treating Dr. Daniel Ellsberg, who leaked Pentagon documents to the press.

And the sources said the report, which apparently reaches no conclusions, appears to raise more questions about the CIA involvement than it answers.

The report was due for release several days ago, but the CIA now is negotiating with the committee staff to delete portions which would expose agency "cover" operations, the sources said.

The report, in its present state, documents an extensive relationship between the CIA and two Washington firms involved in Watergate — Robert R. Mullen & Co., a public relations firm where Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt Jr. was employed, and the law firm of paul L. O'Brien, who was counsel to the Committee for the re-election of the President.

THE REPORT states, according to the sources, that the Mullen Co. and its president, Robert Bennett, son of Sen. Wallace Bennett, R-Utah, long have provided cover for CIA operations, a fact the CIA has admitted.

But the report outlines Bennett's role as a CIA front man and details his efforts to mask the agency's involvement in the Watergate, including leaking information to Washington reporters and withholding information from the FBI.

The sources said the report states that on July 10, 1972, Bennett relayed to his CIA "case officer" some of the details of the June 17, 1972, Watergate burglary. He presumably had gotten the details from Hunt.

Bennett's report was channeled to Richard Helms, former CIA director who is now ambassador to Iran. Helms never passed on the information to Watergate investigators, the committee staff document states.

According to the sources, the report also states that Bennett:

- Knew of efforts to get Sen. Sam J. Ervin Jr., D-N. C., chairman of the Senate Watergate committee, to keep the Mullen firm out of the Watergate investigation.
- Planted phony stories with the news media which would lead investigators away from CIA involvement.

The report also suggests a connection between the CIA and O'Brien, whose role as an adviser to potential Watergate witnesses in the early days of the investigation and his talk with Hunt about legal expenses has made him a possible witness in the House Judiciary Committee's impeachment inquiry.

O'Brien said in an interview that he was employed by the CIA for one year in 1952. But he said he has had nothing to do with the agency since.

O'Brien did say he has learned of a "connection" between his law firm and the CIA, but added that he has had nothing to do with it. O'Brien is a senior partner.

He refused to detail the connection, but sources said the law firm has had a contract to provide cover for CIA agents. One source said publication of this is an important part of the negotiations between the committee staff and the CIA, which is concerned that some of its agents will be exposed.

WASHINGTON POST
1 JUL 1974

Colson Laments Lesson Loss

By Lee Byrd
Associated Press

The greatest peril of Watergate, says prison-bound Charles Wendell Colson, is that, "We'll purge a few people and then we'll says, 'Now all the rest of us are saved.' "

"Well . . . all the rest of the country isn't saved by just exiling a few Nixon men," he declared.

Once one of the closest of the Nixon men, Colson faces, by his terminology, the longest exile yet decreed. He reflected upon Watergate and other issues in an interview just a week before he is to surrender himself for at least a year's imprisonment for obstructing justice.

"We've got to have several things happen out of Watergate if the country is to be better for it," Colson said. One has to be getting rid of the anger and hatred and divisiveness that Watergate has created . . .

"The second thing is we need some serious structural reforms in the political process and in the governmental process . . . change that will result in the future in people being less tempted to abuse their public trust."

Foremost in that area, he said, is "the need for public financing of political campaigns. I mean I think it's just ludicrous . . . you know, so many abuses have been revealed that if we continue just to apply Band-Aids the patient's gonna die, the country's gona hemorrhage, for this. We've got to get rid of the system of private finance."

Along with public financing of campaigns, said Colson, another prime objective should be greater congressional and executive oversight of the Central Intelligence Agency.

He confirmed that he had raised the issue of the CIA's involvement in the Watergate and Ellsberg break-ins with private detective, Richard L. Bast.

But Colson complained that several rather sensational assertions attributed to him by Bast were taken out of context from a discussion aimed merely at exploring "every possible theory." He said he did not, for example, mean to create the impression—as Bast's version of his remarks suggested—that President Nixon felt imprisoned or threatened by CIA sympathiers at the White House.

"What I was saying," Colson explained, "is that I think a lot of people around the President were people with ties into the military and the intelligence establishment."

Colson said the CIA was "much more deeply involved in a lot of things than the public thus far knows. I'm gonna be doing a lot of testifying about this, I suspect, and I'd rather save it for that." Meanwhile, he said, a report on the subject being readied by Sen. Howard H. Baker Jr. (R-Tenn.) "is going to raise an awful lot of questions."

Colson, as yet, does not know where he will be confined. He likely will be kept near the capital for some time, however, since he will be a witness at the "plumbers" trial of John D. Ehrlichman and others and almost surely will appear before the House impeachment panel.

Many have viewed him as potentially star witness No. 2 against the President—the first being John W. Dean III. That prospect was spurred by his surprise courtroom statement that his felonious attempt to smear Daniel Ellsberg was urged repeatedly by Mr. Nixon.

Some of Mr. Nixon's adversaries see Colson as a far more impressive witness than Dean, partly because he was closer to Mr. Nixon and also because he did not barter his testimony for immunity.

According to Colson, a lawyer now disbarred, his plea was a first in legal annals — and was made on his own initiative.

"I have always told the prosecutors that I have been part of an effort to discredit Ellsberg," he said. "As I said to the court . . . that was something I could in conscience plead to and that I felt was a useful plea."

Colson said it was he who "came up with the idea of applying this particular set of facts to the obstruction of justice statute and hopefully making a principle of it—that in the future anyone who tries to interfere with the rights of the defendants is going to violate a criminal law. There had never been a prosecution for this."

WASHINGTON POST
2 July 1974

Baker to Say CIA Helped Hunt Get Job

By Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writer

Testimony indicating that a Central Intelligence Agency official recommended the employment of Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt Jr. by a Washington public relations firm which has served as a CIA "cover" will be released today by Sen. Howard H. Baker Jr. (R-Tenn.).

The public relations firm is Robert Mullen & Co., whose relationship with the CIA forms a central theme of the Baker report cleared by the CIA for release last weekend.

Hunt was recommended to the Mullen firm at the time of his retirement from the agency in 1970 by a CIA official identified as Frank O'Malley. There have been unsubstantiated allegations in the case that Hunt was recommended to Mullen by former CIA Director Richard M. Helms.

Both the CIA and officials of the Mullen company have acknowledged their mutual ties, which included providing a corporate cover for CIA operatives in Mullen & Co. offices in Singapore and Amsterdam.

Sources who have examined the report say it provides no conclusive links between the CIA and the original Watergate break-in such as have been hinted by former White House aide Charles Colson and by Baker.

However, it includes documentation in the form of three CIA memoranda which point to covert efforts by officials of the agency to minimize its involvement in the Watergate investigation.

There is also some evidence that Robert F. Bennett, president of Mullen and son of Sen. Wallace F. Bennet (R-Utah), was tipped off prior to the Watergate burglary that a White House break-in team was targeting McGovern campaign headquarters for a political intelligence raid.

Bennett has privately acknowledged that he was given advance knowledge of the operations of the burglary team. But it was unknown whether he passed this information on to the CIA.

The memos upon which Baker drew in the preparation of his report were drafted by Eric W. Eisenstadt, chief of the central cover staff for the CIA's clandestine directorate; Martin J. Lukasky, Bennett's "case officer" within the agency, and subordinates of former CIA security director Howard Osborn, who recently took an early retirement from the CIA.

The Eisenstadt and Lukasky memos recount the CIA's relationships with Mullen & Co. and recount claims by Bennett that he planted unfavorable stories in Newsweek and The Washington Post dealing with White House aides, including Colson. The object of these stories, the Baker report will indicate, was to draw attention away from CIA involvement in the Watergate case.

The Osborn material, as presented by Baker, suggests that the former CIA security director provided misleading information to the FBI on the identity of a former federal investigator who helped Watergate burglar James W. McCord Jr.'s wife destroy CIA records at their home immediately after her husband's arrest in the Watergate break-in case.

Osborn's retirement, according to one official familiar with the handling of the case, was an outgrowth of the internal memorandum prepared in Osborn's office which resulted in the transmission of misleading information to the FBI.

Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi (D-Mich.), who has reviewed a draft of the Baker report, said Sunday on the CBS program "Face the Nation" (WTOP) that it contained "no bombshells." Nedzi, chairman of the House Armed Service Intelligence Subcommittee, has taken testimony from CIA officials on a number of allegations made in the

draft version of Baker's report.

The Michigan Democrat is said to be in contact with the CIA's congressional liaison office on an almost day-to-day basis as new allegations have arisen suggesting new involvements by the agency in the Watergate scandal.

Some of Baker's colleagues on the Senate Watergate committee, of which he served as co-chairman, have charged that Baker has sought to implicate the CIA in the scandal to divert attention from the White House role in the break-in and ensuing cover-up.

The report also questions why photographs found in the CIA file taken by members of the White House "plumbers" team during the Ellsberg break-in were not turned over to the FBI, even though agency officials were aware of their evidentiary significance.

By and large, the Baker report reaches no definite conclusions but it suggests continued investigation of the relationships between the CIA and Watergate and names prospective witnesses to be examined.

The Senate Watergate committee has gone out of existence but will issue its final report next week.

WASHINGTON POST
3 July 1974

Report Critical Of CIA

Baker Hints Agency Knew Of Break-in

By Lawrence Meyer
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Central Intelligence Agency may have known in advance of plans for break-ins at the offices of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist and the Democratic National Committee's Watergate headquarters, a report released yesterday by Sen. Howard H. Baker Jr. (R-Tenn.) suggests.

Baker's report, accompanied by CIA comments and denials, provides a rare, if incomplete, glimpse into the activities of the CIA that are, by design, normally secret.

Among other things, the report describes how the CIA used a Washington public relations firm as a cover for agents operating abroad, asserts that the CIA destroyed its own records in direct conflict with a Senate request to keep them intact, asserts that a CIA operative may have been a "domestic agent" in violation of the agency's charter and recounts how one CIA employee fought within the agency against withholding information from the Senate committee and other congressional committees.

The report recites several instances in which it says CIA personnel whom the committee staff sought to interview were not made available by the CIA. In addition, the report lists several other instances in which it says the CIA either ignored, resisted or refused requests for information and documents by the committee.

Although the report raises "questions" about the involvement of the CIA in the Watergate and Ellsberg break-ins, Baker said in a letter to present CIA Director William E Colby that was also released yesterday, "Neither the select committee's decision to make this report a part of our public record nor the contents of the report should be viewed as any indication that either the committee or I have reached conclusions in this area of investigation."

The report by Baker, vice chairman of the Senate select Watergate committee, is the long-awaited product of several months of investigation conducted primarily by the Republican minority staff of the Senate Watergate committee.

Although the report is implicitly critical of the CIA, it does not radically alter what is already known about the general outlines of the planning and implementation of the Ellsberg and Watergate break-ins. Remarks by the CIA accompanying the 43-page report reject the suggestion that the agency knew in advance about either of the two burglaries.

The CIA also disagrees with a number of allegations in the report that it has not made information available to the committee. In addition, the report contains numerous deletions of names and descriptions, made at the request of the CIA on the grounds of national security.

One of the central figures who is named in the report is convicted Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt Jr., a former CIA agent who continued to seek assistance from the CIA even after he left the agency in 1970.

In three of the six areas that the report discusses, Hunt emerges as a principal actor. These areas include the activities of Robert R. Mullen and Co., a Washington public relations firm; the providing of technical services by the CIA that Hunt used for the Ellsberg break-in, and the activities of Watergate conspirator Eugenio Martinez, who was recruited by Hunt for the Ellsberg and Watergate break-ins.

In introducing the section on Hunt and his receipt of technical support from the CIA in connection with the Ellsberg break-in, the report states, "In light of the facts and circumstances developed through the documents and conflicting testimony of CIA personnel adduced by this committee . . . the question arises as to whether the CIA had advance knowledge of the Fielding (Ellsberg's psychiatrist) break-in.

The report asserts that the committee gathered "a wealth of conflicting testimony among CIA officials" when it investigated the Ellsberg break-in.

Much of what the report cites about the Ellsberg break-in and Hunt's approaches to the CIA in that connection are already known.

At the request of the White House and with the permission of CIA Director Richard M. Helms, Hunt was supplied with a wig, voice alteration devices, fake glasses, falsified identification, a miniature camera and other gear.

The report recalls that before the Ellsberg break-in, the CIA developed photographs for Hunt that he had made outside the Beverly Hills, Calif., offices of Dr. Lewis Fielding, Ellsberg's psychiatrist.

"Not only was the film developed, however, but it was reviewed by CIA supervisory officials before it was returned to Hunt," the report states. "One CIA official who reviewed the film admitted that he found the photographs 'intriguing' and recognized them to be of 'Southern California.' He then ordered one of the photographs blown up. The blowup revealed Dr. Fielding's name in the parking lot next to his office. Another CIA official has testified that he speculated that they were 'casing' photographs."

According to the report, "recent testimony" showed that the CIA official who reviewed the photographs "immediately" reported their contents to Deputy CIA Director [illegible] assistant. The report says Cushman and his assistant denied ever having been told of the photographs by anyone.

The report asserts, and the CIA denies, that it was only when these photographs were developed that assistance to Hunt by the agency was terminated. According to the CIA, "The decision to cut off support to Hunt was made in the face of escalating demands and was not based upon the development of the photographs."

The report also challenges "previous public CIA testimony" that claimed that the CIA had no contact with Hunt at all after Aug. 31, 1971. The Ellsberg break-in occurred Sept. 3, 1971.

According to the report, "recent testimony and secret documents indicate that Hunt had extensive contact with the CIA after" Aug. 31, 1971, that Hunt played a "large role" in the preparation of a psychological profile of Ellsberg that was completed in November, 1971, and that Hunt had other contacts with the CIA.

According to the report, Hunt and his fellow Watergate conspirator, G. Gordon Liddy, who is now on trial on federal charges arising from the Ellsberg break-in, told a CIA psychiatrist that they wanted to " 'try Ellsberg in public, render him 'the object of pity as a broken man' and be able to refer to Ellsberg's 'Oedipal complex.' "

The report says Hunt asked the CIA psychiatrist not to reveal Hunt's discussion of the profile to anyone else at the CIA. But the psychiatrist, according to the report, was "extremely concerned about Hunt's presence and remarks" and reported them to his CIA superiors. The report says the committee has asked to see memorandums of the psychiatrist and his superiors, but the request was refused.

In addition, the report states, the psychiatrist "also was given the name of Dr. Fielding as Ellsberg's psychiatrist . . ."

"While Director Helms has denied that he was ever told that Hunt was involved in the CIA's Ellsberg profile project, the report asserts, "it is not without significance that

the time period during which the CIA psychiatrist was briefing his superiors of his concerns regarding Hunt was circa Aug. 20, 1971 — a week prior to the developing of Hunt's film of 'intriguing' photographs of medical offices in Southern California which impressed at least one CIA official as 'casing' photographs."

The CIA responded to the report that at the time it developed the photographs for Hunt, Fielding's name had no meaning to the agency personnel involved. In addition, the CIA stated, "Ambassador Helms (Helms is now ambassador to Iran) has testified that he had no knowledge of E. Howard Hunt's role in the profiles. The former director of security for CIA has testified that he was never advised of Hunt's role in the profiles. Further, there is no other agency official who had knowledge of both the provisioning of Hunt and Hunt's involvement in the preparation of the Ellsberg profile."

The section of the report dealing with Eugenio Martinez asserts that Martinez, a CIA operative, alerted his CIA superiors that Hunt was in Miami in early 1972. The response from the CIA to Martinez's superiors, according to the report, was that Hunt was involved in domestic White House business and to "cool it."

Attempts to examine some CIA reports concerning Martinez by the committee have been frustrated by the CIA, the report asserts.

"Because of Hunt's close relationship with Martinez at a time when Martinez was a paid CIA operative, the basic question arises as to whether the CIA was aware of Hunt's activities early in 1972 when he was recruiting Cubans to assist in the Watergate break-in," the report states.

In response, the CIA asserts, "There is no evidence within CIA that the agency possessed any knowledge of Hunt's recruitment of individuals to assist in the Watergate or any other break-in."

The report also discusses the destruction of records by the CIA about one week after the agency received a letter from Senate Majority Leader Mike Masnfield (D-Mont.) in January, 1973, asking that "evidentiary materials" be retained.

Helms, the report asserts, ordered that tapes of conversations held within offices at CIA headquarters be destroyed. In addition, the report states, "on Helms' instruction, his secretary destroyed his transcriptions of both telephone and room conversations" that may have included conversations with President Nixon, White House chief of staff H.R. (Bob) Haldeman, top Presidential domestic adviser John D. Ehrlichman and other White House officials.

Helms and his secretary have testified that the conversations did not pertain to Watergate, the report states, adding, "Unfortunately, any means of corroboration is no longer available."

Two facts about the destruction are "clear," according to the report. "First, the only other destruction for which the CIA has any record was on Jan. 21, 1972, when tapes for 1964 and 1965 were destroyed . . and secondly, never before had there been a destruction of all existing tapes."

The committee obtained summaries of agency logs of conversations held within the CIA, but "it is impossible to determine who was taped in many of the room conversations. In this regard, even the CIA's analysis does not provide this vital information. There are several references to a 'Mr. X.' The CIA has not produced the actual logs for our examination. However, we were informed that there are 'gaps' in the logs."

In this regard, the report also cites a struggle within the CIA over whether it would produce information concerning Lee R. Pennington, a CIA operative who assisted the wife of Watergate consirator James W. McCord Jr.—a former CIA employee—in destroying papers at her home shortly after the Watergate break-in.

The Pennington information may have been "extremely sensitive" for two reasons, the report states—first, because the CIA misled the FBI when it earlier tried to investigate Pennington by diverting the FBI to another man named Pennington; and second because Pennington may have been a "domestic agent," operating in the United States in violation of the CIA charter, which generally limits the agency to intelligence activities abroad.

The report does not make clear what domestic activities Pennington may have been involved in, although the report contains a passing reference to a CIA file on columnist Jack Anderson.

The report states that an unnamed CIA personnel officer became concerned that the CIA was trying to withhold information about Pennington from the Senate Watergate committee. The report says this personnel officer testified in closed session before the committee that he told a superior, " 'Up to this time we have never removed, tampered with, obliterated, destroyed or done anything to any Watergate documents, and we can't be caught in that kind of bind now. We will not do it.' "

Subsequently, the report states, the personnel officer "prevailed and the information was made available to this and other appropriate congressional committees."

The report also discusses the activities of Robert Bennett, president of Robert R. Mullen and Co., and Hunt's employer until shortly after the Watergate break-in.

Mullen and Co. was used as a "front" for CIA agents overseas. Bennett, according to the report, kept his CIA contact informed of his efforts to give information to interested parties in an effort to avoid involving the Mullen firm in news stories and legal actions stemming from the Watergate break-in.

The report asserts that Bennett "funneled" information to Edward Bennett Williams, then a lawyer for the Democratic National Committee and The Washington Post, through another Washington lawyer, Hobart Taylor.

Williams said yesterday that he never received any information directly from Bennett and was not aware that information received from Taylor—which Bennett said was "useless"—had come from Bennett.

Bennett confirmed that he had never met Williams. "The description of what I did with regard to Williams is not an accurate characterization," Bennett said in a telephone interview yesterday, "but I simply don't know where to start with regard to this report."

WASHINGTON STAR
5 July 1974

CIA and Watergate

While the CIA-Watergate-Nixon story handed out the other day by former White House aide Charles Colson is patently absurd in its larger dimensions, a report released since then by Senator Howard Baker of the Watergate Committee indicates there may be at least a few kernels of truth in it.

The Baker report in no way substantiates Colson's implication that the Central Intelligence Agency was behind Watergate and that President Nixon was scared to death of the agency. But it indicates that the CIA has not told all it knows about Watergate and the Ellsberg break-in.

The report establishes fairly conclusively that the Washington public relations firm for which Watergate conspirator E. Howard Hunt worked before he started burgling and bugging for the White House and the Nixon re-election committee was a CIA front.

The report also asserts that a CIA operative named Pennington broke into the residence of Watergate burglar James McCord Jr. shortly after the Watergate break-in and destroyed documents that might show a link between McCord and the CIA. And then the agency tried to steer the FBI off the scent by giving investigators information about a different Pennington who formerly worked for the CIA.

The report says the CIA destroyed tape recordings of conversations of top CIA officials with President Nixon and high White House aides. And there was that silly red wig that the CIA furnished Hunt, along with false identification papers, a voice changer, camera and tape recorder.

The relationship of CIA to Watergate and the other covert operations that have come to light in the investigations bears further scrutiny by appropriate governmental authorities. It is evident that CIA was messing around in domestic affairs, and whether the involvement was large or small, domestic affairs are none of the agency's business.

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
3 JUL 1974

The Watergate Guilt Does Not Belong to Institutions

By JAMES WIEGHART

Washington, July 2 (News Bureau) — Sen. Howard Baker's Watergate committee report detailing the role of the CIA with the burglary team financed by President Nixon's campaign committee takes us full circle as we head into the third summer of the nation's worst political scandal.

In the immediate aftermath of the June 17, 1972, break-in and bugging of Democratic National Headquarters, there were strong signals from the White House that the Watergate black-bag job was the work of a bunch of right-wing Cubans, led by a pair of ex-CIA spooks, who were convinced that the McGovernized Democratic Party would lead the country straight into the embrace of Red dictator Fidel Castro. Just a bunch of well-meaning, but misguided, patriots, that's all.

The early stories emphasized E. Howard Hunt Jr.'s CIA role in the Bay of Pigs disaster a decade before and the fact that the Cubans had also taken part in that abortive adventure. President Nixon has disclosed that he was so concerned about the CIA connection that within a week after Watergate he directed his two top aides, H.R. Haldeman and John D. Ehrlichman, to see that the FBI investigation into the break-in didn't uncover CIA operations.

But alas for the administration, the sensational nationally televised Watergate hearings last summer showed that Watergate was not planned and approved out in some dark room at spy headquarters in Langley, Va., but in the office of then Attorney General John Mitchell, Nixon's campaign chief.

And the hundreds of thousands of dollars that financed the Watergate and Ellsberg, burglaries, along with a good many other illegal activities, and the subsequent coverup did not come from the CIA's well-filled coffers but from cash-filled safes at the Committee for the Reelection of the President.

The CIA theory gradually collapsed under the weight of last summer's evidence, as did other spurious speculations, such as the White House-advanced notion that Nixon had to turn over the Ellsberg investigation to his own merry band of "plumbers" because FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover was too chummy with Ellsberg's father-in-law.

However, as summer 1974 rolls around, the CIA connection pops up again, like crab grass. Former Special White House Counsel Charles W. Colson has spent the last several weeks hinting to reporters that the CIA not only planned Watergate, but later used it cleverly in an aim to destroy the Nixon administration. Never mind that Colson, who will begin serving one-to-three in the federal pen next week for obstructing justice in the Ellsberg case, was a college classmate of Hunt and was the one responsible for getting the retired spy his White House plumber's job.

So now comes Baker, the Tennessee senator who looks like Johnny Carson and who delighted TV audiences during last summer's Watergate hearings by drawling that what he wanted to know was "what the President knew and when he knew it," with his own contribution to the CIA myth.

CAPITOL STUFF

It's all there in Baker's report: How the CIA furnished Hunt with a false ID, a wig, a camera, a speech-altering device and other spy stuff; how the CIA worked up a psychiatric profile of Pentagon Papers leaker Daniel Ellsberg; how most of the Watergate team had ties with the CIA; and how the CIA was less than forthcoming with FBI investigators after Watergate.

Baker's report is, of course, all true as far as it goes. But left unsaid was how the CIA got conned into providing materials and the psychiatric profile on direct orders of the White House, transmitted by Nixon's top aides in the President's name.

Damage to the Bureaucracy

The central point here is that one of the great tragedies of Watergate is the damage that has been done to the federal bureaucracy, particularly the intelligence and law-enforcement agencies. Not only the CIA, but the FBI, whose agents were sent on wild-goose chases by the White House and whose former acting director actually was called on to and did destroy Watergate evidence.

Ditto for the Justice Department, with its reputation blackened by the conviction of former Attorney General Kleindienst and the still-pending Watergate coverup indictment of Mitchell. The image of the Internal Revenue Service, called on to punish the administration's "Enemies" with audits and reward the administration's friends by going easy on their tax problems, has suffered as well. But why go on? The point is that the political crimes of Watergate were performed by individuals, not institutions like the CIA, FBI or IRS.

WASHINGTON STAR
2 JUL 1974

Vic Gold:

On The Latest CIA 'Plot'

Former White House aide Charles W. Colson has developed a detailed theory — which he says is generally shared by President Nixon — that the Central Intelligence Agency is implicated in the Watergate scandals to a far greater extent than has ever been disclosed. — News report

Jim Garrison, Mark Lane, Norm Mailer: where are you now, when your President needs you?

All you true believers in the omni-malevolence of the Central Intelligence Agency — are you ready for another Conspiracy Theory? Good, because this one is wild. Almost as wild as the one Norm was handing out last year about the mystery of Marilyn Monroe's death.

Yes, indeed, there's a fresh CIA plot just waiting to be stirred. One that cries out for experienced hands. You've all been the route, from How-the-CIA-Killed-John-Kennedy to How-the-CIA-Caused-Hurricane-Agnes. So it figures that if Chuck Colson and Howard Baker are going anywhere with their theory of How-the-CIA-Is-Responsible-for-Watergate, they could use your help.

THAT'S SEN. Howard Baker, of course, who was Sam Ervin's sidekick last summer during the Senate Watergate hearings. Baker has been trying to sell his CIA's-the-One line around Washington for the past six months, but with no success. He says it's because the CIA won't cooperate. If you ask me, though, Jim/Mark/Norm, it's because the Tennessee senator keeps talking in parables. Stuff about "animals crashing around in the forest," and the like.

Now, Jim, you know, from your experience gulling the voters of New Orleans (until they finally tired of your act), that talking in parables isn't the way to get a good conspiracy theory going. No, to sell a CIA scenario that people will listen to, a man's got to lay it on the line. The way Colson did last week.

And let me tell you, gentlemen, when Chuck Colson runs a CIA conspiracy theory up his greased flagpole, folks stop, look up and listen. Because Chuck was right there with the President himself. And the way he tells it, the Old Man was fairly quaking over the possibility that the CIA might succeed in a [illegible] operations.

NIXON, said Colson, is "convinced the CIA is in this up to their eyeballs." Sound familiar, Jim/Mark/Norm? Why, it's practically a line taken straight from one of your left-wing texts about the John F. Kennedy assassination. Except, Mark, whereas you titled your book on that subject "Rush to Judgment," I think what we have here is more like "Rush Away from Judgment."

It's as if they sat around the White House one afternoon, the Old Man and Chuck, and thought: The liberal media want a scapegoat for Watergate. O.K., give 'em the CIA. But what could the CIA have in mind, getting "up to their eyeballs" in this sort of mess?

Well, says Colson, the President's theory is "they were coming in . . . to spy and they wanted to get enough on the White House so they could get what they wanted."

And what do they want? That's where we're counting on you, Jim/Mark/Norm. Because, you see, Chuck can only go so far elaborating on a CIA conspiracy. Beyond a certain point, he lacks your experience filling in outlandish details about such things. That is, in explaining to the American people that what the CIA really wants — in league with its allies, the FBI, the Pentagon, those Texas oil millionaires, Burt Lancaster, Kirk Douglas and the rest of the [illegible] "Seven Days in May" — is absolute power. Nothing less.

GENERAL

WASHINGTON POST
8 July 1974

Peace Promises Oversold, Ex-Intelligence Official Says

By Marilyn Berger
Washington Post Staff Writer

'I think the cautionary aspects of this experiment in the diplomatic approach toward the Soviet Union . . . may have been submerged in the need for domestic political triumph.'

In the aftermath of the Moscow summit, a leading analyst of Soviet affairs has expressed concern that the promise of "a generation of peace" is being oversold to the American people as an accomplishment rather than a hope.

The Soviet Union, meanwhile, maintains its goals of expanding its economic and political power in the world, he said.

The Soviets, according to Ray S. Cline, the former director of intelligence and research at the State Department, "use the circus and theater of summitry in their own world strategy of peaceful coexistence. Richard Nixon appears to be using it to make domestic political gains.

"The administration is confusing the American people because it is talking about the prolonged reduction of international tension and a generation of peace. In the American view this means an absence of conflict, but in the Soviet view it means only no nuclear war while the 'class struggle' continues economically and politically around the world."

The Soviet Union, Cline said, believes that the "correlation of forces" in the world—especially the weakening of the United States as a result of its internal economic and political problems—will inevitably lead to the victory of Soviet power.

Cline was the chief of the analytical staffs on the Soviet Union and China in the Central Intelligence Agency and later deputy director of the CIA before he went to the State Department.

He is now director of studies at the Georgetown University Center for Strategic Studies.

Cline said the experts in government are well aware of what is happening and are reporting fully on the Soviet policy and attitudes. Numerous outstanding Sovietologists have been making the same points in scholarly journals, books and congressional testimony.

"But," Cline said, "I think the cautionary aspects of this experiment in the diplomatic approach toward the Soviet Union—and toward China—may have been submerged in the need for domestic political triumph."

These were strong words coming from Cline, who has refused to let himself be quoted on government policy since he resigned from the State Department nine months ago. At that time it was clear that he was concerned that the problems of Watergate were interfering in the orderly process of conducting foreign policy.

Cline admitted that there was some irony in the fact that Mr. Nixon was now using cooperation with the Soviets when he had built his early political career in the 1940s and 1950s on Cold War rhetoric and virulent anti-communism.

Summit conferences like the one just completed, Cline said, tend to create an atmosphere of improved relations, but they also create the illusion that the Soviet Union and the United States share the same goals in seeking detente.

Actually, Cline said, what the Soviet Union, in an effort to obtain Western technology and consumer goods, is seeking, is peaceful coexistence—in Moscow's lexicon the avoidance of war, the support of world revolutionary forces, the shrinking of capitalist resources and the "class struggle."

"Detente," according to Cline, "is defined by most Americans as peace, stability, international cooperation, tolerance and convergence.

"One of the things that bothers me," he said, "is that we've got ourselves pretty well convinced that basic formulations of national purpose don't mean anything. Obviously ideological statements are not simple blueprints for future action, but they mean something."

He said, "This problem has been around a long time. I believe we tend to ignore ideology completely, just as we refused to believe what Hitler said about Germany in the 1930s."

Cline made his rather pessimistic remarks during a lengthy interview in his office in the quiet of a fourth of July weekend.

The paradox, he said, "is that if detente were really to succeed in our sense of the world, of opening meaningful contacts inside Soviet society, the Soviet internal control system would feel so threatened it would destroy those contacts. Therefore our concept of detente can continue only so long as it doesn't succeed."

President Nixon's description of a web of relationships drawing the Soviet Union into a detente that is irreversible, in Cline's view, is thus probably not in the cards.

"The kind of peaceful coexistence and detente which we do in fact have, a strong mutual interest in avoiding nuclear war, was established not by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger but by Jack Kennedy as a result of the education in international affairs he gave Nikita Khrushchev during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962," Cline said.

The basic outlines of present Soviet strategy, Cline said, was decided at that time. A very high Soviet leader came to the United States shortly after that crisis and told an American official that there would never again be a conflict on those unequal terms. The Soviet leaders decided then to have no more missile gaps, on land or sea. It was then that Moscow started investing in its big missile build-up toward a parity of forces with the United States.

"What we've had since, but without the hoopla surrounding detente," Cline said, "is the successful deterrence of nuclear war. Everyone has struggled since then on how to translate this into international cooperation and understanding—our concept of detente as distinct from the Soviet vision of continued, bitter struggle based on class and the need to support world revolutionary forces wherever they are."

At this point Cline pulled out a recent article from the influential Soviet journal Problems of Peace and Socialism to make his point. It said: "Peaceful coexistence is a specific international form of class confrontation, linked to the peoples' struggle not only for peace but also for the revolutionary transformation of society, to the strengthening of the socialist community and to mass actions against imperialism."

It is Cline's view that the American people must be educated about the Soviet perception of what is happening. Cline quoted from a recent monograph by former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Foy Kohler and others.

He noted that after the 1972 Moscow summit meeting Soviet spokesmen said the Soviet Union does not view the U.S. policy of detente as reflecting a change of heart but as a policy forced upon it by what the Soviets call "the social, economic and ultimately, military power of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries."

The quote continues: "The standard Soviet line has been, and continues to be, that 'the real alignment of forces in the world arena' has shifted against the United States."

Exaggerated hopes from summitry, Cline said, "create an illusion that tends to divide and confuse and produce apathy, not only at home but among our

allies."

In Europe, he said, there is "fear that a new Soviet-American relationship will lead to a diminution of the U.S. commitment to NATO, that there will be a withdrawal of U.S. forces and a lessening of economic cooperation, and hence increasing pressure on them to enter into long-term understandings with the Soviet Union which, in time, would neutralize them politically and strategically and, even sooner, provide opportunities for united front governments, getting Communist parties into power through the 'parliamentary road to socialism'."

Cline noted that this almost happened in France and could very likely occur in Italy within the year.

Thus the Soviet Union, Cline said, is using the atmospherics of summitry for its own ends. "Just as the Chinese saw the Peking summit of 1972 in the same terms as a thousand years ago they saw the arrival of delegations from tributary states to bear gifts to the emperor—first kowtowing nine times—the Russians, with a different psychology, out of their sense of insecurity, take pride that Nixon was coming to seek a modus vivendi with their now powerful state—and that when problems build up in the Middle East they can summon Kissinger to Moscow."

Soviet Communist Party chief Leonid I. Brezhnev is using summitry for his own purposes. He has, Cline said, "identified himself with peaceful coexistence of a kind which will permit the gradual growth of what he calls the socialist world, without serious danger of war with the United States, the only adversary the Russians fear."

Cline's concern is, first of all, that the American people be made aware of what is going on. "There is a need for what these days we call 'consciousness raising'," he said.

They should be urged, he said, "to focus on the economic and political conflict which continues, and not be misled by diplomatic spectaculars."

The Soviets he stressed, "have shown no interest in creating any web of relationships because they fear the penetration of Soviet society by hostile Western ideology." Instead, he said, they point to this desire for a "web of relationships" as demonstrating American weakness.

Cline's prescription for dealing with the Soviets entails first of all understanding what we are about. The United States, he said, should remain strong militarily, preserving its deterrent "whatever it costs."

It should trade with the Soviet Union, but on non-concessional terms. He has no objection to granting most-favored-nation status, which would only put the Soviets on a par with other nations. But he thinks credits should be limited only to those deals that would be economically beneficial to the United States.

"We should take care not to export our most advanced technology but to trade the products of that technology for Soviet raw materials," Cline said.

Finally, "we should make no large, long-term investments in capital unless there is no other opportunity for the development of those same resources," he said. This would mean that we should avoid investments in developing things such as Siberian oil and natural gas because of the uncertainties of long-term access to the products.

"We should offer concessions in limited fields," Cline said, "if and when, through quiet diplomacy, we can make progress in opening Soviet society to foreign contacts, which is, after all, what we have advertised detente diplomacy is all about."

NEW YORK TIMES
11 July 1974

Arms, After Moscow

By Herbert Scoville Jr.

McLEAN, Va. — Although no proof was probably needed, the agreements negotiated at the Moscow summit conference have demonstrated beyond a shadow of doubt that United States arms control goals have become hostage to impeachment politics.

No longer can President Nixon assert that his continuance in office is essential to bringing the arms race under control and making the world less vulnerable to a nuclear conflagration.

Quite the contrary. It is now clear that as long as Mr. Nixon remains in office we are doomed to increase nuclear competition, with all the dangers and costs it entails. His political survival rests on the appeasement of the conservative pro-military clique in Congress.

The summit meeting not only failed to mark any significant progress toward reducing the threat of nuclear war, it actually took us several steps backward.

■

The hopes that a broad permanent limitation on offensive weapons might be achieved have long been dim, but there remained a faint glimmer that some restraint might be placed on MIRV's—or multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles—those dangerous multiple-missile warheads that provide incentives for initiating a nuclear strike. But now these hopes have been dashed, and the large programs to procure new and more-threatening MIRV's will soon have progressed beyond the point of no return in both countries.

Secretary of State Kissinger was unwilling to bite the MIRV bullet, as it were, in the first round of talks on limiting strategic arms, when it should have been relatively easy to stifle these programs in their infancy, and now when he was willing to face up to this issue his efforts were sabotaged by Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, the military and the Congressional hawks led by Senator Henry M. Jackson and assisted by the recently resigned strategic-arms negotiator Paul Nitze.

A year from now the MIRV Pandora's box will be wide open and both countries will have MIRV's that will have the technical capability of threatening the other's land-based-missile deterrent. A major new rung in the arms race will have been climbed.

■

A year ago at the much-touted Washington summit talks, Mr. Nixon and Leonid I. Brezhnev pledged to seek to achieve a comprehensive, permanent agreement on offensive weapons by the end of 1974. Now a year later the goal of a permanent treaty has disappeared, and they are instead seeking the prolongation of an interim agreement to run until 1985.

This hardly seems like progress along the road to peace, of which President Nixon boasted on his return to the United States on July 3.

This retrogression was mandated by the need to allow the military in both countries to proceed with their colossally expensive new weapons programs, such as the Trident submarine and its Soviet counterpart, the new counterforce MIRV intercontinental ballistic missiles, and the supersonic bombers.

These are all bargaining chips for negotiations that will now continue for eleven years, and are hedges in case no permanent treaty is ever achieved. As Mr. Kissinger stated in his Moscow news conference, this will mean an "explosion" in numbers of weapons and technology in search of superiority, which he indicated is meaningless since both sides already have thousands of warheads.

But the most damaging agreement negotiated at Moscow was that related to underground nuclear testing, and for this the President alone must take full responsibility.

Soviet leaders had made it abundantly clear that they were prepared to sign immediately a treaty stopping all underground tests. In the United States, 37 Senators have cosponsored a resolution supporting the negotiation of such a ban; only the most confirmed hard-liners were reluctant.

Yet the Administration opposed a threshold treaty that would halt explosions only above a certain power.

To make matters worse at Moscow, this limit was set at greater than 150 kilotons of explosive power—ten times the power of the bomb used over Hiroshima in 1945—so as to have almost no effect on any current weapons development.

Such a threshold ban at this time in history would be worse than no ban at all. It would almost certainly prevent the achievement of a total ban for many years. However, the crowning act of superpower cynicism was to put off for two years—until March 31, 1976—the date when even this inconsequential restriction would take effect.

A primary objective of limiting nuclear tests is to inhibit the further spread of nuclear weapons to new nations. Under the Nonproliferation Treaty, effective in 1969, the United States and the Soviet Union undertook to negotiate seriously toward a complete ban on nuclear testing.

■

In the aftermath of the recent Indian nuclear explosion and the pro-

posed transfer of nuclear technology to the Middle East the problem of weapons proliferation should be given a high priority.

Yet the Moscow treaty—which must be ratified by the Senate—can only be viewed by potential nonnuclear countries as proof that the superpowers have no intention of exercising restraint or of fulfilling their obligations taken in exchange for the nonnuclear countries' giving up their option to acquire nuclear weapons.

Those countries will now undoubtedly feel free to confine the Nonproliferation Treaty to the scrap heap at next year's review conference and to make their own way into the nuclear-weapons jungle. The risk that we will all be incinerated in a nuclear holocaust has been immeasurably increased by the Moscow underground-test treaty.

Herbert Scoville Jr., Secretary of the Arms Control Association, was formerly assistant director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
30 June 1974

Doubt on Joint Space Flight...

BY ALBERT PARRY

In certain high-level circles in Washington and Houston there is talk going around that the joint U.S.-Soviet space flight planned for 1975 is little more than a "wheat-deal in the sky." The reason is clear: The Russians need it far more than we do.

The Nixon Administration is pushing it for political reasons—as a prop for the faltering U.S.-Soviet detente (which President Nixon is making additional efforts to preserve during his current visit to Moscow).

Albert Parry, professor emeritus of Russian civilization and language at Colgate University, is a Russian-born U.S. citizen who is the author of "Russian Cavalcade: A Military Record," "Russia's Rockets and Missiles" and "The Russian Scientist."

The scientific-engineering wisdom of the joint space flight is doubtful and is growing more so all the time. Indeed, we must ask: Is this trip necessary? For America, that is.

Knowledgeable men in Washington and Houston talk about their doubts informally, but they refuse to be identified. After all, their careers must be safeguarded. These are some of the points brought up in quiet conversations:

—Why go ahead with the Apollo-Soyuz flight? And why now? Engineers had discussed the possibility of a joint U.S.-Soviet manned space mission ever since 1966, but it was not until it assumed political significance that it was approved in both Washington and Moscow.

—If the flight is really to be a symbol of meaningful space cooperation, why so few other signs of cooperation? Those there have been were of paltry significance (exchange of weather satellite photos, of moon rock samples, of scientific papers the Russians would have gotten their hands on anyway).

Keeping close watch in London on scientific developments in the Soviet Union is Leonid Vladimirov, formerly a science writer-editor in the Soviet Union who defected during a trip to England in 1966.

Not long ago, he told me, "Only the Soviet side will gain from this (Apollo-Soyuz) project. True, your American experts may gather some more of an idea about the general level of Moscow's space achievements. But even without this project your specialists have, in the last half-decade, learned much about the Soviet *kosmonavtika*. There will be no other results for America—except, that is, for some questionable political dividends for the White House."

I asked Vladimirov: "Precisely what will the Soviets gain, and what might we lose, from the Apollo-Soyuz project?"

He replied, "They will learn more about the latest American technology while trying to conceal their own lag. In the process they hope to charm a few more American experts and businessmen with those vodka-and-caviar parties. And whatever new the Soviets find out from the Americans, they will use . . . (it) for military purposes.

"Then there is the Soviet propaganda aim. Here is what they will stress in their domestic and, later, foreign propaganda:

"First: 'Without us Soviets, the Americans could not develop their space technology any further, even if they did achieve their landings on the moon and their Skylab success. To make their next giant steps they simply had to have our Soviet technology and the help of our cosmonauts.'

"Second: 'All the disrupting cries by Andrei Sakharov and other dissidents could not, will not, prevent the American scientists and engineers—in addition to businessmen—from cooperating with us.'

"Third: 'All the world can see for itself that the U.S.S.R. is a peaceful nation and stands for naught but a most complete collaboration between nations, including disarmament'—with, I must add, no real control over the Soviet side."

Some facts about the Apollo-Soyuz mission are publicly known, but the Russians are giving the Americans as little information as possible.

U.S. astronauts will be allowed to visit the Soviet launch center at Tyuratam to check out some American-made equipment that will be installed in the Soviet spaceship. But the Americans will be flown to the airport at the Soviet base, will be taken to the assembly building in a blacked-out Soviet limousine, will check the equipment — and will leave the same day, not being permitted to stay until the Soyuz launch.

American astronauts confirm Vladimirov's opinion that they already have learned enough about the Soyuz to have misgivings about its primitive systems and the lack of real control by the pilot. One member of the U.S. link-up crew was heard to say about the Soyuz: "You'll never get me up in one of those."

The American side began Apollo-Soyuz flight planning with considerable enthusiasm. This was fostered by the initial belief that the Russians, with a dozen or more manned space flights to their credit since 1967, had compiled a record approximately equivalent to that of the U.S. Apollo program.

★

But as the 1975 link-up began to be studied in depth, as the Americans dipped into the available Soviet documentation of the Soyuz and started practicing in Soyuz ground simulators, the consensus emerged that—in terms of onboard capabilities and design—the Soyuz does not compare even with the American Gemini capsule of 10 years ago.

Some disquieting specifics: Soviet cosmonauts have little flight-planning flexibility, few malfunction indicators or controls, and minimal flight instruments. There is no onboard inertial platform or programmable computer.

Already, though, the Russians are trying to claim more than their proper share of credit for the project.

The Apollo is larger than the Soyuz (more than twice the weight and nearly twice the length of the Soyuz), but the official drawing used in the Soviet press shows the two spaceships as being of equal size. The docking module is American-made, and it is the Apollo attitude control system that will keep both vehicles stabilized during the link-up—but not a word of such important facts can be found in Soviet publications.

Finally, the Soyuz systems will run out first, and the cosmonauts will have to land after five days in space. The Apollo would be able to stay aloft for another week or more, but the sensitive Russians insist that both crews must land the same day.

No wonder the Russians want this project! As an American astronaut mused, "While they were ahead, there was no chance of their joining with us. They played their space

lead for all it was worth. Now that we've pulled way in front with Apollo and Skylab, they are very eager to cooperate in any manner we'll let them."

As for the U.S. side—leaving out the lure of detente—there is one viable reason for the project. Says an American expert:

"Until this link-up came up, we had no plans for manned space flights for the period between the end of the Skylab project in early 1974 and the start of flight-testing the Space Shuttle in 1978. Our experienced astronauts and our trained, professional ground support personnel—who are among this nation's greatest space assets—would have had to spend more than four years practicing without the real thing. That is why we need this link-up with Soyuz."

Still, the political reason dominates. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration is under pressure from the highest levels of government to carry out this mission without trouble. Why is the project so important?

Even President Nixon's severest critics admit that his foreign policy moves have been commendable. As the morass of Watergate infects the national political scene, and as rising prices and possible renewed energy shortages threaten, foreign policy spectaculars remain the last ace-in-the-hole for Mr. Nixon.

Detente is very popular now—as long as one does not think too much about the concessions the United States was forced to make at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks—and what better symbol of detente could there be than a Russian-American space mission?

The symbol is all the more important as the reality becomes less pleasant to contemplate.

NEW YORK TIMES
2 July 1974

Power and Saintly Purity

By Peregrine Worsthorne

LONDON—Any public man who has ever succeeded in doing anything must be aware of how vulnerable his conduct is to moral judgment. Every biography of a great statesman bears this out. There are always skeletons in the cupboard; always incidents where even the most illustrious and heroic figure behaved with less than total honesty or truthfulness.

Such a statement is certainly not intended to be provocative or controversial. It is, of course, the merest truism. The exercise of power cannot be combined with saintly purity, since once a man assumes responsibility for public affairs, the moral simplicities within which it is just possible, with luck, to be able to lead a private life are soon hideously complicated to an extent that precludes all clear distinctions between right and wrong.

A healthy public opinion understands this, and judges its public men accordingly, allowing them some latitude. It is always a question of applying a sense of proportion of turning a judiciously blind eye, of having a feel for what is excusable and what is not. Mass opinion sometimes needs guidance in these matters, which is what a properly functioning "Establishment," or governing order, should be able to supply.

What is so disturging about the Kissinger affair is that it demonstrates a total failure by the American liberal Establishment to do precisely that; worse, on an almost hysterical determination to do precisely the opposite.

By any standards of common sense it is ridiculous that the Secretary of State should be so unnecessarily involved in a major row threatening his moral credibility. Yet the quality press, whose job it ought to be to get these matters right, to articulate the Establishment voice of worldly wisdom, has taken the lead in getting them wrong and articulating the voice of unworldly stupidity.

It may well be that Henry A. Kissinger was rather less than frank in his Senate evidence about the part he played in the telephone tapping of his colleagues, and of certain members of the press. Possibly the documents will show that he did more than assent to it, and positively encouraged and even ordered it.

More likely it will show nothing wholly conclusive either way. But this surely is not the point. The point is that the question is not terribly important; certainly not important enough to risk endangering the American national interest by discrediting a highly successful Secretary of State.

To some extent this can obviously be explained by Watergate, which has shown the dangers of excessive cynicism. But an attitude to the exercise of power which contains too little cynicism is quite as dangerous as one which contains too much. And in the aftermath of Watergate, this second danger may be the one that needs watching most.

What is new today in all advanced societies is the extent to which intellectuals determine the climate of Establishment opinion because, with the dependence of almost all forms of large organization on specialized knowledge, academics have become so much more an integral and highly influential part of the power structure than ever they were before. But they do not feel at home in it. Theirs is the world of theory, of concepts, of ideals, or talking rather than doing.

For the first time, in short, the new power structures include an element of growing influence—based on brain power—which finds the moral ambivalence inherent in the exercise of power alien, not to say shocking, to its own values.

That this development should coincide with Watergate is distinctly unfortunate for the United States, since everything about the Nixon Administration has seemed to justify and deepen this resistance to a proper understanding of the painful and ugly realities of power. But the absurd Kissinger affair surely underlines how dangerous it is if public opinion comes to be dominated by influences constitutionally incapable of understanding these realities.

Nothing would be gained if, in escaping from the nightmare world of Richard Nixon and Watergate, the United States took refuge in the dream world of The New York Times and The Washington Post.

Peregrine Worsthorne is a columnist for The Sunday Telegraph of London. This is adapted from that newspaper.

WASHINGTON STAR
8 July 1974

Milton Viorst:

The Heritage of Moscow

By diplomatic standards, Richard Nixon's trip to Moscow must be judged a disaster. Presidents of the United States aren't supposed to go to the summit, exchange a few smiles, sign a vapid communique and return home empty-handed.

But diplomatic standards, in these times, are secondary. These are impeachment times, which I presume will not characterize the future indefinitely. Understandably, Nixon measures the trip in impeachment terms — and he probably came out ahead.

I don't know which government must assume greater blame for the failure to reach a disarmament agreement. Secretary Henry Kissinger's strange statement put the onus equally on Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, neither able to control his military establishment. It was further evidence of an increasingly angry man.

KISSINGER SURELY recognized that, without impeachment, might have been willing to make con-

cessions, to take risks in the interests of disarmament. An impeachable Nixon, cannot afford to take such risks and alienate the pro-military right wing in the country, his last body of unflinching support.

So the Moscow visit was pure ceremony, which is not necessarily bad. In 1972, Nixon went to Moscow and, after the long years of confrontation over the Vietnam war, his presence there conveyed the symbolism of a new relationship.

A decade or so ago, during the transitional era between Eisenhower and Kennedy, the very principles of summitry (what purpose did it serve?) were a regular topic of conversation in diplomatic circles and the press.

It was accepted then that summit meetings which have no positive results tend, by their nature, to have negative results. Such meetings tend to solidify disagreements, in having them sanctified by heads of state, and to signal these disagreements to the entire world.

Nixon's visit, I suspect, achieved just that result. Although Nixon insists publicly that the momentum toward disarmament has been accelerated, I suspect it's been stopped dead in its tracks.

NIXON AND BREZHNEV tell us that the low-keyed talks will resume, and we all might as well hope for the best — but there is little doubt what the failure of this summit will mean in other countries.

It is foolish to imagine that middle-sized powers around the world will not be influenced by the example which the big powers have set in Moscow. The reasoning of the middle-sized powers goes like this: If you guys, who have this fantastic capacity for overkill, can't keep yourselves under control, then why should we?

The latest count on countries with the unrealized potential for nuclear weaponry has, according to American experts, soared to 24. Thanks to India, Pakistan will be next. Why not, one day, Costa Rica or Tanzania?

Americans have largely convinced themselves, right or wrong, that the big powers have too much good sense to fire these weapons. But what about the other 24? That question, alas, is the heritage of the Moscow summit.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
4 July 1974

Rosy Theme Startles Negotiators in Geneva

Optimistic Tone of Moscow Communique Surprises Delegates Locked in Dispute

BY JOE ALEX MORRIS JR.
Times Staff Writer

GENEVA—Western and neutral delegates to the European security conference expressed surprise at the relatively optimistic tone of the U.S.-Soviet communique issued in Moscow Wednesday on the subject of the conference here.

Delegates from the 35 nations at the conference are still locked in a tough dispute over whether to call a break in the conference for the rest of the summer. Both West European partners in the NATO alliance and European neutrals are dissatisfied with the lack of Soviet concessions on key issues, such as greater freedom of movement of both ideas and peoples.

The Moscow communique did not reflect this. Instead it referred to "substantial progress" being made here at Geneva, called for a windup of the conference "at an early date," and assumed that the results of current negotiations would permit this to take place "at the highest level."

This is, delegates pointed out, pretty much what Soviet Communist Party leader Leonid I. Brezhnev wants from the security conference. It is also what he signally failed to get from the late French President Georges Pompidou during his Soviet visit shortly before his death.

Taken together, it raised suspicions in many minds here that President Nixon did not take into account the serious reservations the Europeans have about winding up the security conference soon. These may come into clearer focus Friday when the plenum meets here for the second time to try to decide whether to call a summer recess.

The Russians are vigorously opposing the idea, and want instead to try to break the deadlock by elevating the level of delegations here. In informal conversations they have suggested raising it to deputy foreign minister level.

Several Western nations have countered that the present problems have nothing to do with the level of leadership, but concern substantive issues.

This was emphasized June 11 when the nine Common Market foreign ministers issued an unusual statement after their meeting in Bonn, in which they expressed their "surprise" at the lack of progress at Geneva. This stands in contrast to the Nixon-Brezhnev claim of "substantial progress" being made on "many significant questions."

Delegates here emphasized that they could not see that any "substantial progress" had been made between the foreign ministers' statement and the Nixon-Brezhnev communique.

The soviets have shown some indications they may be ready to make concessions on questions of acces information, family reunions across the iron curtain, and on advance notification and sending observers to each other's military maneuvers. This has been less specific than tantalizing, sources here say, but it will probably contribute towards extending the current session beyond the original July 12th planned cutoff date.

At the same time, delegates expressed hopes that earlier signs of American anxiousness to speed up the whole process of negotiation will disappear.

One also drew attention to an apparent contradiction in American policy. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, in a press conference held in Bad Reichenall last month, reluctantly agreed with the Common Market statement on the lack of progress at Geneva.

It was noted at the time that the endorsement appeared to be drawn out of Kissinger more or less against his will. The Moscow communique appeared likely to increase European fears that the United States will not join in a tough stand on the windup of the security conference — a suspicion some Europeans had even before Mr. Nixon went to Moscow.

WASHINGTON POST
8 July 1974

Summits and Human Rights

UNLESS MR. NIXON and Mr. Brezhnev address "the problems of humanity and the basic rights of man," Soviet dissident Andrei Sakharov said in a letter to the two leaders on the eve of the summit, their meeting will be "condemned to failure." But, one gathers, aside from some practical talk about emigration as it relates to trade, there is no evidence—certainly not in the communique—that this appeal was heeded. Mr. Sakharov himself spent the summit week conducting a hunger strike to dramatize the plight of Soviet political prisoners.

Three summits have only sharpened, not resolved, the broad issue he raised. It proceeds from the outrage which all decent people must feel at the continuing Soviet record on human rights. Earlier, Western liberals had hoped that contact with the West and the onset of detente would liberalize or "mellow" Soviet society, but Kremlin authorities responded instead by tightening controls. Others felt that the very process of industrialization would make Soviet ways and values "converge" with Western ones, but this prospect has been blocked by Russian tradition and Kremlin ideology alike. Soviet propagandists and well-meaning Americans cultivate the view that underneath, as people, we're all the same. In fact, underneath we're different in fundamental values: we have one view of the relationship between the individual and the state and the Russians have another. This is nothing to get excited or defiant about, but it cannot be ignored.

Two political strategies have arisen for relating this fact to detente. By the first, these differences in values are accepted, and diplomacy moves on to make the best government-to-government agreements possible, with the hope that a kind of political suction will carry some human rights causes along. This is the administration's strategy. Mr. Nixon and Dr. Kissinger have been extremely sensitive to Soviet threats to break off other diplomatic avenues if the United States expressed more than perfunctory concern for Soviet intellectuals, dissenters, Jews, constituent nationalities, and so on.

Sen. Henry Jackson's (D-Wash.) contrary strategy holds that internal Soviet liberalization is not just a welcome byproduct but an essential precondition of any real and enduring detente. Until the Kremlin is tamed by the political need to consider the wishes of the Soviet people, he feels, it will be free to act in arbitrary and hostile ways in foreign affairs. Mr. Jackson believes that the Soviet government, desperate for trade, is more vulnerable to American pressure on human rights than the administration has perceived.

The terms of this debate do not allow any single categorical resolution. But enough experience has been gathered under detente to support certain judgments.

First, a detente policy will not win the strong popular support it needs to be effective in other areas if it does not evince a serious concern for Soviet human rights. Not only do Soviet writers, dissenters, Jews, Ukrainians, and others have their American constituencies, but as a people Americans have shown that they demand that American values be reflected in American foreign policy. This is all the more so now that it is becoming generally clear that detente in its other aspects, such as arms control, is sticky and slow.

Second, different Soviet human rights issues cut different ways. The Kremlin's principal thrust is to maintain its control at home. Thus it is particularly open to pressures whose aim or result is to get certain people—Jews, writers—out of the country. But pressures meant to soften the situation within Soviet society touch domestic politics directly more and encounter tougher going. This produces an unhappy paradox: foreign pressures, if they succeed, may leave the Soviet Union a more *illiberal* place because they draw out of the country many individuals who might be pushing to liberalize it if they remained.

Third, it is not possible, or necessary, to avoid argument over how to press Moscow on human rights. That Mr. Jackson knew better than Dr. Kissinger over the last three years that the Kremlin would "give" on emigration to get trade, does not prove there is no effective limit on how hard the West can push. Indeed, the emigration-trade link may dissolve if Congress decides that, on economic grounds alone, trade with the Soviet Union should not keep receiving Ex-Im Bank subsidies. Pressures might then switch to political issues, such as relations in Europe. If the Russians want a full-dress European summit, for instance, why should they not first accept Western proposals on the exchange of information and people? Pressures should not be applied, however, unless the United States is prepared to have its bluff called. Each case must be thought out. Stalemates and reverses can't be excluded. They will produce, in the West, feelings of anger and guilt.

Finally, there is no justification to walk on tiptoe and to avoid speaking plainly and unprovocatively on appropriate occasions about human rights out of fear that Russian sensitivities and politics will be upset. The Russians are tougher than that. There is no need to be abusive but no need to paint pictures either. Russians routinely spout false and vicious stuff about Americans. The least Americans can do is offer the truth. Soviet officials often contend that they do not demand internal American changes as the condition of political agreements. But that is not out of delicacy; it is out of an absolute indifference to human rights on the part of the Soviet political establishment. Nothing illustrates more sharply and sadly this basic obstacle to an authentic Soviet-American detente.

NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, JUNE 30, 1974

Détente, With Caution

By Robert Taft Jr.

WASHINGTON—President Nixon is in Moscow to further the cause of détente. There should be no one in Washington who does not wish him success. But at the same time that we work for the lessening of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, we must continue to watch not just the rhetoric but also the realities of United States-Soviet relations.

Foremost among these realities is the discrepancy between the Soviet public endorsement of détente and the quiet but constant build-up of Soviet military power.

In strategic arms, the Russians are preparing to deploy four powerful new intercontinental ballistic missiles plus a new strategic bomber.

More ominously, they are moving to nullify the United States acceptance of the first agreement on the limitation of strategic arms, by adopting their own system of MIRV's, or warheads with multiple missiles.

In conventional armaments, their naval expansion is proceeding rapidly and includes the building of aircraft carriers. They are embarked on a major program to strengthen their conventional land forces in Europe, both with men and with advanced, high-fire-power weapons.

Nor do the private statements of Soviet leaders offer assurance. It is no secret that at the Prague conference of Eastern European party chiefs, Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet party leader, described détente not as a goal but as a tactic with limited duration. Détente is justified within the party on the grounds that it is acceptable to bargain with the devil as long as you cheat him in the end.

As long as these Soviet policies and attitudes persist we must base our diplomacy not on *pro forma* détente, but on diplomatic and military realities. The foremost of these realities is our need for a strong and independent China to act as a counterweight to the Soviet Union.

In our recent concern with the Middle East and with improving relations with Moscow, we have diverted our attention from Peking, with unfortunate results. The Chinese leadership has been increasingly open about its disappointment with the United States and its feeling that China has received little American assistance in reducing the Soviet threat.

It is clear that an important element in the current Chinese power struggle is the argument of the old Lin Piao faction that the understanding with the United States has failed and that the only way to reduce the Soviet threat is through a new alliance with the Soviet Union.

If we are to maintain China's current position as a counterbalance to Soviet power, we must take forceful measures to strengthen the United States-Chinese relationship. Secretary of State Kissinger in a recent but unfortunately little noticed address did re-emphasize the United States interest in a strong and independent China.

But the American effort must be in concrete terms. Specifically, we must make it clear that we would expect to give active diplomatic and material support to China in the event of a confrontation with the Soviet Union. We should carefully examine inclusion of China under the Nixon Doctrine, providing her with an opportunity to acquire the material she needs to defend herself against aggression.

Exchanges of ballet troupes and orchestras are all very well, but Peking is aware, if some here are not, that antitank weapons are rather more effective in deterring potential Soviet aggression.

This does not mean that we should fail to seek détente with Moscow. A real détente would, by definition, include a reduction of the Soviet military threat to all powers.

But as long as the current discrepancy exists between Soviet public pronouncements and Soviet military preparations, we cannot afford to abandon the traditional practice of counting the divisions.

In the current world balance of power, it is imperative that the divisions of China's Army continue to be stationed on the Soviet frontier.

Robert Taft Jr. is Republican Senator from Ohio.

WASHINGTON POST
9 July 1974

Victor Zorza

Kissinger's Strategic Challenges

At the end of last week's summit talks Dr. Kissinger issued an emotional challenge to his adversaries in both Washington and Moscow. The two most quoted remarks to emerge from his Moscow press conference set the stage for the next phase of the political struggle in both capitals. He said:

"One of the questions we have to ask ourselves as a country is: what in the name of God is strategic superiority? . . . What do you do with it?" What he had observed—in both capitals—led him to believe that "both sides have to convince their military establishments of the benefits of restraint, and that is not a thought that comes naturally to military people on either side."

The thought that came naturally to Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger was that this was an attack on him, and he retorted angrily that "we have firm civilian control in this country," that "there is no problem with the military." How Soviet defense minister Marshal Andrei Grechko responded is not on record, but an article he published just before the summit led CIA analysts to conclude that he too had gone out of his way to stress his submissiveness to the political leadership.

Kissinger evidently does not accept this picture of the realities of power, in either capital. In urging the Kremlin to "convince" its military establishment of the benefits of restraint, he is in effect telling Brezhnev to bring to a conclusion the power struggle with Grechko over the making of strategic policy which has proceeded fitfully in Moscow for the past few years. In return, he has undertaken to engage in a similar policy struggle with Schlesinger—and even, if need be, with Nixon.

This is evident from his remark, just before the summit, that if the President were faced with differences between his top officials, "then it is his duty to move ahead in the direction which he believes to be in the national interest, keeping in mind the views of all of his senior advisers, but, if necessary, choosing among them . . ." It was the duty of the President, "which I do not doubt he will exercise," to resolve disagreements.

He was not pushing Mr. Nixon—not yet—but serving notice on him that the time might come when the President would have to choose between the Schlesinger defense policy and the Kissinger foreign policy. Lest Mr. Nixon should feel inclined to shirk his duty, Kissinger pointed out that he must realize that "in the present climate" a fundamental debate was inevitable.

The "present climate" includes not only the strategic debate, but Watergate as well. The Kremlin's Washingtonologists examine Kissinger's utterances word by word and comma by comma, in much the same way that Western Kremlinologists study Soviet statements. His remark may suggest to them that Kissinger's post-summit press conference began to pose for Mr. Nixon the choice which Kissinger had previously adumbrated.

Kissinger's earlier resignation threat over allegations that he was involved in wiretapping would, if carried out, do more damage to Mr. Nixon than to anyone else. Without Kissinger, Nixon could not convincingly persist with the argument that he must stay in power to complete the "structure of peace."

Vice President Gerald Ford, on the other hand, has already said that if he became President he would retain Kissinger—and that he would drop Schlesinger. Ford has made his choice, but Nixon has still to make it. A Soviet analyst trying to determine which way Mr. Nixon will turn might well conclude that the President has no choice, that the resignation or dismissal of either Kissinger or Schlesinger would bring the administration down.

The Kremlin makes no secret of its belief that Schlesinger is responsible for the persistence of cold war tendencies in the administration. Schlesinger —as the Soviet press says—insists on retaining the "superiority" which Kissinger has denounced with such feeling. In the Kremlin's view, therefore, the retention of Schlesinger for the remainder of Mr. Nixon's tenure would mean that no progress could be made in strategic talks.

One conclusion the Kremlin may draw from this analysis is that, even if Mr. Nixon remains in power, he will be politically too weak to trade concessions with Moscow. Yet without mutual concessions, without imposing on the military of both sides the "restraint" which Kissinger demands, a strategic arms agreement will be unattainable.

But if Mr. Nixon is in no position to meet the Kremlin half-way, then Kissinger's advice to Brezhnev to take on Grechko in a full-scale power struggle is unlikely to be heeded in the Kremlin. Why should the Kremlin risk a major leadership crisis if the Nixon administration is committed to strategic "superiority" in any case? The administration's spokesmen, of course, call it "parity," but that is not how Grechko sees it, as his statements make quite clear.

WASHINGTON POST
7 July 1974

Joseph Kraft

A New Weakness in Our Global Relations

MOSCOW—The Moscow summit meetings last week provided a foretaste of the rough going the United States is apt to encounter in the international arena as long as President Nixon clings to office. The talks here showed plainly that Mr. Nixon has lost his clout in the most important of foreign affairs.

Moreover, the President's weakness is now beginning to rub off on his Secretary of State. Dr. Kissinger can no longer wield the club of a strong presidency to line up the American bureaucracy in the style required by his special kind of diplomacy.

Unmistakable evidence of the President's weakness abroad arose from his efforts to make the summit talks a personal victory. He repeatedly and publicly declared that the talks and their success depended upon "personal diplomacy" between himself and Secretary General Leonid Brezhnev.

But the Russians did not rise to that bait. On one occasion, which referred to the future, Pravda struck the term "personal" from the text of a presidential toast.

At the final banquet, Mr. Brezhnev made rejoinder to the President's stress on personal diplomacy by pointedly alluding to the American people and the American Congress. The Russians have come to understand that their future with the United States requires a thick diet of relations with all elements in American life. It says something of Moscow's changing view that a documentary film of Sen. Edward Kennedy's recent visit to Russia opened here last week.

Neither were the Russians prepared to oblige the President on the main matter of substance in the summit talks here. The big item on the agenda turned around proposals for a limitation on multi-headed missiles, or MIRVs.

The Russians clearly sensed that they had Mr. Nixon on the defensive. Secretary General Brezhnev presented proposals which would have allowed the Russians to catch up with the United States and perhaps achieve a decisive edge in 1980. The Politburo spurned more restrictive numbers put forward by Mr. Nixon.

Not only did the Russians feel able to hang tough, but it seems clear that the President could not have bought a slightly softer Russian position. Mr. Nixon depends on conservative votes in the Senate to overcome impeachment. The last thing he can afford is a nuclear agreement that would alienate such hawks as Barry Goldwater.

Congressional opposition was the more certain because the administration position on MIRV limitation has not been unanimous. Defense Secretary James Schlesinger actually wanted more restrictive limits on Soviet deployment than those set forth in the U.S. proposal which the Russians rejected. Had a deal been struck there would have been some murderous infighting within the administration.

For relations among the chief figures inside Mr. Nixon's government have been recently altered. Dr. Kissinger used — by invoking the President's authority and by playing a close, inside game — to force his own positions on the rest of Washington.

But the presidency which he once brandished as a club has turned into a banana. Independent-minded men, such as Dr. Schlesinger, can and do take positions which differ from those of the Secretary of State. Dr. Kissinger now has to make treaties with the Washington opposition instead of overcoming it by main force.

It says a good deal that during the Moscow visit various Russians expressed a keen interest in a visit from the Defense Secretary. It also says something that Dr. Kissinger hung back in the negotiations, and once, not entirely in jest, said, "Nobody tells me anything. I just follow ten paces behind."

What was achieved at the Moscow summit, in these conditions, is not to be disparaged. The condition called detente was maintained. Some accords which provide for further cooperation were signed. A truly bad deal was avoided.

No doubt it is unfortunate that more was not achieved. But no one should be in any doubt as to why the accomplishment was so meager.

The central fact is that the United States has a President crushed by the problems which have brought an impeachment process down upon his head. Even if he were a man of pure motive and unblemished conscience, he could not possibly separate out his own interest from the national interest. So long as he remains in office, the country will limp along in its most important international business.

WASHINGTON POST
Friday, July 5, 1974

An Epitaph for Detente

THE PREMIER diplomatic project of the Nixon presidency, to negotiate meaningful checks on the strategic arms race, is stalemated. The point of all previous arms control agreements was to build up political momentum to tackle the problem of strategic offensive nuclear arms. As recently as the last summit, that was the goal for this one. In Moscow, however, Mr. Nixon and Mr. Brezhnev evidently could not come near finding a mutually acceptable basis to put permanent controls on offensive arms or temporary stopgap controls on the development and deployment of the multiple-warhead missiles called MIRVs, technologically and politically the hottest brand of strategic weaponry. They could only agree to send their negotiators back to Geneva to negotiate a "new agreement," to follow the interim offensive-arms limitation expiring in 1977, to cover the decade ending in 1985.

Not everyone, of course, agrees that the summit reflects such a great disappointment. Mr. Nixon, as his TV audience Wednesday night could plainly see, has his own domestic political reasons to portray his diplomacy as fruitful and forward-looking ("the process of peace is going steadily forward"): this is his principal bulwark against impeachment. Mr. Schlesinger, the Secretary of Defense, having long worried of the possibility of ill-considered arms control agreements, at once offered the stoical view that the country should be relieved [illegible] have its dialogue with Moscow sustained. Certainly those who professed to fear that Mr. Nixon would give away the nation's security to compensate for his Watergate weakness have been proven wrong.

Before he left Moscow, however, Secretary of State Kissinger uttered what struck us as an apt remark. "Both sides have to convince their military establishments of the benefits of restraint," he said, "and that is not a thought that comes naturally to military people on either side." As a statement or allegation about the Soviet government, these words—spoken in Moscow, no less—are startling enough. As a statement or report about the American government, they are even more startling, suggesting as they do that President Nixon has not convinced the Pentagon and its political allies of those "benefits of restraint".

Recall the uncontested fact that Mr. Nixon went to Moscow without having resolved strong differences among his advisers on how to proceed on arms control. No one can say flatly what alterations in its position the Kremlin might have made but it is evident that President Nixon did not resolve the differences he brought to Moscow in a way making substantial progress possible. Certainly the American "military establishment" cannot be faulted for offering the President its best judgment of what the national security requires.

The President's responsibility, however, is to make choices among his advisers' competing judgments. In

the circumstances. it is hard to avoid suspecting that Mr. Nixon negotiated as he did not merely because he may have been swayed by the Pentagon's strategic arguments but because he wished to protect his domestic political position against attack from the right. In other words, considerations of political survival influenced his determination of the requirements of national security. Here is Watergate at work in the most dispiriting and insidious way.

This is not to dismiss the particular accomplishments of this summit. The agreement not to build a second ABM site is reassuring, and perhaps not entirely the foregone conclusion that many people had thought it to be. The threshhold test ban, which will limit underground tests of warheads larger than 150 kilotons starting in 1976, will strike many observers as late, weak and incomplete but it will evidently put a stop, two years from now, to certain arms work that both sides might otherwise have carried forward, and it sets some useful technical precedents—exchanging test-site geological data, for instance. Then, it is good news, if not exactly worth house-top broadcast, that Moscow and Washington will work on agreements to prevent the waging of war by modifying the weather, and to take a "first step" to control the "most dangerous, lethal" kinds of chemical warfare.

The political results of the summit, furthermore, are not to be dismissed. "Detente," we are all learning, can provide a framework for orderly discussion of difficult problems like the Mideast and Europe, even when solutions are remote. This fact is registered in the final communique. On trade, Mr. Nixon—wisely—seems to have made no promises which will precipitate a battle with Congress. The word he brings back on Soviet emigration policies will be especially important in this regard. The apparently common Soviet-American desire to make new bilateral agreements symbolizing progress in detente is leading to some pretty rarified areas, such as—this time —"artificial heart research." Mr. Brezhnev is to come to the United States next year. This is well and good. The more that summits become routine, the more they can perhaps be isolated—though of course there is a limit—from political tugs and pulls in both countries.

For all of this, the bottom line is that the dangerous arms build-up has not yet been checked. Both countries are now moving ahead to what Dr. Kissinger calls "astronomical" numbers of warheads. "What in the name of God," he declared to newsmen in Moscow, "is strategic superiority at these levels?" Barring a measure of mutual restraint in the next few years in the absence of a formal agreement, this just might be—at least in respect to the arms race—an epitaph for detente.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, SATURDAY, JUNE 29, 1974

Power in the World Economic Arena

By O. Edmund Clubb

PALENVILLE, N. Y.—The world is experiencing a massive power shift. There is talk of military budgets, multiple-warhead missiles, strategic-arms talks and counterforce strategy. But the real issues lie in the international economic arena. There, the United States and its allies battle among themselves, while the Soviet Union, a sometime enemy, is rapidly gaining ground.

The Nixon Administration's strategic concepts and tactical maneuvers are seriously flawed. In July, 1971, the President forecast that future world confrontations would be among the United States, the European Economic Community, Japan, the Soviet Union, and China. Confrontations promptly ensued, but they were primarily among the United States, the Common Market and Japan, and not with the Communist powers that the so-called free world had been organized to combat.

Later, Henry A. Kissinger hailed 1973 as "the Year of Europe" (with a role provided for Japan) but disputes persisted within the projected partnership and were aggravated by the Arab-Israeli war.

Though the full impact of the energy crisis on the international trade structure and monetary system is still to be felt, commercial patterns are being distorted, inflation magnified, and protectionism spurred in the capitalist world. Also, internal political weaknesses in the West will be aggravated by the growing economic nationalism of Third World countries, who threaten to have greater control over their valuable raw materials. The United States, Japan and Western Europe must share the limited supplies, or compete for them. The free enterprise system is not designed for sharing with competitors, and the United States produces an agricultural surplus with which it can pay some of the increased costs of oil imports.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization referred in its June 19 declaration to "sources of conflict between their economic policies," reflecting the actuality. Mr. Nixon's Moscow visit is to be viewed in that light.

The Soviet Union also faces industrial and agricultural problems. But it has not been involved in the capitalist world's economic feuding and has thus been spared major economic difficulties. Its gross national product climbs, its foreign trade is expanding, the ruble is stable. And the Soviet Union is more richly endowed with natural resources than even the United States. Possessing vast reserves of oil and natural gas, and over one-half of the world's coal, it is self-sufficient in energy, and in 1973 exported 118 million metric tons of petroleum and 4.9 billion cubic meters of natural gas. It also exports such goods as nickel, chromium and platinum-group metals —which other industrialized countries have to import.

The Soviet Union is in a position to produce substantial surpluses of energy materials and metals for export at a time when the E.E.C., Japan and the United States face major deficits of those goods.

Soviet trade with the West was up 40 per cent in 1973. Trade with the United States doubled over that of the year before, but West Germany was still the Soviet Union's chief capitalist trading partner. The present urge of E.E.C. countries and Japan in particular to exchange industrial equipment and technology for needed raw materials is only a fraction of what it promises to be in a short time. Just as the Europeans dealt directly with the Arab countries in 1973 despite American displeasure, so will they deal increasingly in the future with both the Third World and the Soviet Union.

The Nixon Doctrine disrupted our major alliances and was counterproductive. The Administration's attempts to assert American domination over the capitalist sector of the global economy has failed. World influence is now destined to flow not to those commanding the biggest nuclear warheads but to those wielding economic power. A fundamental adjustment of American foreign policy, relating it more effectively to a radically altered global economic situation, should be the order of the day.

O. Edmund Clubb was former director of the State Department's Office of Chinese Affairs.

LONDON TIMES
5 July 1974

The poppy crop that could cost Turkey dear

'A Bill to cut off all US aid to Turkey if poppy cultivation were resumed, is going through Congress rapidly now'

The Turkish Government is risking a major crisis in its relations with the United States after its decision to uphold an electoral pledge and lift the ban on the cultivation of the opium poppy, the source of morphine and heroin.

The American Government which regards Turkey as the origin of as much as 80 per cent of all the heroin smuggled into the United States, had made it "vigorously clear" to Ankara that to rescind the poppy ban would cause irreparable damage in their relations, if not a definite breach.

Under the current law in Turkey, the Government had to produce a decree by July 1 listing the districts where the ban must continue. This is intended to give farmers timely warning to switch to other, less lucrative, crops. This year's decree names all but six or seven of the main districts in the poppy-growing plains of south-western Anatolia.

The Americans accuse the Ecevit Government of choosing this issue, so vital to their drive against hard-drug addiction in the United States, merely in order to display "virility" in their external relations. They forecast that Congress would cut off all United States economic and military aid to Turkey in retaliation.

Turkish Government leaders shrug off the threats as outrageous. They insist that their motive is the economic well being of about one million Turks who live off this crop. They give solemn pledges that the product will be controlled so effectively that none of it will be diverted from the medicinal purposes for which it is intended.

United States officials asserted that the popy ban in Turkey, imposed in 1971 under strong American pressure, has had spectacular results in their campaign to check the spread of drug addiction in the United States. They said that a major heroin shortage in the United States in the past two years had forced many addicts to seek medical treatment. They attributed this to the ban, as well as the fact that the price of heroin in the streets of New York had risen from 18p to 63p a milligram by mid-1973, while its purity at street level had decreased considerably.

The United States Drug Enforcement Administration noticed a sharp decline in the total haul of heroin intercepted in the United States from 705 kilograms in 1971 to 219 kilograms in 1973—only 63 per cent of it white (therefore presumably Turkish) against 92 per cent in mid-1972.

The grave implications that a lifting of the poppy ban would have on United States-Turkish relations were recently conveyed by the American Ambassador, Mr William Macomber, jnr., personally to the Prime Minister, Mr Bulent Ecevit, whose Republican People's Party is the senior partner in the ruling coalition.

The Turkish leader was told of resentment in Congress where poppy growing in Turkey and the rate of drug-addiction in the United States were dramatically linked in a direct cause-and-effect relationship. Lester Wolff, Chairman of the House of Representatives Special Narcotics Subcommittee, stated recently: "If Turkey rescinds the ban . . . we may expect to lose an additional 250,000 young Americans to the ravishes of drug addiction."

A Bill to cut off all United States aid to Turkey if poppy cultivation were resumed, is going through Congress rapidly now. American officials said if the bill went through as it is, it would end United States military and economic aid to Turkey worth some $200m annually.

"If they go ahead with it", one American diplomat said, "relations between the two countries will never be the same again. To cut off aid will be felt here not so much as a financial loss as an insult from the United States."

The United States-Turkish opium controversy has gained nationalist overtones which reflect the Ecevit Government's eagerness to show—at home and abroad—that the days of unquestioning conformism in Turkey's relations with the West are over and gone.

Beyond this there is the awareness that the United States might ill be able to afford, at this phase in East-West relations, the removal of United States bases in Turkey.

To ensure effective control the authorities are expected to limit poppy-growing to areas totalling 50,000 acres in the six or seven main provinces. The cultivation of other crops in these districts will be banned so that aerial inspection would be possible.

The poppies would not be incised to drain the opium gum, but the plant will be surrendered as a whole to the state agents. The price is to be raised substantially to discourage illicit sales, seeing that in any event only a fraction of the price eventually fetched by smuggled narcotics reaches the farmer.

The Americans are accusing Turkey of violating an arrangement made in 1971 whereby the US budgeted a programme worth $35.7m for the payment of compensation to farmers for three years, as well as to finance crop substitution programmes. The Turkish Government denies the arrangement was binding. They have serious doubts that any form of control could be effective, especially after the discovery of a heroin laboratory in Turkey for the first time in 12 years last May.

A leading Turkish parliamentarian whose opinions influence the Government policies, said: "We know that this is one of the dirtiest businesses in the world. It does not give us joy to deal with opium, nor is it a question of challenge or prestige. But we must ensure the livelihood of about one million peasants before we ban the crop on which they made a living for centuries."

The US crop substitution programme was quite inadequate and although he was aware that the Americans were willing to pay a much higher price to keep the ban, nothing could be done this year:

Turkish officials and private individuals react sharply when the poppy dispute is treated as a problem of morality or ethics: "Why should Turkey be the only poppy-growing country which is being pressed to ban it. Just because the drug is not consumed locally as in other countries?", asked an influential Turkish journalist.

Mr Semih Akbil, the Government spokesman, raised a different objection: "The Americans manufacture guns and sell them freely", he said. "Each year about 100,000 guns are smuggled into Turkey. Do we ask the Americans to stop manufacturing guns? No, no. We just tighten our controls against smugglers."

Mario Modiano

THE ECONOMIST JUNE 29, 1974

Nuclear tests

All in secret

It is a measure of present British politics that the angriest public debate on defence policy in years should have been initiated by a speculative report in a daily newspaper. At the weekend Labour's left wing was up in arms because it thought Britain was about to test a nuclear weapon underground in Nevada; on Monday it discovered from Mr Wilson that the test had already taken place some weeks ago. The methods by which Mr Wilson tried to persuade the left that it had nothing to complain about cast more light on Mr Wilson's habitual politicking than on anything else. But it is a measure of the international self-confidence of the present government that it saw fit to keep secret as long as possible a smallish, non-polluting and wholly legal nuclear test conducted in strict accordance with Britain's international undertakings.

The real issue, and one that merited serious public concern early last year but did not get much of it, was whether Britain should install new tubes in its Polaris submarines to take the larger Poseidon missile with its multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles (Mirvs), or build new warheads for the American-produced missile bodies it already has. There are many factors involved: whether the United States will continue to supply spare parts for Polaris missiles that its own forces are now giving up; how much extra protection the submarines would get from Poseidon's longer range, which enables them to operate farther away from Russia; and whether it is really necessary to have a lot of Mirvs to get through Russia's anti-missile defences.

But the time for debating these things is now past. The 1974 British test means that the decision has been made: to design new warheads for the present

missiles. The actual installation could begin within a year. This is very likely the correct decision, and no British government should have hesitated to explain it, or to let the Soviet Union know about it. After all, secret deterrents do not deter.

It is the cheaper decision, by millions of pounds, compared with putting new tubes in the submarines to take Poseidon missiles. The money saved is money Britain badly needs to spend on its conventional forces. The extra range of the Poseidon, which is of immense value to the Americans, is not so valuable to Britain. Poseidon's Mirv warheads—10-14 per missile, compared with 3 cluster-type in Polaris—are primarily of use in avoiding and confusing a wide anti-ballistic missile defence of a sort that does not yet exist in Russia, and probably will never be built. Even if it is, a smaller number of warheads would probably still deter an attack on Britain.

So Britain's missiles are to be modernised, but not replaced. The Nevada test does not add to the number of nucl powers, as India's did last month; a unlike France's tests in the Pacific produces no fall-out. The aim of th who attack it is that Britain should ce to be one of the five accepted nucle countries. There was never any questi that Britain could pay the price or mus the technological skill to stay in t business. There was, and still is, as t great nuclear non-debate of 1974 sho a serious question whether British politi is up to coping with the nuclear age.

BALTIMORE SUN
11 July 1974

U.S. blamed for not agreeing to complete nuclear ban

By MICHAEL PARKS
Moscow Bureau of The Sun

Moscow—The chief Soviet government spokesman blamed the United States last night for the failure during the Soviet-American summit meeting to agree to a full ban on underground nuclear tests.

Leonid N. Zamyatin, the director general of the government news agency TASS, a participant in the summit talks, said the Soviet Union had wanted and still wants a flat prohibition against any underground testing of nuclear weapons.

The reason that President Nixon and Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet Communist party's general secretary, failed to reach such an agreement, Mr. Zamyatin said, was "the position of the United States."

"Our position is still," he continued, "that the Soviet Union stands for a complete end of underground tests of nuclear weapons."

American officials have openly said that they did indeed reject a complete prohibition at this time.

Henry A. Kissinger, the United States Secretary of State, told a press conference here at the end of the summit last week that Washington had opposed a complete ban because Moscow's conditions would make it impossible to verify and enforce and because, he implied, it was directed at China, making it appear that the two superpowers were trying to force an end to the Chinese nuclear weapons program.

Mr. Zamyatin did not go into the background of the negotiations on the new nuclear test ban, which bars underground nuclear weapons tests equivalent to more than 150,000 tons of TNT starting April 1, 1976, and his critical remarks suggested that Moscow wants to shift more of the blame for a lackluster, even disappointing summit onto Washington.

Mr. Zamyatin also attacked pessimistic Western assessments of the summit, which Soviet commentators see as modestly successful, as deliberate attempts to undermine public faith in detente itself.

In particular, he said that Western suggestions — which in fact originated with the analysis made by Dr. Kissinger — that the two superpowers were far apart on a new overall agreement to limit strategic arms is wrong.

"Skeptics who doubt that agreement are wrong," he said of the decision to seek a 10-year pact lasting until 1985.

There was "a big positive advance toward solving that problem" of limiting long-range missiles with their multiple nuclear warheads during the summit, Mr. Zamyatin maintained.

The failure to reach a permanent limitation and the outright declaration that both this type of agreement and even a short-term one are now impossible are the chief reasons for the pessimistic assessments made by Western commentators.

The discussion in which Mr. Zamyatin participated was apparently directed at answering these questions for the nationwide Soviet television audience and viewers in Eastern Europe, where the 40-minute program was also broadcast.

Mr. Zamyatin's carefully prepared comments were meant not only to innoculate these listeners against the Western assessments but also to answer Dr. Kissinger's continuing discussion of the summit's secret negotiations, sources here said.

The Kremlim has been particularly annoyed, the sources said, by Dr. Kissinger's disclosures to newsmen traveling with him in Western Europe of summit negotiation details. Some of the information he has given, the sources said, amounted to a serious breach of confidence.

The moderator of the television program, Valentin Zorin, a political commentator, took the occasion to attack Senator Henry M. Jackson, the Washington Democrat and, in the Soviet view, chief opponent of improved relations between Moscow and Washington.

"One must be very naive," Mr. Zorin said, "to believe that [Senator Jackson's trip to Peking during the Moscow summit] was an accidental coincidence."

American sources here provided additional background on the negotiations on the test-ban agreement, which supplements a 1963 treaty banning all nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space or in the sea.

The United States originally wanted a ban on anything above 150 kilotons, the agreed limit, but had wanted it to include peaceful nuclear explosions that in the end were excluded at Soviet insistence.

The American position itself was a compromise reached by various American government agencies and took into account a military desire to test new missile warheads for which a 200 kiloton limit would be low and the desire of arms-control experts to limit any underground explosions to less than 30 kilotons, which they said could be easily distinguished now from natural seismic disturbances.

LOS ANGELES TIMES
7 July 1974

TECHNICAL KNOW-HOW SETS STAGE

India's A-Bomb a Warning for U.S.

BY WILLIAM DRUMMOND

NEW DELHI—The Canadian government over the last 20 years gave India plentiful technical and financial assistance to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Times staff writer William Drummond is based in New Delhi.

Ottawa recognized too late that this assistance had opened the way for New Delhi to make an atomic bomb.

Although Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau tried by negotiations and eventually threats to head off India's steps toward building an explosive device, he could not.

Of all the reactions to India's May 18 atomic test, Ottawa's has been the bitterest, because the Canadians feel they were betrayed.

The history of the Canada-India nuclear collaboration, pieced together from interviews and documents, including previously unpublished correspondence between Trudeau and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, holds particular significance for the United States.

Washington wants to sell Egypt a nuclear reactor for the peaceful purpose of generating electrical power.

Critics of the proposal say it will provide Egypt with the wherewithal to make a nuclear bomb and lead to proliferation in the Middle East.

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger's response to these fears were expressed in a June 19 press conference:

". . . We see no possibility that Egypt can develop nuclear weapons by means of the reactor that we have agreed to sell; it will take six to eight years to install or build, and will be subject to safeguards which we consider substantially foolproof . . ."

The Canadians look at Kissinger's statements with skepticism. Their experience with India taught them one major, unforgettable lesson:

Safeguards and inspections, however "foolproof," can at best delay proliferation of nuclear weapons. They cannot stop it.

This is not because evasion is inevitable, but because evasion may not be necessary for long.

★

"Does the American plan for Egypt involve a transfer of technology?" asked an informed Canadian source. "That should be the main consideration. Protecting the source of plutonium is predicated on safeguards, but the inevitable element of risk is the transfer of technology, not safeguarding the reactor."

(Plutonium is the byproduct of the burning of uranium fuel in any nuclear reactor. The plutonium, after reprocessing, becomes the raw material for atomic explosive devices).

"Once a country acquires the technology to operate a nuclear power plant," the Canadian said, "it can then move on to building its own unsafeguarded nuclear power plants. It can then have access to unsafeguarded plutonium.

"As for acquiring explosion technology, the Indians got it on their own," the sources said.

The debate on the Egyptian reactor sale according to these sources, should not focus on safeguards on plutonium, but on whether America should give Egypt's technical elite a boost in a direction that would take many years for them to attain without external aid.

★

In this respect, Canada's nuclear aid to India was of crucial importance.

By October, 1971, Canada had brought 263 Indians to Canada for training in nuclear technology.

In addition, Canada had put up $10.8 million, about half the total cost, to build the Canada-India nuclear reactor called CIRUS at the Bhaba Atomic Research Center, Bombay.

Another $89 million in credits was extended by Ottawa to buy equipment for the Rajasthan atomic power project near Kota.

Against this background, Trudeau wrote to Mrs. Gandhi on Oct. 1, 1971:

"You will remember in our talks (the previous January) I referred to the serious concern of the Canadian government regarding any further proliferation of nuclear explosive devices. The position of my government on nuclear explosions has been stated on a number of occasions and you will no doubt be well aware of it.

"The use of Canadian supplied material, equipment and facilities in India, that is, at CIRUS, at Rajasthan, or fissile material from these reactors, for the development of a nuclear explosive device would inevitably call on our part for a reassessment of our nuclear operation arrangements with India . . ."

Mrs. Gandhi's response was cordial but noncommittal:

"The obligations undertaken by our two governments are mutual and they cannot be unilaterally varied. In these circumstances, it should not be necessary, now in our view, to interpret these agreements in a particular way based on the development of a hypothetical contingency."

The contingency was anything but hypothetical, as India's atomic blast last May 18 proved.

How had India gotten the plutonium?

It came from the CIRUS reactor, as New Delhi later informed Ottawa.

But the plutonium was not of Canadian origin. India had put its own uranium in CIRUS, and made weapons-grade plutonium.

India used know-how that was largely a spinoff from the many years of Canadian and, to a lesser degree, American technical assistance.

Under the CIRUS agreement, Canada had the right to inspect any Canadian uranium fuel in the reactor. However, CIRUS had not used Canadian fuel for several years.

India said the Canadian fuel had "corroded" in the reactor and as a result, Indian uranium fuel was substituted.

As the Canadians point out, the agreements for safeguarding CIRUS were worked out in 1956, 14 years before the nuclear nonproliferation treaty took effect.

Canada signed the treaty, but India never has.

It was impossible for Ottawa to impose inspection under the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Thus what Canada had to settle for was a limited inspection access, that is, permission to inspect only Canadian fuel.

This inspection was ineffective when India substituted its own uranium fuel. While reactors can be sealed off and inspected, knowledge cannot.

The CIRUS and Rajasthan reactors have made such a major contribution to India's know-how that New Delhi is now building wholly indigenous reactors, which will in turn become sources of unsafeguarded plutonium.

BALTIMORE SUN
8 July 1974

Reasoner became delivery boy when Russians pulled plug

Harry Reasoner became the world's highest paid delivery boy last week.

The $250,000-a-year ABC News anchorman, angered by Soviet censorship of American TV news reports from the Soviet Union, personally escorted a can of news film on a flight from Moscow to London, where he finally was able to feed the film via satellite to the United States in time for his network's Wednesday newscast.

The report, an interview by Russell Jones with Andrei Sakharov, the dissident Russian physicist, was one of six news stories abruptly blacked out Tuesday evening when Soviet technicians "pulled the plug" on CBS, NBC, and ABC.

All three networks telecast the abbrieviated and garbled reports—blackouts and all—and explained to American viewers exactly what had taken place.

Pressing Reasoner into emergency duty as a flying messenger proved to be a wise move by ABC.

Even after an official Soviet apology for Tuesday's censorship and a pledge that it wouldn't happen again, Russian technicians Wednesday night again refused to transmit an interview with Sakharov by a CBS newsman, Murray Fromson.

"They pulled the plug on us again," a CBS News spokesman said.

"The Russian engineers told Murray they thought his film was anti-Soviet and that they wouldn't transmit it. And they didn't. They just walked out and refused to rack up the film."

The CBS White House correspondent, Dan Rather, meantime, placed partial responsibility for the censorship on the Nixon administration.

"As far as can be determined," Rather charged, "White House officials did nothing to prevent the Soviets from making good on their threat [to censor]."

Rather and several other U.S. network newsmen who accompanied President Nixon on his summit trip to Moscow privately feel that the White House didn't want TV reports on Soviet Jews, intellectual dissidents or hunger strikes any more than Russian leaders did.

The newsmen believe the Nixon administration therefore applied little or no diplomatic pressure on the Soviet hierarchy to give American TV reporters freedom to transmit their choice of news stories during the Nixon-Brezhnev meetings.

Sources at the networks said the Soviet technicians who cut off the satellite reports were supervisory personnel and not rank-and-file workers as the Soviet government claimed. The lower-echelon workers were deeply embarrassed by the situation, the sources said.

Rather said there were no shouting matches or taunts exhanged between American newsmen and Soviet TV employees when the blackout occurred. Instead, he explained, there was quiet in the studio.

Finally, one American broadcaster called out to another, "Did they ever do this to us in China?"

"No, they didn't," another answered from the opposite side of the room.

The Soviet technicians said nothing, and the blackout continued.

Bill Sheehan, senior vice president of ABC News, said both the Secretary of State, Henry A. Kissinger, and the White House press secretary, Ronald L. Ziegler, "indicated they were very upset" by the Soviet censorship, and that they would register a formal protest if the networks requested it.

"It's really just an extension of the difficulty we always have in Russia with film cameras," Sheehan said.

"You have to hire your film cameras from the Russians and you have to tell them what story you want to do. And if they don't like the story, then there's no film camera available to you.

"But it was surprising that it could happen during this Nixon visit, in such a cordial atmosphere of diplomacy."

Knight News Service

THE WASHINGTON POST *Friday, July 5, 1974*

Censorship and Summitry

It was only a week after the United States Supreme Court had affirmed the principle that a free society can only remain free if the government keeps it hands off the news. Tuesday night, the Russian technicians who operated the "satellite feed" that brought pictures from the Moscow summit showed what happens when governments take into their own hands the right to censor public expression. Each time American broadcast correspondents tried to get out the story of what was happening to Soviet dissidents—with particular respect to the repressive precautions taken during Mr. Nixon's visit—the technicians cut them off in mid-sentence. It was a story the Russian authorities did not wish to have told while the summit was in progress, so they cut it off—just by pulling the plug.

It has never been easy for Western correspondents to get stories out of the Soviet Union that the government didn't want told. And it is certainly true that the Soviet Union is not the only government in the world that resorts to censoring what it dislikes to hear. Yet, the heavy fashion in which the Russians behaved on just this one occasion tells us all we need to know about the value of a free press and the price that is paid when an overbearing government intervenes. The story the Americans were attempting to tell concerned the general problem of the lives of dissidents in the Soviet Union, and especially their treatment while President Nixon was in town. The story of the way that Mr. Nixon's presence resulted in the Russian authorities rounding up their local critics and jailing them was of more than passing interest to the American people.

And yet Mr. Nixon's aides were conspicuously silent on the subject, declining to lodge any forceful formal protest, saying merely to whomever might be listening that the American broadcasters should have the right to cover and report whatever they pleased. It is somewhat disappointing that no one in the President's party was willing to defend, if only for the record, the elementary principles, so central to a free system of government, of a free press. Ironically, it was left to the Russians, by their abrupt interruption of the American broadcasters, to drive the lesson home.

WASHINGTON POST
9 July 1974
George F. Will

Moscow: Censorship and Persecution

In Moscow, Mr. Nixon embarrassingly and almost pathetically referred to detente as largely the product of his "personal relationship" with Leonid Brezhnev.

It might seem odd that a President, even one fighting impeachment and trying to convince an understandably skeptical public that he is indispensable to peace, should solicit public enthusiasm for his "personal relationship" with the commandant of the Gulag Archipelago. But these are odd times, as the summit demonstrated even before it started.

As Mr. Nixon prepared to fly to Moscow there were numerous reports that Brezhnev was preparing for Mr. Nixon's arrival by ordering wholesale arrests of the most conspicuously brave Jewish dissenters. Mr. Nixon gave no sign that he thought that anything untoward was happening.

Here was the leader of the free world placidly packing his toothbrush for a trip that he knew already was producing as its first (and, as it turned out, its most important) result the wholesale persecution of people whose only crime is adherence to principles of freedom.

It would have been an act of simple decency, and a useful political and diplomatic stroke, for Mr. Nixon to have made use of his "personal relationship" with Brezhnev by explaining to him that the arrests must stop or the summit would stop.

This would have demonstrated to an understandably skeptical American public that Mr. Nixon is not dead to all feelings of disgust about the bullying use of state power. And it would have demonstrated to an understandably skeptical Brezhnev that there is some Soviet behavior too gross for Mr. Nixon to tolerate in the name of detente.

But Mr. Nixon either did not dare or did not care to use his personal relationship with Brezhnev to stop the arrests that his own trip was causing.

Aside from Mr. Nixon's nonresponse to the persecution of the Jews, the most interesting aspect of the summit was the brutal Soviet censorship of all U.S. television broadcasts from Moscow concerning the persecution.

One reason Brezhnev arrested the Jews was to try to keep them away from American journalists. One reason Brezhnev censored the broadcasts to America is that he knew that he could do it without provoking a protest from Mr. Nixon, whose opinion of the press is no secret to Brezhnev.

The U.S. television correspondents should have insisted that the Moscow authorities transmit the stories about the dissidents before transmitting all those stories about Mr. Nixon and Brezhnev drinking toasts to detente. The correspondents would have given the Soviet government a choice—either all the news from Moscow, or none of the news. Both Brezhnev and Mr. Nixon care very much about televising those carefully staged events where they sign the documents proclaiming detente.

We have no evidence or reason to believe that Mr. Nixon uttered even a private protest to Brezhnev about either the arrests or the censorship. But if the arrests and the censorship occured in spite of what Mr. Nixon likes to call his quiet diplomacy, that is more evidence that the quiet diplomacy is as unavailing as the personal relationship.

It is interesting that Brezhnev's controlled press, in translating Mr. Nixon's remarks about the importance of the "personal relationship," gave Mr. Nixon a taste of censorship. The Soviet press dropped the word "personal" so that Mr. Nixon's remark would be read as just a reference to the relationship between two nations.

Marxism insists that politics (and hence politicians) are ephiphenomena —that history is a dialectic of vast impersonal forces moving ineluctably to a predictable climax. So a proper Marxist like Brezhnev rejects the notion that any "personal relationship" is really important in history.

Unfortunately, the tattered doctrine of detente rests on the blind hope that the Soviet leaders are not serious about their Marxist ideology. But they obviously do take Marxism seriously. It conditions their approach to detente. It assures them of the inevitable enfeeblement and eventual collapse of nations like ours.

DAILY TELEGRAPH, London
8 July 1974

U.S. FIRMS TO SHOW SPY GEAR IN MOSCOW

By Our New York Staff

Fears that some American secret intelligence systems may be compromised have been raised by the *Chicago Tribune*, which reported yesterday that many American and foreign firms making police equipment are being urged to take part in a Moscow exhibition on crime detection next month.

At least two American companies making the latest electronic crime-detection gear, which can also be used to gather political intelligence, have agreed to exhibit. A Middle West firm specialising in trade with Russia, Welt International Corporation, is trying to drum up interest.

A Chicago manufacturer who says he does not plan to exhibit, said: "It seems mighty strange that a country which maintains its has little or no crime would want our goods."

Department of Commerce officials emphasised that there are no regulations banning the export of police equipment to Russia.

NEW YORK TIMES
5 July 1974

AMERICAN IN SOVIET SAYS U.S. BARS HIM

MOSCOW, July 4—An American Communist who settled in the Soviet Union 17 years ago said today that the Soviet authorities had given him permission to go home but that the United States Government had blocked his return.

Dean Hoxsley, who is 47 years old, reported that the consular office of the American Embassy here had notified him by letter that his request to be recognized as an American citizen had been rejected because he accepted a Soviet passport in 1957, thus surrendering his American citizenship.

He said that his application to visit the United States as an alien had also been refused because he had been a member of the American Communist party and because he did not intend to return to the Soviet Union.

But American consular officials have invited him to the embassy tomorrow for a further discussion of his case, Mr. Roxsey said.

Far East

WASHINGTON POST
30 June 1974

Food for Peace—Is It Really for War?

Cambodia Seen Shifting Funds

By Philip A. McCombs
Washington Post Foreign Service

PHNOM PENH — Congressional efforts to prevent military use of funds generated by the Food for Peace program apparently are being frustrated by some ingenious bookkeeping in Cambodia and South Vietnam.

Food for Peace is the American assistance program which for years has shipped massive amounts of foodstuffs to countries around the world including millions of dollars in goods yearly to Cambodia and Vietnam.

The proceeds from the sale of this food has consistently been used to support the war effort in both countries and it is this practice which Congress set out to stop with legislation last year.

Despite the legislation, however, it appears the Cambodian government may be able to circumvent the intent of Congress by simply allowing the funds to pile up unused in a bank account and then printing an equal amount of new money to pay soldiers.

In Saigon, it also appears possible that funds generated by the program could be channeled into other non-military areas of the economy, freeing up equal amounts of money for military use and thus again frustrating Congress' efforts at control.

In the 1974 fiscal year ending today, $182 million in Peace commodities were shipped to Cambodia and $268 million to South Vietnam. In each country, the food was sold for local currency.

Much of this currency was then given by the United States to the government of Cambodia and South Vietman to pay soldiers' salaries and other military costs.

It was this type of practice which many congresmen considered to be hidden and uncontrolled war spending by the administration and which led to legislation this past December to bring it to a halt.

The Congressional ban prohibits any military use of funds generated by the Food for Peace program "unless such [use] is specifically authorized by legislation." The ban goes into effect today.

Previously grants were made by the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) as an administrative matter and required no specific Congressional authorization.

A Senate Foreign Relations Committee report on the Senate version of the December legislation said, "It will keep Congress and the American people better informed about this particular aspect of the foreign ad program."

The legislation will, the report said, "enable Congress to approve, disapprove, or amend agreements" for any future possible military use of funds generated by the Food for Peace program.

"In a larger context," the report said, "this (legislation) is simply another step forward in the committee's efforts to help Congress redress the imbalance between the executive and legislative branches in the field of foreign policy."

Aid officials here and in Saigon conceded that it was possible for them to appear before Congress to request "specific authorization" to use Food for Peace-generated funds for military purposes as contemplated in the December legislation.

However, they said this was not likely to happen because such appearances would impose an unbearable administrative burden on them.

"It's scary—just the time that would be involved in bringing the U.S Congress into day-to-day decisions."

Thomas F. Olmsted, AID director here, also said it is unlikely that AID officials will go back to Congress with specific requests.

However, both Olmsted and Yaeger said they are planning trips to Washington in the near future to consult with higher AID officials who will make the final decisions on this and other problems raised by the December legislation.

In addition, the officials will discuss other legislation now under consideration in Congress that would impose strict new limits on Food for Peace spending in any one country and thus bring to an abrupt end the massive programs in Indochina.

Passage of such legislation presumably would end the possibility of bookkeeping changes being used to circumvent the December legislation —at least on the large scale that now seems possible.

In the case of Cambodia, where the Food for Peace program plays a far more important role in the tiny, staggering wartime economy than it does in Vietnam, the administration presumably would have to launch an immediate appeal to Congress for additional AID funds to keep the entire American effort here from collapsing.

With respect to the December legislation, both Olmsted and Yaeger emphasized that no Food for Peace-generated funds will be channeled to military uses after the June 30 mandatory cutoff.

They both said that the ultimate use of the funds will be strictly legal and in no way designed to frustrate the objectives of Congress.

He said that Food for Peace funds can only be grauted to the government to the extent that there is a designated use for them under the provisions of Public Law 480.

The money can no longer go for military purposes, he said, and the other uses under the law, which include things like funds for painting the U.S. Embassy or acquiring books for the Library of Congress, are not sufficient to use the vast amounts of money involved.

Therefore, said Olmsted, under the law the funds revert to an entirely different status.

Instead of belonging to the U.S. government, he said, they will now automatically belong to the Cambodian government, but in the form of a soft loan that must be repaid in dollars in 40 years.

The payments must begin after 10 years, said Olmsted, with interest of 2 per cent during the next 10 years and 3 per cent after that.

Olmsted said that Cambodian officials were "shocked" when they learned that the effect of the December legislation was to halt the free grants of funds that they had been receiving and to substitute for them obligations that must eventually be repaid in dollars.

He said the officials were further shocked when they learned that roughly $110 million that has built up unused so far in their Food for Peace account will, instead of being granted to them free, also become a dollar obligation. There has not been such a buildup in Vietnam.

Olmsted said neither he nor the Cambodian officials have any idea how these debts—beginning with the healthy interest payment that comes due next year—can ever be repaid to the United States.

He also said the change in status will place enormous pressure on the government to raise the price of rice because under the previous grant system, the government heavily subsidized rice.

Although the Food for Peace funds will now belong to the Cambodian government, Olmsted said, they still cannot be used directly for military purposes under Public Law 480 and the administrative procedures of AID.

AID procedures require that the funds be used for economic development projects approved by AID, he said.

However, he added, Cambodia is in such a state of economic distress and general turmoil that there are no conceivable projects that could qualify.

Olmsted said the money will simply build up in the national bank and not be used.

On the other hand, the government can then turn around and print an equal amount of money that can be used to pay soldiers just as the Food for Peace funds have been used in the past, Olmsted said.

This can be done without generating the massive inflation that usually results when a government prints money, he said. Cambodia already suffers from tremendous inflation.

Olmsted said that, in real economic terms, when the United States sends large quantities of rice and other foodstuffs to a county like Cambodia hovering on the edge of bankruptcy and military disaster, this aid is, in fact, military aid no matter what one calls it.

Cambodia's domestically generated government revenues from taxes in fiscal 1974 amounted to $54 million—not nearly enough to cover its $109 million military and $60 million civilian budgets.

The $115 million difference was made up roughly by $50 million in Food for Peace funds, $50 million in local funds generated by the Commercial Import Program, and $15 million in deficit financing.

The Commercial Import Program, which works like the Food for Peace program except that it involves commodities other than food, is author-

ized under the Foreign Assistance Act and has not been as strongly criticized as the Food for Peace program as a hiding place for military aid.

The Cambodian military budget goes mostly for pay and benefits. U.S. military assistance to Cambodia is not included in this budget figure.

Under the old Food for Peace system, Olmsted's office maintained strict control over the military uses to which the granted funds were put.

For example, he said, AID was able to get the Cambodians to institute a computerized pay system in the army that substantially reduced the number of "ghost" soldiers—troops that did not exist but whose officers received their pay.

Under the new system, Olmsted said this control will be lessened.

In Saigon, Yaeger said that the December legislation will also mean a change in status in the Food for Peace program that will probably impose a similar 40-year soft loan on the government.

However, he said, government officials were very disturbed when they learned of the change and it is not yet clear if they will continue to accept Food for Peace under the condition that they must pay for it in dollars.

WASHINGTON POST
30 June 1974

Indochina Food Aid Program Under Fire on Hill

By Dan Morgan
Washington Post Staff Writer

"These decisions are made downtown by a faceless group, an interagency body, it is called, and it is made up of representatives from OMB, Treasury, AID, National Security, National Defense and Agriculture . . . What it amounts to is a $435-million slush fund."

With those words on the House floor June 21, Rep. James P. Johnson (R-Colo.) opened a congressional drive to force a drastic shake-up of the administration's food aid program—for years the least questioned form of foreign assistance.

A Johnson amendment which the House passed on a 61-to-51 vote would prevent the administration from allocating more than 10 per cent of the appropriated funds to any single country. The effect would be to put a $42.5 million 1974 ceiling on farm commodities transferred to South Vietnam and Cambodia under concessional loans.

Advocates of a radical reordering of food aid priorities charge that the administration has systematically used the 20-year-old Public Law 480 to circumvent congressional limits on military and economic aid to Indochina. In the fiscal year just ending, nearly half of all food aid loans were allocated to South Vietnam and Cambodia.

Johnson's amendment, attached to the administration's agricultural spending bill, is now before a Senate Appropriations subcommittee which is reported fairly evenly divided on the issue.

Senate sources said that Sen. George McGovern (D-S.D.), backed by a number of Senate liberals and some Republicans, would make a floor fight for the food aid restrictions if the amendment is deleted in the subcommittee.

"The issue here is the prostitution of the American Food for Peace program," said a Senate source last week.

"Something has got to be done about food aid," an administration official asserted.

Congressional battle lines are drawn between security-minded supporters of the Nixon doctrine of giving aid priority to U.S. military clients, and "doves" who feel the many-faceted aid to Saigon is only delaying an eventual political accommodation between the regime and the Communists.

However, officials who have followed the evolution of the Food for Peace program over the years say broader principles are involved.

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger has called for a world food conference to be held in Rome in November. The plight of hungry nations, and the response of wealthy countries to it, is high on the agenda.

In the background are rivalries involving half a dozen government agencies, which have differed in the past two years over the allocation of the United States' limited food aid resources.

These rivalries have sometimes pitted representatives of Kissinger against those of Agriculture Secretary Earl L. Butz, with Butz often emerging the loser.

Sources said that in the interagency board that allocates food resources, Kissinger's aides on the National Security Council consistently pressed for massive shipments to Indochina—the so-called "supporting assistance."

Butz argued for giving the priority to countries such as Indonesia and South Korea because of their potential as future commercial markets.

In this debate, pleas for a bigger share for some 90 other poor countries that received little or no food aid have gone mainly unheeded.

In the House floor discussion last week, Rep. James D. Symington (D-Mo.), asked: "Why should 1 per cent of the world's population, the peoples of Cambodia and South Vietnam, receive nearly half of the scarce funds available under Title I? It does not seem proper, yet it happened in 1974, to our surprise and dismay."

Public Law 480, which established the food aid programs of the 1950s and 1960s, was set up to make use of surplus U.S. food production, develop overseas markets, combat hunger and "promote in other ways the foreign policy of the United States."

Some critics claim that the latter has increasingly become the central rationale for American food largesse, with less and less emphasis given to humanitarian considerations or feeding the world's hungry.

The United States halted food aid loans to India after that country's war with Pakistan in 1971, and plans to resume such loans to Chile in the coming fiscal year, in the aftermath of the ouster of the Marxist regime of the late Salvador Allende. The Agency for International Development estimates that $35 million out of the total $50 million food assistance loans to South America will be allocated to Chile. Food aid loans are at an average 2.2 per cent interest for a period averaging 33 years.

A report issued by the General Accounting Office this year stopped just short of calling a 1971 American pledge to increase by $275 million food aid commitments to South Korea a political quid pro quo for Seoul's agreement to limit textile exports to the United States.

Subsequently, however, the United States sharply reduced its food aid to Korea. The United States responded to Korean complaints by saying the commodities were not available. But some congressional officials assert that the reason was the heavy diversion of food products to South Vietnam.

In the coming fiscal year, however, food loan shipments to the Seoul regime will be increased from $10 million to an estimated $150 million AID says.

The administration predicts a slight overall decline in the value of food aid shipments in the coming year: $891.7 million compared with this year's $1.013 billion.

It wants Congress to appropriate $425 million in new money for the program of concessional sales of farm commodities, called Title I, and $353.2 million for the food giveaway program, called Title II.

According to AID, South Vietnam and Cambodia received just under half the world total of food aid in the fiscal year just ending.

In defense of this preponderance, officials say: "All the rice was eaten." They also assert that last year, because of quadrupled U.S. rice prices, only 600,000 tons, rather than the 1 million tons sent in fiscal year 1973, was shipped to Indochina.

Congressional critics retort that the aid was nothing but a thinly disguised budgetary subsidy for Saigon's war economy.

Administration officials have conceeded that much of the proceeds from the Saigon government's sale of Public Law 480 food on the local economy went to military or defense purposes, with U.S. approval.

Rep. Joseph P. Addabbo (D-N.Y.) charged on the House floor:

"These funds all were used, or could be used, under aid for common defense, so as we cut the military aid they came in through the back door with Public Law 480 aid and reversed the fandate of Congress."

Under the 1973 Foreign Assistance Act, proceeds from the sale of the PL-480 commodities cannot be used for military purposes after July 1, unless specifically authorized by Congress.

However, some ambiguity apparently remained as recently as Jan. 21, when South Vietnamese Foreign Minister Vuong Van Bac signed a $55.2 million agreement for the delivery of rice, soybean, corn and peanut seeds under Public Law 480. In that, it was stated that the government of Vietnam understood that the foreign aid act restriction [illegible] the effect of prohibiting the use of for-

eign currencies for common defense purposes. U.S. officials said last week that ambiguities have been cleared up.

AID Director Daniel Parker told a Senate Agriculture Committee panel in April: "Unequivocally . . . we are not going to continue to use these funds for defense budgets."

Rep. Johnson's amendment providing country ceilings on future food aid shipments was opposed by Rep. Jamie L. Whitten (D-Miss.), chairman of the Agriculture Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee, and by Rep. Otto Passman (DLa.). Both are from rice-growing states.

Passman's home state is the country's leading rice producer. The domestic market uses only 35 to 40 per cent of the rice produced in the United States. The rest is exported, much of it to Asia.

The rice industry has been a major beneficiary of the Public Law 480 program, which has accounted for about half of all U.S. rice exports in recent years. Rice is not consumed in many poor parts of the world. Therefore, the Asian food aid program, rice industry officials say, is important.

"This (congressional amendment) will definitely be a blow, if it meant losing that export market," said J. P. Gaines, executive president of the Rice Millers Association.

Public Law 480 still enjoys a broad following among farmers and their representatives on Capitol Hill. Although world food demand outstripped supply last year, some farmers feel that bumper U.S. corn and wheat crops this year could reverse the trend. Therefore, Public Law 480 is seen as the best guarantee that the government will still be around to help move surpluses abroad, if foreign demand slackens.

The food aid debate marks a questioning of the allocation procedure, rather than the program itself. Critics point out that only $4.1 million in food give-aways is currenly planned for the drought-stricken Sahel region in Africa—one-fortieth of the South Vietnam estimate.

House and Senate critics claim that the food aid appropriations, as handled in the past, give the administration a blank check.

The interagency board which decides how the funds are spent can shift the allocations from one country to another without congressional approval. It also has at its disposal some $300 million in annual loan repayments.

There are other loopholes as well, Johnson and others maintain.

"If they're determined to keep the aid to South Vietnam at the present high level, they can do it one way or another," said one official. "The question is how long they are prepared to hold the whole program hostage to Vietnam."

WASHINGTON POST
Sunday, June 30, 1974

Covert Unit Disclosed to Australians

Manchester Guardian

CANBERRA — Liberal former Prime Minister William McMahon has revealed the cryptic title of a top-secret security organization, MO-9, previously unknown to Australians.

McMahon referred to the organization three times during a television interview but refused to discuss its operations.

The revelation seems certain to escalate the ruling Labor Party's growing demands for a full examination of security and intelligence operations. It was only 18 months ago that the existence of ASIS, the Australian Secret Intelligence Service, came to light.

The right-wing news magazine, the Bulletin, recently published a long report on a 1971 security assessment of Jim Cairns, the deputy prime minister, from the files of ASIO, the Australian Security Intelligence Organization.

The fourth known member of the security family is JIO, the Joint Intelligence Organization within the defense department, deals in strategic assessments and information. ASIO is supposed to be limited to domestic intelligence connected with possible subversive activity.

The government refuses to talk about ASIS, but it appears to be primarily and perhaps solely concerned with gathering intelligence overseas. It's existence became known when the precipitate withdrawal of Australian troops from Singapore last year uncovered a secret signals unit whose job was to monitor military and diplomatic radio traffic in the region for JIO and ASIS assessment.

There is a marked reluctance among officials even to confirm the existence of MO-9. But it, too, maintains a network of operatives outside Australia, according to the little information available.

It is said to deal in "purely factual" information about any country in which Australia has an interest. MO-9 agents are briefed to gather industrial, political and some military intelligence as the basis for long-term assessments, but not to attempt to influence events.

Prime Minister Gough Whitlam already has instituted an inquiry into ASIO to be conducted by a Supreme Court judge. This was started late last year. There are now suggestions that the inquiry be widened to cover the entire intelligence establishment.

The dossier on Deputy Prime Minister Cairns leaked to the press was prepared during McMahon's term, but he disclaimed any knowledge of it.

"If I had known that the activities of a member of Parliament were under scrutiny by ASIO I would have immediately taken action to see that it stopped, and that what records there were, were destroyed," he said.

Liberal Party Sen. Ivor Greenwood, who was attorney general at the time was responsible for ASIO, has also disclaimed knowledge of the file but defended it as a legitimate activity of the organization.

THE GUARDIAN, MANCHESTER
26 June 1974

Cambodia's rotten frui

Prince Sihanouk once boasted that he had only to wait until Phnom Penh fell to him like an overripe fruit. By most standards, the government of Marshal Lon Nol and the area under his control have gone rotten on the branch. But even without the support of American bombing, it steadfastly refuses to drop. The capacity of this lame government for hanging on has often been underestimated. With the dry season coming to an end, it looks as if the weather will contribute to extending its life.

Lon Nol is in trouble from many directions. His Prime Minister, Long Boret, who has proved no more competent than his predecessors, formed his most recent cabinet against a background of inter-party bickering. His previous government had been brought down by student demonstrations which culminated at the beginning of this month in the murder of the Minister of Education. Their complaints — against a cost of living rising at the rate of 300 per cent a year, against the draft, and against corruption in government — are shared by many. But although the population is demoralised and overcrowded in the capital and the republican spirit of 1970 has evaporated, its patience is not at an end. The military situation is poor, with the main roads from the capital to the ports and agricultural areas cut off.

The anti-Lon Nol forces, the Khmer Rouge, have their problems. They have shown some indecision in changing their tactics from an assault on Phnom Penh to an assault on provincial capitals. Prince Sihanouk appears to be losing political support from Peking and Hanoi to the Deputy Prime Minister, Khieu Samphan. A vital factor in the longevity of Lon Nol's regime is the US economic support, running at £240 millions a year. Both sides are in fact victims of Cambodia's long-standing tragedy of being everyone's puppet. North Vietnam's priority is success in South Vietnam. Both China and the US appear to be keeping their clients armed and equipped up to a certain level. This produces an indecisive situation in which both sides grind on without either looking likely for some time either to gain victory or to suffer defeat.